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 In an East and West debate on human rights, scholars from different cultures 
disagree on whether all civil and political rights are human rights. While they 
generally agree that basic civil rights such as rights against torture and slavery (i.e., 
physical security rights) are human rights, some of them argue that traditional 
political rights in the West such as freedom of speech and political participation (i.e., 
liberal rights) are not human rights. Some scholars, such as Daniel A. Bell, argue that 
liberal rights are not human rights because liberal rights conflict with some East 
Asian cultures.  
In this dissertation, I argue that both physical security rights and liberal rights 
are human rights, and explain the relationship between these rights and East Asian 
cultures. First, I argue that if liberal rights are not human rights becaus they conflict 
with some East Asian cultures, then physical security rights are also not human rights 
because physical security rights also conflict with some East Asian cultures.  
  
Next, I discuss the idea from Daniel Bell and Michael Walzer that physical 
security rights are human rights because they are minimal values. Based on their idea, 
I explain what minimal values are, and why it is possible to develop some maximal 
theories of physical security rights in East Asian cultures. I argue that since physical 
security rights are minimal values, they are still human rights even they conflict with 
some East Asian cultures.  
I then argue that liberal rights, similar to physical security rights, are also 
minimal values, and it is possible to develop some maximal theories of them in East 
Asian cultures. Therefore, similar to physical security rights, liberal rights are also 
human rights even they also conflict with some East Asian cultures.  
 I also discuss other human rights debates, especially the debates between 
Daniel Bell and other philosophers. Charles Taylor argues for an overlapping 
consensus approach on human rights; Jack Donnelly argues for a Western liberalist 
approach on human rights. I explain the relationship between these approaches and 
my arguments, and how my arguments can help them to reply to the challenges from 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There are different human rights debates between the East and the West. One 
of these debates is about the list of human rights. Scholars from different cultures 
disagree on which rights are human rights and which rights are not human rights. 
Some scholars, such as Daniel A. Bell, emphasize the importance of East Asian 
cultures, and try to limit the list of human rights for East Asian cultures. In this 
chapter, I briefly introduce such a human rights debate, and then I describe the aimof 
my project and outline what I am going to argue in this dissertation.  
First of all, I want to identify what is meant by “the East” and “the West.” 
According to Daniel Bell, “‘East Asia’ refers to countries in the East Asian region 
that have been subject to prolonged Chinese cultural influence and that have 
demonstrated economic prowess in the post-World War II era: mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Singapore is also included because it is 
predominantly Chinese, though it is located in the Southeast Asian region” (2006a, 
p.6n13). He also mentions some other countries in the Southeast Asian region, such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. In general, the “East Asian 
cultures and regions” he focuses on are countries and regions affected by Chinese
culture (especially Confucianism) in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This 
definition is also shared by other political philosophers and politicians.1 In this 
dissertation, I also assume that “the East” refers to these regions.  
                                                
1 For example, Langlois (2001) and Wan (2008) also share a similar definition of East Asia or the East. 
The only exception is that Bell himself explicitly excludes Vietnam because of its “relatively 




Similar to “the East,” “the West” also refers to many different regions, such as 
Western Europe (including United Kingdom), United States, etc. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, I will focus on the Anglo-American cultural contexts (especially 
liberalism). In a word, I simply assume that the East is China and other countries i  
East Asia, while the West is America and other countries in Western Europe. Later 
we shall also see that Chinese culture (especially Confucianism) is the East Asian 
cultural context that we need to discuss, and Anglo-American culture (especially 
liberalism) is the relevant Western cultural context. These definitions of theEast and 
the West are the foundations of the human rights debate that I assume in this 
dissertation.  
The history of East and West debates on human rights can be traced back to 
the end of the nineteenth century, when East Asian began to discuss the concepts of 
rights from the West.2 Since then, there have been many different debates and 
dialogues. The most famous one is the “Asian values debate.” This debate began in 
the early 1990s and lasted until around the economic crisis in East Asia in 1997-1998. 
In the Asian values debate, some politicians and scholars in East Asia argue against 
“Western values” (such as human rights, liberties, democracy, etc.). They argue that 
East Asians should abandon these Western values (especially civil and political 
rights) because these values undermine the values and cultures in East Asia. For 
example, Lee Kuan Yew,3 a former prime minister and now a political elder of 
                                                                                                                                          
usually include Vietnam in East Asia. Nevertheless, we shall only focus on regions affected by 
Chinese culture (especially Confucianism). Therefore, we may simply ignore such an exception.  
2 For further detail, see An-na’im (1995), Angle & Svensson (2002), and Svensson (2002).  
3 In this dissertation, I mainly use the pinyin system to translate names and terms from Chinese to 
English. But there are some exceptions. Some Chinese ames and terms are already translated by other 




Singapore, claims that “Asian values” are culturally unique and some Western values
should not be considered as rights for East Asians.4 Lee’s view is also shared by some 
politicians in East Asia, such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, a former prime minister of 
Malaysia.5 Their views are also adopted in “the Bangkok Declaration”—this 
declaration emphasizes the cultural and socio-economical differences between the 
East and the West, and it undermines the notion of universal human rights.6 In a 
word, the Asian values debate aims at showing us how some Western values, such as 
human rights (especially civil and political rights), conflict with Asian values.7  
  In addition to the Asian values debate, there are also many other human rights 
debates between the East and the West. Another famous debate is the long dispute 
between the Chinese government and the American government, in which the 
American government has continuously accused the Chinese government of violating 
human rights. The Chinese government has responded to these challenges in a series 
of white papers (e.g., China, 1991, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2009). A core idea in these 
white papers is that China has its own cultural background, and so China has a 
different standard of human rights and other “Western values.” For example, in 1991, 
                                                                                                                                          
Yew”). For these names and terms, I keep the well-known translations instead of using the pinyin 
translation. In addition, some references I use in this dissertation do not use the pinyin system (most of 
them use the Wade-Giles system). For the purpose of citation and reference, I also do not re-translate 
these names and terms (especially the names of the au ors) by the pinyin system. At the end of this 
dissertation, I provide a Chinese glossary to list the traditional Chinese characters and the English 
translation of these names and terms.   
4 For the detail of Lee’s view, see Gardels (1992) and Zakaria (1994).  
5 However, some East Asian politicians disagree withLee. For example, Kim Dae Jung, the president 
of South Korea in 1998-2003, disagrees with Lee (seKim, 1994).  
6 See Davis (1995), pp. 205-209 for the full text of he Bangkok Declaration 
7 For further discussions on the Asian values debate, se  Avonius & Kingsbury (2008), Dallmayr 





the Chinese government published a white paper called Human Rights in China. The 
preface of this white paper says, “Despite its international aspect, the issue of human 
rights falls by and large within the sovereignty of each country. Therefore, a country's 
human rights situation should not be judged in total disregard of its history and 
national conditions, nor can it be evaluated according to a preconceived model or the 
conditions of another country or region…From their own historical conditions, the 
realities of their own country and their long practical experience, the Chinese people 
have derived their own viewpoints on the human rights issue and formulated relevant 
laws and policies.” In a word, these white papers argue for a view that China does not 
strictly follow the Western values and standards because China has its own cultural
conditions.  
 Although the Asian values debate and other political debates in East Asia do 
not aim at constructing any profound philosophical argument, these debates have 
stimulated many prominent political theorists and philosophers to think about the 
cultural differences between the East and the West. One of these philosophers is 
Daniel Bell.8 In general, Bell thinks that the Asian values debate itself “generated 
more heat than light” (Bell, 2006a, p. 52), but he also argues that “it would be a 
mistake to assume that nothing of theoretical significance has emerged from East 
Asia. The debate on Asian values has also prompted critical intellectuals in the region 
to reflect on how they can locate themselves in a debate on human rights and 
                                                
8 Other philosophers who also discuss human rights and East Asian cultures include Roger Ames, 
Stephen Angle, Joseph Chan, Ci Jiwei, Wm. Theodore e Bary, Li Xiaorong, Liu Shu-Hsien, Henry 
Rosemont Jr., Shun Kwong-Loi, Tu Weiming, David Wong, and many others. They hold different 
views on the relationship between human rights and East Asian cultures. I mainly focus on the 
arguments from Daniel Bell, but in the following chapters I shall also discuss arguments from some of 




democracy in which they had not previously played a substantial part” (Bell, 2006b, 
p. 266). He believes that “we need to identify areas of commonality and justifiable 
difference. Regrettably, though, there is a dearth of constructive dialogue between the 
East and the West” (Bell, 1998a, p. 14). His aim is “to get beyond the rhetoric that 
has dogged the human rights debate and identify relatively persuasive East Asian 
criticisms of traditional Western approaches to human rights” (2006a, p. 53). He 
concludes that if human rights and other Western values “also need to be adapt d in 
China,” then these values “need to be enriched, and sometimes constrained, by 
Confucian values” (Bell, 2008, p. xvi. His italics). In other words, if human rights and 
other Western values “are to take root and produce beneficial outcomes in East Asia, 
they must be adjusted to contemporary East Asian political and economic realities 
and to the values of non-liberal East Asian political traditions such as Confucianism 
and Legalism” (2006a, p. 9).  
 Bell’s idea is very persuasive and interesting. Indeed, he has argued over the 
cultural differences between the East and the West on many topics. For example, he 
argues that the East and the West have many cultural differences on democracy and 
capitalism (e.g., Bell, 2000, pp. 286-289; 2006a, pp.152-179, 231-280). For the 
purpose of this dissertation, I will focus on the part of his view on human rights, 
which is about the cultural differences on the list of human rights between the East 
and the West.  
 Bell’s view on regarding the list of human rights can be called “the East Asian
challenge to human rights.” This is the title of one of his articles (Bell, 1996), and this 




arguments focus on which rights are to be included in a list of human rights and 
which rights are not. Bell argues that physical security rights (e.g., rights against 
torture, rights against slavery, rights against genocide) are human rights, but liberal 
rights (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of political participation) are not human 
rights.9 He considers that liberal rights are not human rights because they are 
culturally determined as Western rights but not East Asian rights. They are not East 
Asian rights because they conflict with East Asian cultures. In short, he argu s that 
East Asian cultures can affect the justification of rights, and this leads to the
conclusion that only physical security rights are human rights, while liberal rights are 




(1) Human rights are universal rights.  
(2) Universal rights are accepted in all major cultures in the world.   
(3) Physical security rights are accepted in all major cultures in the world. 
(4) Physical security rights are universal rights. (from 2 and 3) 
(5) Liberal rights are not accepted in East Asian cultures.  
(6) Liberal rights are not accepted in all major cultures in the world. (from 5) 
(7) Liberal rights are not universal rights. (from 2 and 6) 
                                                
9 Bell also discusses whether East Asian cultures can extend the list of human rights (e.g. Bell, 2000, 
pp. 95-103; 2006a, pp. 76-78). For example, Bell discusses some economics and social rights that are 
not in the list of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (e.g. “rights to elderly parents”), but he 
thinks that these rights are also East Asian rights or even universal rights (e.g. Bell, 2006a, pp. 76-78. 
See also Chan, 1999.) However, this dissertation only aims at civil and political rights, and so I skip 




(8) (Therefore) physical security rights are human rights, but liberal rights are not 
human rights. (from 1, 4 and 7) 
 
This is a valid argument. Statements (4), (6) to (8) are all derived from the 
previous statements. Statement (1) is a definition that I shall discuss further in chapter 
2, but this definition is not controversial.  The real controversial statements ar (2), 
(3) and (5). If they are all true, then the argument will be a sound argument. But these 
premises are ambiguous and vague. What does it mean that a right is accepted in a 
culture? And why are cultures so important to rights? In the following chapters, I 
shall explain everything in depth.  
Let me outline what I am going to discuss in the other chapters of this 
dissertation. I shall introduce in chapter 2 what “the East Asian challenge to human 
rights” is and discuss how Bell and others argue for a philosophical account of “the 
cultural justification of rights.” I shall show how Confucianism is the relevant East 
Asian cultural context for the human rights debate, and why Bell concludes that 
physical security rights are human rights, but liberal rights are not human rights. I 
shall show how Bell’s arguments are different from some classical challenges to 
human rights, and why his arguments are comparatively more promising than other 
challenges to human rights. I shall also discuss the problems and explanatory gaps in 
his arguments. 
 I shall develop my own arguments in chapter 3 and 4. In chapter 3, I shall 
discuss physical security rights and East Asian cultures. Bell argues that physical 




(Walzer, 1994), but both Bell and Walzer have not explained his idea clearly. I shall 
discuss different notions of the minimal and universal moral code in depth. Moreover, 
some people believe that human rights are based on dignity or humanity. I shall 
develop my own arguments based on these notions (minimal, dignity, etc.), and my 
arguments aim at showing why physical security rights are East Asian rights and 
human rights.  
 In chapter 4, I shall discuss liberal rights and East Asian cultures. Bell claims 
that liberal rights are not East Asian rights (and hence not human rights) because 
liberties conflict with some East Asian cultural factors. I shall develop my own 
arguments to explain why liberal rights are also East Asian rights and human rights. I 
shall argue why liberties are essential necessities of dignity, and I shall discuss the 
relationship between liberties and Confucianism. I shall also show why my arguments 
for physical security rights and liberal rights can refute Bell’s Eat Asian challenge to 
human rights. 
 In chapter 5 I shall discuss some applications of my arguments in referenc to 
debates between Bell and other philosophers. I shall discuss the debate between Bell 
and Charles Taylor (Taylor, 1999) and the debate between Bell and Jack Donnelly 
(e.g., Donnelly, 1999, 2003).  Bell argues that the approaches from Taylor and 
Donnelly are problematic and mistaken. I shall argue that Bell has successfully 
challenged the approaches from Taylor and Donnelly, but it does not mean that Bell 
has refuted all of their conclusions as well. I shall argue that my arguments can save 




can do, and explain how my arguments can contribute to the East and West debate on 
human rights in general. 
 I shall conclude my project in chapter 6. I shall conclude that the arguments 
from Bell (and many others who concur with Bell) cannot successfully explain why 
physical security rights are human rights but liberal rights are not human rights. The 
main purpose of this project is not only to refute Bell’s arguments but also to develop 
my own arguments to solve problems in this East and West debate on human rights. 
Without neglecting the importance of East Asian cultures, I conclude that both 
physical security rights and liberal rights are human rights. Lastly, I shall also discuss 












Chapter 2: The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights 
 
Section 2.1 Introduction 
 In the East and West debate on human rights, some scholars, such as Daniel 
A. Bell, aim to limit the list of human rights for the East Asian cultural contexts. Such 
a view can be called “the East Asian challenge to human rights.” Bell’s conclusion is 
that physical security rights are human rights but liberal rights are not human rights.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a literature review to “the East Asian challenge 
to human rights.” In this chapter, I discuss the arguments from Bell and others in 
depth. I also discuss some problems and explanatory gaps of their arguments.  
 In section 2.2, I discuss the relationship among human rights, universal rights, 
Western rights, and East Asian rights. I explain why the discussion of East Asi n 
rights is the core part of the East and West debate on human rights. The aim of this 
section is to discuss some background information and set up a framework for the 
discussions in other sections. In section 2.3, I explain how Bell and others argue that 
“cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” (e.g. Bell, 2004, pp. 29). In 
other words, I discuss a philosophical account for the “cultural justification of rights.” 
In section 2.4, I discuss some cultural contexts that are relevant to the East and West 
debate on human rights. Particularly, I discuss what Bell terms “Western lib alism” 
and “values in Asia” in Confucianism.  
In section 2.5, I use the contents of the previous sections to explain how Bell 




rights. In section 2.6, I also discuss some advantages and disadvantages of Bell’s 
arguments. In section 2.7, I summarize all the points in this chapter. In general, this 
chapter will tell us why we need detailed research on the East and West debate on 
human rights.  
 
 
Section 2.2 Human Rights, Universal Rights, Western Rights, and East Asian Rights 
  As I said in chapter 1, Bell’s view can be called “the East Asian challenge to 
human rights.” Roughly, his view isabout the list of human rights, i.e., which rights 
are human rights? Bell argues that physical security rights are human rights, but civil 
and political liberal rights (i.e., liberal rights) are not human rights. Liberal rights are 
not human rights because they are not universal rights; they are only Western rights 
but not East Asian rights. I shall elaborate and evaluate Bell’s view in detail. But 
before I discuss his view, I need to clarify the notions of human rights, universal 
rights, Western rights, and East Asian rights clearly.  
 To begin with, let me quote some words from Jack Donnelly and Daniel Bell. 
Donnelly is one of the Western philosophers of human rights that Bell always 
discusses in his writings.10 According to Donnelly, “[t]o claim that there are human 
rights is to claim that all human beings, simply because they are human, have rights 
in this sense. Such rights are universal, held by all human beings. They are equal: One 
is or is not human, and thus has or does not have (the same) human rights, equally” 
(Donnelly, 1999, p. 61). Donnelly (2003) also explains that human rights are 
                                                




universal rights in this sense: “human rights are, literally, the rights that one has 
simply because one is a human being…they are universal rights, in the sense that 
today we consider all members of the species Homo sapiens ‘human beings,’ and thus 
holders of human rights” (p. 10. Donnelly’s italics)   
Bell tends to agree with the above passages from Donnelly (e.g. Bell, 2000, p. 
50; 2006a, p. 62). But Bell also has his own and unique idea of human rights. For 
example, he describes human rights as follows: 
 
Human rights are held by individuals. They protect individuals against the 
actions of other individuals and/or collectivities (including political and 
economic organizations). They are egalitarian because they are held equally
by all individuals. They are universal because they apply in all cultural 
contexts. Finally, human rights are fundamental, meaning that they override 
other political goods in cases of conflict (barring exceptional circumstances). 
Most people, I suspect, can endorse this definition of universal human 
rights…The controversial part, however, is to specify the content of universal 
human rights. Which rights are fundamental, universally valid human rights, 
and which ones are locally valid, ‘peripheral’ rights? (Bell, 1999, p. 849)  
 
Both Donnelly and Bell agree that if X is a human right, then X is also a 
universal right. Although human rights may be something more than universal rights 
(e.g., human rights may also be equal or inalienable rights), I only focus on universal 




here, and I assume in this dissertation that universal rights and human rights are just 
the same.  
What are universal rights? Universal rights are, obviously, rights. But the 
rights with which we are concerned here are moral rights.  In other words, we focus 
on whether some moral rights are universal rights. Legal rights are not the main 
concern here. In the East and West debate on human rights, people argue that some 
moral rights (such as civil and political rights) are or are not u iversal rights, but it 
does not matter whether these rights are also legal rights.11 Therefore, in this 
dissertation, I assume that most of our discussions are limited to moral rights; I 
explicitly say so if legal rights are involved in some parts of the debate.   
Who are the holders of universal rights and who are responsible for these 
rights (i.e., the subjects and objects of universal rights)? Bell realizes that “human 
rights are held by individuals.” Human (universal) rights pertain to those who are 
right-holders. Therefore, we may also assume that all right-holders of universal rights 
are individuals. It also seems that the word “universal” in universal rights directly 
refers to all individuals (human beings or human persons). In other words, universal 
rights are rights that are held by all (human) individuals (i.e., pertain to all human 
individuals).  
This is controversial. One may ask further whether human rights are rights for 
all human beings or only for all human persons. One may also ask whether all human 
beings include human beings at all times, including the past, present and future. 
Another controversy is that some human rights are considered held by collectivities 
                                                
11 Indeed, it seems that most countries in East Asia have written civil and political rights in their 
constitutions and legal systems. However, their governments frequently ignore, disrespect, and violate 




rather than individuals. The universal quantifier (i.e., all) is also controversial. It is 
doubtful whether universal rights are really held by virtually  human individuals. 
Some scholars even restrict the domain of this universal quantifier. For example, 
Talbott restricts the holders of universal rights as “all adult human beings who reach a 
minimum level of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning” (Talbott, 2005, 
pp. 6-7). It seems that Bell’s idea here is controversial. However, for the sake of 
argument, we do not need to discuss these controversies in depth. This is because the 
debate mainly focuses on the relationship between East Asian cultural contexts a d 
human rights. The real concern here is whether some rights are rights for (present) 
East Asians. If some rights are not rights for East Asians now, then they definitely are 
not human rights. Therefore, these controversies are not directly relevant to the 
debate. For the purpose of this project, I skip all these controversies and use the term 
“individuals” or “human individuals” without further clarification.  
Bell also thinks that “human rights are held by individuals” and these rights 
“protect individuals against the actions of other individuals and/or collectivities 
(including political and economic organizations)” (Bell, 1999, p. 849). In other 
words, others have correlative duties to the right-holders.12 This correlation between 
rights and duties (or more precisely, moral rights and moral duties) explains what it 
means by saying that a right is held by an individual.  In general, universal rights (and 
human rights) are claim-rights,13 and so there are also correlative duties. That is, if an 
individual holds a right, then others have a correlative duty to the right-holder to have 
                                                
12 In this dissertation, the terms “duty” and “obligation” are interchangeable.  
13 Besides claim-rights, there are privileges-, power-, and immunity-rights. See Hohfeld (1919) and 
Wenar (2010) for detail. I do not mean that universal ights cannot be rights other than claim-rights. 




this right. Since universal rights are held by all individuals, duty-holders have 
correlative duties to all individuals. In summary, universal rights are moral claim 
rights held by all individuals. Both sides of the East and West debate on human rights 
agree with such a notion of universal rights. Although such a notion is not without 
question, it is good enough to serve as an assumption or a common ground in the East 
and West debate on human rights.   
From the above analysis, we know that human rights are universal rights, and 
universal rights are moral claim rights held by all individuals. We may divide human 
rights into some smaller groups. Occasionally, people call these rights “human rights 
for East Asians,” “human rights in the West,” etc., but these expressions are 
confusing. If X is a human right, then how can X only be a human right in the East or 
in the West? Does it mean that there is no human in the rest of the world? To avoid 
such confusion, I suggest that “East Asian rights” and “Western rights” are better 
terms for our discussion here. East Asian rights are moral claim rights held by East 
Asians; Western rights are moral claim rights held by Western people. While
universal rights are held by all human individuals, East Asian rights and Western 
rights are only held by some human individuals (i.e., East Asian and Western 
people).14 This implies that if some rights are not East Asian rights, then these rights 
are not universal rights as well; being a right in East Asia (i.e., East Asian right) is a 
necessary condition for being a right everywhere (i.e., universal right). This is why 
                                                
14 When I say that East Asian rights are rights for East Asian, I focus on people who live in East Asia 
and are influenced by East Asian cultures. Similarly, Western rights are rights for people who live in 
the West and are influenced by Western cultures. There are controversial cases, such as Westerners 
living in East Asia (e.g., Daniel Bell) or East Asian living in the Western world (e.g., Asian-




the debate of East Asian rights is a core part of the East and West debate on human 
rights. 
Although the above notions are not without controversies, they are generally 
accepted in the East and West debate on human rights, and hence they can be 
considered as some assumptions or backgrounds of the debate.15 As I have already 
quoted above, the real controversial part is “to specify the content of universal human
rights. Which rights are fundamental, universally valid human rights, and which ones 
are locally valid, ‘peripheral’ rights?” (Bell, 1999, p. 849). Bell thinks that cultures 
somehow determine which rights are universal and which rights are not. In the next 
sections, I shall discuss his idea in depth.  
 
 
Section 2.3 Can Cultural Factors Affect the Justification of Rights? 
Which rights are universal? Bell thinks that the answer is based on cultural 
contexts.16 Why and how are universal rights relevant to cultural contexts? Bell 
argues that “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” (e.g., Bell 2004, pp. 
29). I discuss Bell’s idea in detail in this section.  
Before discussing Bell’s idea, I want to answer a question first. One may 
wonder whether it is necessary to define culture in this project. Culture is not a well-
defined subject even in empirical research such as anthropology or sociology; there 
                                                
15 It is unclear whether Bell also assumes that human rights are rights that are held by virtue of being 
human or by virtue of humanity. But Bell disagrees with the natural rights or natural law tradition 
because he thinks that it is only a Western tradition. I discuss Bell’s idea on the Western tradition 
further in section 2.4.  
16 “Culture,” “cultural context,” and “cultural factor” are all interchangeable in the writings of Bell and 




are many different and controversial definitions of culture.17 Nevertheless, we do not 
need to define culture in this project. This is because later we will see that only 
Western cultures and East Asian cultures (especially liberalism and Confucianism) 
are important in the debate. One may explain these cultures with specific content a d 
examples. Bell and others also discuss East Asian cultures with specific content and 
examples. I shall discuss Western and East Asian cultures further in the nex sections. 
Hence we do not need to discuss any definition of culture now.  
Instead, we need to focus on the relationship between cultures and rights. Why 
and how are cultures relevant to universal rights? A reasonable assumption is that 
universal rights are held by all human individuals, and hence they are somehow 
related to, or even determined by, the culture of these individuals. East Asian rights 
are only held by East Asians, and so East Asian rights are related to East Asian 
cultures. Bell and others provide a more philosophical explanation here. Bell thinks 
that “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights”. Let me quote a paragraph 
from Bell: 
 
Cultural factors can affect the justification of rights. In line with the 
arguments of ‘1980s communitarians’ such as Michael Walzer, it is argued 
that justifications for particular practices valued by Western-style liberal 
democrats should not be made by relying on the abstract and unhistorical 
                                                
17 For example, Benedict (1934) discusses a classical view of culture in anthropology; Donnelly has 
discussed the similarities and differences between culture and civilization (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 86-88, 
100-103). Li (2006) summarizes different definitions from anthropology and sociology into a 
“textbook definition”: “A culture is an inherited body of informal knowledge embodied in traditions, 
transmitted through social learning in a community, and incorporated in practices” (Li, 2006, p.9). 




universalism that often disables Western liberal democrats. Rather, they 
should be made from the inside, from specific examples and argumentative 
strategies that East Asians themselves use in everyday moral and political 
debate. For example, the moral language (shared even by some local critics of 
authoritarianism) tends to appeal to the value of community in East Asia, and 
this is relevant for social critics concerned with practical effect. One such 
communitarian argument is that democratic rights in Singapore can be 
justified on the grounds that they contribute to strengthening ties to such 
communities as the family and the nation.18 
 
The first statement, “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights,” is the key 
statement here. Generally, to justify something is to show something to be just, right, 
or reasonable. Justification is also generally contextual, that is, it addresses doubts or 
questions relevant to some specific contexts. But there are still many questions about 
this claim. For example, one may ask why Bell and others believe that cultural factors 
are important. One may also ask what justification of rights is relevant to our debate. 
And one may also ask why Bell and others think that cultural factors an affect the 
justification of rights. In the following I explain these topics in detail.  
Why is culture so important? From the passage I quoted above, Bell argues 
that his statement “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” is based on or 
“in line with the arguments of ‘1980s communitarians’ such as Michael Walzer” 
(e.g., Bell, 2009, section 1). I need to clarify what Bell means by “communitaria s” in 
                                                
18 This passage appears in exactly the same wordings in the following references: Bell (2004), pp. 29-
31; Bell (2006b), pp. 267-268; and Bell (2009), section 1 no.2. See also Bell (1996), pp. 660-667; Bell




this quotation. Some philosophers are called “communitarians”; these philosophers 
include Alasdair MacIntyre (1989; 2007), Michael Sandel (1998), Michael Walzer 
(1983, 1994), and others. Indeed, Daniel Bell is also considered as a “communitarian” 
as well. For example, William Kymlicka writes, “the kind of communitarianism 
which has recently come to prominence with the writings of Michael Sandel, Michael 
Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre, Daniel A. Bell, and Charles Taylor is quite diff rent 
from traditional Marxism” (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 209). Bell explicitly declares that he 
belongs to the campaign of “communitarianism” (e.g., Bell 1993, 2009). He even 
once calls his philosophy “Asian Communitarianism” (The title of Bell 1998a). 
However, the term “communitarianism” is also ambiguous and vague. Bell himself 
also realizes that many philosophers deny that they are “communitarians.” For 
example, Bell writes, “These critics of liberal theory never did identify themselves 
with the communitarian movement (the communitarian label was pinned on them by 
others, usually critics)… Both Taylor and Walzer identify themselves as libera s in 
Gutmann 1992. MacIntyre (1991) says ‘In spite of rumors to the contrary, I am not 
and never have been a communitarian’. Sandel (1998) uses the label republican rather 
than communitarian” (Bell, 2009, introduction and footnote 1). Buchanan even 
writes, “There are perhaps almost as many communitarian positions as there are 
communitarian writers” (Buchanan, 1989, p. 852). In a word, it is unclear what 
“communitarianism” is. To avoid confusion, I discuss their arguments directly 
without using the term “communitarianism.”  
Among these philosophers, Bell especially agrees with Walzer. Let me discuss 




culture is important in many moral discourses. As Walzer writes, “We are (all of us) 
culture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds. Since there is 
no way to rank and order these worlds with regard to their understanding of social 
goods, we do justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular 
creations…Justice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, 
things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life. To override those 
understandings is (always) to act unjustly” (Walzer, 1983, p. 314). Generally, these 
philosophers (Walzer and others) emphasize the importance of culture because they 
want to argue against liberalism, especially Rawls’ liberal principles of justice 
(Rawls, 1971). Buchanan clearly summarizes their thoughts in a simple sentence: 
“Liberalism devalues, neglects, and/or undermines community, and community is a 
fundamental and irreplaceable ingredient in the good life for human beings” 
(Buchanan, 1989, p. 852).19 Although Walzer and others aim to challenge 
liberalism,20 their ideas on culture can also apply in other debates, such as in our 
debate on human rights.  
Bell concurs with Walzer and others on the challenges to Rawls’ liberalism.21 
But for the discussion here, the more important point is that Bell also borrows their 
                                                
19 The terms “community” and “culture” can be used interchangeably in this sentence.  
20 For the detail of this liberalism-communitarianism debate, see Delaney (1994) 
21 Here is an example from Bell. He writes, “A critic who tries to push beyond the limits of community 
consciousness cannot generate any politically relevant knowledge…all knowledge is context-bound—
the critic cannot extricate herself from her context so as to be true to principles of rational justification 
independent of any context, even if she tries…once we recognize that our knowledge is context-bound, 
that there is no ‘objective’ standpoint from which to evaluate how we think, act, and judge, this should 
lead us to abandon this project [Rawls’ liberalism] that aims at finding independent rational 
justification for morality, an external and universal perspective that’s to serve as a critical standard 
from which to evaluate the morality of actual communities. And if there’s no trans-communal ground 
from which to seek independent vindication for the moral standards of communities, this means that 




ideas to construct his own arguments on human rights.22 A part he borrows from 
Walzer is that Bell believes that “abstract and unhistorical universalism” cannot 
justify rights. Instead, rights should only be justified from “inside,” i.e., from culture 
or community. For example, Bell writes, “Rather, they should be made from the 
inside, from specific examples and argumentative strategies that East Asi ns 
themselves use in everyday moral and political debate” (e.g. Bell, 2006b, pp. 267-
268). In a word, on top of Walzer’s idea, Bell develops his own arguments on why 
rights should only be justified from “inside.”23 
But what does it mean that rights should only be justified from “inside”? Bell 
does not explicitly define how to justify a right from “inside.” But we may be ableto 
understand what he means from some of his writings:  
 
The second challenge is an argument over the justification of rights. As 
against the claim that the Western liberal tradition is the only possible moral 
foundation for human rights, many East Asian human rights activists argue 
that their own cultural traditions can provide the resources for local 
justifications of ideas and practices normally realized through a human rights 
regime in Western countries. This argument is not merely theoretical, it also
                                                                                                                                          
they are vindicated” (Bell, 1993, pp. 65-67) There is also a footnote for this passage. This footnote 
says that Bell concurs with Rorty in this passage. See Bell (1993), pp. 82-83, n25. 
22 As I mentioned in some paragraphs earlier, Bell has used the ideas from Walzer and others to 
develop his arguments on other areas as well. For example, he argues that “cultural factors can provide 
moral foundations for distinctive political practices and institutions (or at least different from those 
found in Western-style liberal democracies).” In addition to the justification of rights, he also argues 
that “cultural factors can affect the prioritizing of rights, and this matters when rights conflict and it 
must be decided which one to sacrifice.” See Bell (2004), pp. 29-31; Bell (2006b), pp. 267-268; and 
Bell (2009), section 1. See also Bell (1993), pp. 140- 43 & 183; Bell (2000), pp. 23-105. However, 
these areas are not directly related to our debate here, hence I do not discuss them in detail.  




has strategic importance for advocates of human rights reforms in East 
Asia…cultural particularities in East Asia may justify a different moral 
standpoint vis-à-vis the human rights regime typically endorsed by Western 
governments, scholars, and human rights activists… some values in Asia may 
be more persistent than others and may diverge from some human rights ideas 
and practices typically endorsed in Western countries. If these values are 
widely shared by both defenders and critics of the political status quo, there is 
a strong presumption in favor of respect for those values. (Bell, 2006a, pp. 54-
55. Bell’s italics)24 
 
In this passage, Bell thinks that different cultures have different “moral 
foundations for human rights.” These different moral foundations can provide 
different justifications for human rights. But what do “moral foundations” mean? And 
why can they provide different justifications? To answer these questions, I need to 
discuss not only Bell’s own writings, but also the interest accounts of rights and some 
arguments from other philosophers as well.  
In the contemporary literature of rights, it is common to distinguish two 
different accounts of rights: choice (or will) accounts and interest (or benefit) 
accounts. Choice accounts understand rights (and the correlative duties) to be 
protected choices, while interest accounts understand rights to be protected interests. 
In the East and West debate on human rights, it seems that many Eastern philosophers 
prefer interest accounts more than choice accounts. I am not sure why they like 
                                                





interest accounts more, but one possibility is that it is easier for East Asian cultures to 
play some roles in interest accounts of rights. Comparatively, choice accounts are too 
“Western,” and many East Asian cultures do not emphasize choice.25   
Bell and other philosophers also like interest accounts of rights. In addition to 
Bell’s view, I also discuss the views from Stephen Angle and Joseph Chan as well. 
Although Angle, Bell, and Chan have different conclusions on the list of human 
rights (i.e., they disagree on which rights are universal rights), t ey all agree that East 
Asian cultures are important and should play some roles in the human rights debate. 
Indeed, Bell has agreed and quoted their works quite often (e.g., Bell, 2000, pp. 50, 
73-91; 2004, pp. 397-400; 2006, pp.34, 63-75). Therefore, in the rest of this section, I 
shall discuss their views together in detail.26  
Their particular interest account of rights is probably similar to or consistet 
with the following formula from Joseph Raz: “‘X has a right’ if and only if…other 
things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty” (Raz, 1986, p. 166).27 It seems that 
Bell and others generally agree with Raz’s account of rights. For example, Angl  
argues that “As we turn now to Chinese rights theories, we will see that rig ts are 
taken by most theorists to protect interests in a manner quite consistent with Raz’s 
                                                
25 For further detail on choice accounts and interest accounts of rights, see Rainbolt (2006), Sumner 
(1987), and Wenar (2010). Some philosophers argue that both choice accounts and interest accounts 
are problematic. However, most philosophers in the East argue for interest accounts of rights. 
Therefore, I also only focus on interest accounts of rights here.  
26 I discuss their differences in chapter 4, section 4.4. 
27 In the original formula, Raz has also discussed who the right-holder is (“‘X has a right’ if and only if 
X can have rights…”). But this is not relevant to our c rrent discussion, and so I ignore this part of his 
formula. It is also controversial whether Raz’s account is only an interest account of rights, or it can 
also be considered as a choice account of rights (because its formula may also suggest that we have 
rights to free choice in many circumstances). Again, this is not relevant to our current discussion, and




ideas” (Angle, 2002, p. 213). Angle also argues that “it is clear that the dominant 
view of rights, both now and throughout the history of Chinese rights discourse, has 
been that rights are closely tied to interests. Indeed, we saw that ‘quanli’ was 
originally adopted as an equivalent for ‘rights’ in large part because it readily 
expressed the ideas of both legitimate powers and legitimate benefits or interests—
ideas with which one strand of the Confucian tradition had been concerned for 
centuries” (Angle, 2002, p. 214).28 In summary of these two quotations, Angle clearly 
states that some Chinese versions of the interest accounts of rights are quite consistent 
with Raz’s interest account of rights.  
In another example, Joseph Chan also follows Raz’s idea in developing his 
own Asian or Confucian account of human rights (Chan, 1995a; 1995b; 1998, p. 31; 
1999, p. 230, especially n55; 2000, pp.63-64). Bell himself has not directly discussed 
Raz’s idea; he only mentions Raz when he discusses Angle’s arguments (Bell, 2004, 
p. 398; 2006a, p. 63). But there is no evidence that he disagrees with Raz’s interest 
account of rights. Indeed, not every part of Raz’s account is our concern here; the 
concern here is simply limited to how a right is justified by interest. And Joseph Chan 
has summarized the idea as follows: “To justify a right, we need to show that the 
interests of the right-holder are weighty enough to place some other person or people 
under some obligation or duty” (Chan, 1998, p. 31). It seems that Bell also agrees 
with this idea (e.g. Bell, 2006a, pp.72-73). In a word, such an idea is consistent with 
or similar to Raz’s idea, and such an idea provides a consensus among Bell and 
others.  
                                                




Now we know that the justification of rights in the debate is an interest 
account of rights. But what interests are weighty-enough to place others under some 
duty? This is exactly where Bell and others believe that the East and the West hav  
different answers. This is also why cultural factors are moral foundations that can 
affect the justification of rights. Another quotation from Bell will help us to 
understand further the issue at hand: 
 
A human rights regime is supposed to protect our basic humanity—the 
fundamental human goods (or needs or interests) that underpin any 
“reasonable” conception of human flourishing. But which human goods are 
fundamental? ... It is possible that most politically relevant actors, both 
officials and intellectuals, in East Asian societies typically endorse a 
somewhat different set of fundamental human goods than their counterparts in 
Western societies now and for the foreseeable future. Different societies may 
typically have different ideas regarding which human goods must be protected 
regardless of competing considerations, and which human goods can be 
legitimately subject to trade-offs with other goods as part of everyday politics. 
If there is some truth in these propositions, it is essential for purposes of 
improving mutual understanding and minimizing cross-cultural conflict to 
take them into account. It may mean that some Western conceptions of human 




goods, not readily accepted elsewhere, too encompassing in some cases and 
too narrow in others. (Bell, 2006a, p. 72-73)29 
 
From the above quotation, we know that at least one of the interests that are so 
important is “the fundamental human goods.” What are these fundamental human 
goods? Bell does not explain that very clearly. Joseph Chan argues that some 
fundamental human goods in East Asia are “Razian common goods,”30 but it is 
unclear whether other philosophers agree with him or not. Nevertheless, we do not 
need to define fundamental human goods, nor do we need to find a complete list of 
fundamental human goods here. This is because the focus in this East and West 
debate on human rights are physical securities and liberties. Therefore, all w  need to 
discuss in this dissertation is whether physical securities and liberties are fundamental 
human goods, and we shall discuss that in the later sections and chapters. 
Bell and others believe that generally there are different fundamental human 
goods in different cultures. Since each culture has its own fundamental goods that are 
weighty enough to place other under duties, Bell and others believe that rights are 
justified differently in different cultures. They also believe that cultures can affect the 
justification of rights in a positive and a negative way. In a positive way, cultures can 
                                                
29 Similar ideas can also be found in Bell (1996), pp. 660-663; Bell (2000), pp. 83-88.  
30 Raz considers that common goods are goods “which, in a certain community, serve the interest of 
people generally in a conflict-free, non-exclusive, and non-excludable way” (Raz, 1992, p. 135). Raz 
also believes that common goods do not conflict with individual interests. For example, Raz writes, 
“the right is justified by the fact that by serving the interest of the right-holder it serves the intrest of 
some others, and their interest contributes to determining the weight due to the right” (Raz 1992, p. 
133). Joseph Chan explains further that common goods are not individual interests but general interests 
(Chan, 1995b, pp.17-18). Chan writes, “A common good is non-exclusive, in that the enjoyment of one 
person of that good does not detract from that of others. It is non-excludable, in the sense that once it is 
available in a community, no members of that community can be excluded from enjoying it” (Chan, 
1995, p.18). See also Chan (1999, especially pp. 216-217) for his discussion on Razian common goods 




affect “which human goods must be protected regardless of competing 
considerations” (Bell, 2006a, 73). In other words, human goods that must be 
protected are also interests that are important (and sufficient) enough to place other 
under moral duties, and Bell and others believe that these interests are different n 
different cultures. In a negative way, cultures can affect “which human goods can be 
legitimately subject to trade-offs with other goods as part of everyday politics” (Bell, 
2006a, 73). This tells us that that a right is not justified if the correlative human goods 
are subject to trade-offs with other goods. That is, since these goods are subject to 
trade-offs, they are not weighty enough to place others under some duties. Notice that 
both ways are empirical. In other words, cultures empirically affect the justification of 
rights. While the positive way states that cultures tell us which human goods are 
weighty enough to place others under duties (i.e., which rights are justified), the 
negative way focuses more on how cultures determine which human goods are not 
weighty enough to place others under duties (i.e., which rights are not justified). 
Since cultures can affect the justification of rights positively and negatively, 
this is probably why Bell and others think that different cultures are grounds or 
“moral foundations” for rights (e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp. 62-72). In summary, Bell and 
others argue that “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” (e.g., Bell, 
2006b, pp. 267) because there are fundamental human goods or interests that are 
weighty enough to place others under some duties, and cultures can affect these 
fundamental human goods or interests positively and negatively. Following the 
reasoning here, universal rights are fundamental human goods that are weighty 




specifically on East Asian rights, we can conclude the following two statemen s from 
the above analysis: 
 
(1) X is an East Asian right if and only if X is an interest of East Asians (i.e. 
the right-holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some 
duties. 
(2) X is such an interest if and only if X is a fundamental human good in East 
Asian cultures.  
 
These statements can be considered as the first two premises of the argument 
on the justification of East Asian rights. For convenience, we may call such an 
approach to the justification of rights “the cultural justification of rights.” So far, I can 
only briefly and abstractly discuss such a conceptual framework of the cultural 
justification of rights. To discuss the details, we need to discuss what Western and 
East Asian cultural contexts are relevant to the debate, and we need to discuss which 
rights are justified by the East Asian cultures and which rights are not. I shall di cuss 
these topics in the next two sections.   
 
 
Section 2.4 Western Liberalism and Confucianism 
In this section, I am going to introduce the Western and East Asian cultural 
contexts that are relevant to the East and West debate on human rights. The relevant 




part of the East Asian cultures is Confucianism. I discuss why Bell thinks that 
liberalism is only for Western people but not East Asian. I also introduce what 
Confucianism is, and why Confucianism is so important to our debate on human 
rights.  
Similar to East Asia, “the West” also includes many different regions. Bell 
and others mainly focus on the Anglo-American culture, especially on “Western 
liberalism.”31 It appears that Bell and others use “Western liberalism” as an umbrella 
term for many different views. For example, Bell has discussed views from traditional 
liberals such as John Locke (1689/2002) and John Stuart Mill (1859/2002),32 and has 
also discussed views from contemporary philosophers such as Brian Barry (1995),
Jack Donnelly (1999, 2003), Ronald Dworkin (1977, 2002), and John Rawls (1971, 
1993).33 Bell and others argue that Western liberalism is solely “Western 
perspectives” or “Western traditions.” Western liberalism originated in the West, but 
Bell and others do not think that the origin is a problem. Indeed, if the origin were a 
problem, then the views from Bell and many others (such as Angle, Walzer, etc.) 
would also be problematic because they are also from the West. The real problem is 
that liberals do not realize or they do not agree that East Asian cultures are so 
important. For example, Bell writes: 
 
                                                
31 Sometimes, they also call it “liberalism,” “liberal tradition” or “Western liberal tradition.”  
32 For examples, see Bell (2000), pp. 50-51, 114-115; Bell (2006a), p. 62, 190-191, & 280n113. 
33 For the discussion of Rawls, see Bell (1993). For the discussion of Barry, see Bell (1998b), Bell 
(1999). For the discussion of Donnelly and Dworkin, see Bell (1996), Bell (1998a), Bell (2000), Bell 
(2006a), Bell (2006b). As I mentioned before, I shall discuss the debate between Bell and Donnelly in 




There are a number of West-centric perspectives which simply assume that 
their views are universally applicable to other cultures…For example, Jack 
Donnelly, who I think represents the best of human rights activist and theorist, 
never allows for the possibility that non-Western values could shape 
international human rights regime. Western political theorists also claim th t 
their theories are universal, but only draw on the moral practices and moral 
aspirations found in Western societies. Brian Barry would be an instance of 
this. The problem with these West-centric outlooks is that they block the 
development of a truly international human rights regime that can 
accommodate the ends and aspirations of non-Western peoples, and that they 
fail to allow for the possibility of areas of justifiable difference between “the 
west” and “the rest.” (Bell, 1998a, pp. 14 & 16) 
 
For another example, Bell believes that Barry (1995) is also too “West-centric”. In 
addition to the above citation, Bell also writes: 
 
However, the most important distinguishing characteristic of Barry’s 
approach…is the attempt to put forward a universally valid theory of justice 
that draws only on the moral aspirations and political practices found in liberal 
Western societies. Barry’s theory, for example, does not draw on anything 
worthwhile from the Chinese political tradition. This should worry those 
concerned with promoting human rights in a Chinese context, for Barry’s 




to push forward a ‘universal’ theory that rides roughshod over the cultural 
particularities for non-Western societies. (Bell, 1998b, p. 568) 
 
For another example, when Bell comments on Dworkin’s presentations in China in 
2002, Bell thinks that Dworkin is too hegemonic. Bell writes: 
 
Dworkin made no serious attempt to learn about Chinese philosophy, to 
identify aspects worth defending and learning from, and to relate his own 
ideas to those of Chinese political traditions such as Confucianism and 
Legalism. Whereas earlier luminaries such as Dewey and Russell had 
expressed their admiration of Chinese culture and argued for a synthesis of 
‘East’ and ‘West’, Dworkin merely put forward his own ideas and identified 
fellow ‘liberal’, and the ‘debate’ rarely moved beyond this starting point. 
(Bell, 2006a, p. 4)34 
 
Although some of these liberals mention East Asian cultures,35 East Asian 
cultures are not the core part of their arguments. Bell does not discuss every liberal 
argument in detail, but he argues that all of them suffer from the same weakness, 
which is failing to recognize the importance of East Asian cultures. When Bell 
particularly focuses on the human rights debate, he argues that “Western liberal 
                                                
34 Bell also summarizes some comments to Dworkin’s visit from other Chinese scholars. See Bell 
(2006a) pp. 2-4. For Dworkin’s presentations in China, see Dworkin (2002). See also Dworkin (1977) 
for his philosophy related to these presentations.  
35 For example, Donnelly has discussed the Asian values debate (Donnelly, 2003, pp.107-123); 




tradition may not be the only moral foundation for realizing the values and practices 
associated with human rights regimes” (Bell, 2006a, p. 65). Instead, “awareness of 
‘values in Asia’ allows the human rights activist to draw on the most compelling 
justifications for human rights practices” (Bell, 2006a, p. 69. Bell’s italics). In other 
words, Bell argues that Western liberalism is not the only moral foundation for 
human rights; some East Asian cultural contexts can also be moral foundations for 
human rights.  
Why are East Asian cultural contexts so important? And what are they? Bell 
and others realize that East Asia includes many regions with different and plural 
cultural contexts. Since East Asia covers such a large geographical area, its traditions 
sometimes vary greatly among different regions. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned in 
chapter 1, Bell and others focus on the East Asian regions affected by Chinese 
culture, which is probably one of the oldest cultures in the world. Bell and others 
believe that East Asian regions share some values in common. Bell and others calls 
these common values “values in Asia” or “Asian values” (e.g. Bell, 2006a, p. 54; 
Chan, 1998, p. 35). These values are not really distinct values that can only be found 
in Asia but not the rest of the world; they are only local values emphasized in Asia. 
As Joseph Chan writes, “‘Asian values’ need not be understood as a set of values 
entirely distinct from and in opposition to Western values, but simply as those values
that many people in Asia would endorse and that would guide them in their search for 
a political morality…Thus the search for a political morality is the busines  of each 
individual country in Asia; each country’s quest must take into account its own 




underlying values ‘Asian’ is irrelevant” (Chan, 1998, p. 35). Bell generally agrees 
with Joseph Chan on this point, and Bell also argues that some values in Asia are 
different from the West. He writes, “some values in Asia may be more persistent than 
others and may diverge from some human rights ideas and practices typically 
endorsed in Western countries. If these values are widely shared by both defenders 
and critics of the political status quo, there is a strong presumption in favor of respect 
of those values” (Bell, 2006a, p. 55). Among these common traditions and values, 
Bell particularly focuses on the Confucian tradition and its values.36  
 Confucianism has a very long history—it has lasted for more than two 
thousand years. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) is usually considered as the founder of 
Confucianism, and Mencius (c. 372-289 B.C.) is the second most important 
Confucian (the “Second-Sage”). They are probably the two most famous Confucian 
philosophers who are recognized even in the Western world. But there are other 
Confucian philosophers throughout the history of Confucianism. Although 
Confucianism originated from China, it has also influenced other regions in East 
Asia. Confucianism is still one of the main schools of thought in contemporary East 
Asia such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc. In China, Confucianism is rising 
again after the era of “cultural revolution” (1966-1976).37 With such a long history 
and so many Confucians in different periods and regions, “Confucianism” is actually 
a big name for many diverse thoughts. As Bell writes, “Confucianism is a long 
                                                
36 Another one is Buddhism. However, Bell and others focus more on Confucianism than Buddhism, 
and so I also focus on Confucianism more. I shall discuss Buddhism further with some particular 
cultural examples in section 2.5 and chapter 5, section 5.2.  
37 For a detailed introduction to the classical and contemporary history of Confucianism, see Liu 




tradition with different strands and different combinations of values with different 
traditions” (Bell, 2008, p.xv). In other words, similar to the term “liberalism,” 
“Confucianism” can also be considered as an umbrella term for many different 
philosophical views in East Asia. Since Confucianism is such a long tradition, it is 
necessary to discuss which parts of Confucianism are closely related to our 
discussion.  
Shu-Hsien Liu (2007) discusses different parts of Confucianism, and his 
division is helpful for our discussion. He writes: 
 
I find a threefold division helpful in distinguishing between three distinct but 
related meanings of the term [“Confucianism”]: 
1. Spiritual Confucianism. The tradition of great thinkers such as 
Confucius, Mencius, Ch’eng Chu (Cheng Zhu), and Lu Wang that has been 
revived by Contemporary Neo-Confucians as their ultimate commitment. 
2. Politicized Confucianism. The tradition of Tung Chung-shu (Dong 
Zhongshu), P’an Ku (Ban Gu), and others that served as the official ideology 
of the dynasties and had taken in ingredients from schools of thought such as 
Taoism, Legalism, and the Yin Yang school. 
3. Popular Confucianism. Belief at the grassroots level that emphasizes 
concepts such as family values, diligence, and education and can hardly be 
separated from other beliefs in popular Buddhism and Taoism, including, for 
example, various kinds of superstitions.  





Liu’s division of Confucianism can be summarized and interpreted as follows. 
Spiritual Confucianism is not only about the metaphysics and religion of 
Confucianism, but also relates to moral, social and political philosophy of 
Confucianism. Indeed, some scholars believe that some parts of Confucianism are 
moral theories. For example, Van Norden argues that Confucius’s and Mencius’s 
philosophies are theories of virtue ethics (2007). Confucianism in this sense is more 
related to moral and metaphysical theories. Some important values in Confucianism, 
such as ren (benevolent) and yi (righteousness), are moral virtues, and Confucian 
philosophers use different moral theories to explain and express them.  For 
convenience, we may simply call this the “theoretical Confucian tradition.”  
On the other hand, there is also a “practical Confucian tradition.” Politicized 
Confucianism is about the influence of Confucianism on real world politics. Popular 
Confucianism is about the influence of Confucianism on East Asians in their daily 
lives. In general, Liu reminds us that Confucianism is not only a school of thought in 
an ivory tower, but also a practical cultural habit in East Asia. In some situations, the 
theoretical Confucian tradition and the practical Confucian tradition may even 
conflict with each other. This division is important to our discussion on the cultural 
justification of physical security rights and liberal rights. I shall discus  them further 
in chapters 3 and 4.  
Now let me introduce different views on the relationship between 




Confucianism rejects human rights in general. On the other side, some believe that 
Confucianism and human rights are quite compatible.  
Some scholars argue that the Confucian tradition lacks the concepts of rights 
or human rights (Ackerly 2005; Ames 1988; Hansen 1985a, b, 2004; Henkin 1986; 
Ihara 2004; Rosemont 1988, 1991, 1998, 2004, 2007, etc.). They think that rights or 
human rights are only Western concepts and cannot be found in the East Asian 
cultures (especially Confucianism). For example, Louis Henkin writes, “In the 
Chinese tradition the individual was not central, and no conception of individual 
rights existed in the sense known to the United States. The individual’s participation 
in society was not voluntary, and the legitimacy of government did not depend on his 
consent or the consent of the whole people of individuals” (Henkin, 1986, p.21). For 
another example, Henry Rosement Jr. writes, “But now consider specifically the 
classical Chinese language in which the early Confucians wrote their philosophical 
views. That language not only contains no lexical item for m al; it also has no terms, 
for example, corresponding to freedom, liberty, autonomy, individual, utility, 
principles, rationality, rational agent, action, objective, subjective, choice, dilemma, 
duty, or rights; and, probably most eerie of all for a moralist, classical Chinese has no 
lexical item corresponding to ught—prudential or obligatory” (Rosement, 1988, p. 
173. Rosement’s italics). However, Rosement’s view may be too strong; many 
scholars argue that Confucianism has at least some of these so called “Western 
concepts.” But at least all of the scholars mentioned above think that rights and 




 These scholars also believe that the concepts of rights and human rights do not 
have any role in Confucianism. For example, Rosemont argues that Confucianism is 
already morally sufficient for the Chinese society (Rosement, 1991, 2004, 2007). In 
an article replying to Dworkin, Rosemont argues that it is not necessary to take rights 
seriously in China (Rosemont 1988).38 Craig Ihara (2004) also holds a similar view 
that individual rights are not required for the moral philosophy of Confucianism. 
Roger Ames (1988) argues that Confucianism uses li  (rites) instead of law and rights 
as an apparatus for the order of a society.39 Most of these scholars suggest that the 
concepts of rights and human rights have no place in the Confucian tradition and 
probably no place in East Asia at all.  
On the other hand, some scholars hold a more moderate position (e.g., Chan, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2007; de Bary 1983, 1985, 1998a, b; Lee 1992, 1996; Wong 1984, 
2004, 2006). These scholars believe that the concepts of rights or human rights may 
have some roles in the Confucian tradition. For example, Chan (1999) argues that the 
Confucian tradition is partially compatible with the rights to freedom of speech. He 
argues that early Confucian philosophers would allow freedom of speech whenever 
freedom of speech benefits ren (the most important moral value in Confucianism). 
But he also argues that only freedom of “good speech” but not freedom of “bad 
                                                
38 It appears that Rosemont and Bell share the same perspective on the importance of Confucianism. 
For example, Rosemont writes, “if rights are borne by human beings regardless of these 
differentiations, then those rights must obtain for human beings altogether independently of their 
cultures. But then it becomes extremely difficult to imagine actual bearers of rights, because there ar  
no culturally independent human beings. And if our c lture has no concept of rights, or has concepts 
incompatible with that concept, then how could we imagine what it would be like to have rights, or that 
it would be right and good and proper for us to so imagine” (Rosemont, 1988, p. 167). A main 
difference between Rosemont and Bell is that Rosemont probably denies all human rights, while Bell 
still agrees that physical security rights are human rights. See also Dallmayr (2002, pp.178-182) for 
further details on Rosemont and Ames. 




speech” would be allowed in the Confucian tradition (Chan, 1999, pp. 228-230).40 For 
another example, Both Lee (1996) and Wong (2004) argue that either a “virtue-
based” or “community-based” of rights would be compatible with Confucianism. De 
Bary (1983) discusses “the liberal tradition in China” (this is also the title of his 
book). He particularly focuses on two topics: liberal education and individualism in 
Ancient China. This liberal tradition in China is quite different from the Western 
liberal tradition, but they are probably compatible with each other.41 
The works from the above scholars mainly focus on whether the concepts of 
rights and human rights are compatible with Confucianism. There are also some other 
scholars who try to determine whether East Asian cultures or Confucianism can 
contribute to human rights in some way. For example, Angle argues that the concepts 
of rights and human rights have been developed in a distinctive way in East Asia, 
especially in China.42 He argues that “Chinese discussions of rights emerged and 
developed in a distinctive way, sharing some but not all features with developments 
outside China … I will look at three aspects of Chinese rights discourse…The three 
aspects are (1) the ways in which rights are related to interests, (2) thedegree to 
which different people’s rights are can be harmonized, and (3) the interrelation 
between economic and political rights” (Angle, 2002, pp. 205-206). And then he 
argues specifically how the Chinese concepts of rights enrich Western theories of 
                                                
40 His argument mainly focuses on Mencius’ philosophy. I shall discuss his argument further in chapter 
4, section 4.4.  
41 I shall discuss de Bary’s argument further in chapter 4, section 4.4.  
42 For the English translation of some human rights documents in the modern China, see the collection 
from Angle & Svensson (2002). See “The Chinese Human Rights Web” for supplementary 
information of this collection http://www.chinesehumanrightsreader.org (Angle & Svensson, 2001). 
See also Angle (2002) and Svensoon (2002) for further analysis.  For commentaries from other regions 




rights and human rights, such as Raz’s interest account of rights (Angle, 2002, pp. 
208-225). It is important to note that the Chinese rights discourse is mainly in terms 
of Confucianism. In other words, Angle’s argument is also about how Confucianism 
can benefit the human rights debate.  
How about Bell? In general, Bell realizes that we need to treat East Asian 
cultures and Confucianism in the human right debates carefully. He realizes that 
Confucianism is more popular in the past than in the present, but he also thinks that 
Confucianism is beginning to revive in contemporary China and East Asia (Bell, 
2008, p. xv). He asks “how we might ‘modernize’ traditional Confucian values” 
(Bell, 1998a, p. 20): 
 
There is a tendency to overestimate the social and political importance of 
traditional cultural values in contemporary societies, and I think this is a 
fallacy we need to be aware of and take care to avoid. This is because, while 
systematic comparisons between Eastern and Western philosophies can be 
interesting, they become problematic when attempts are made to draw some 
political implications in modern Asian societies on the basis of traditional 
cultural values. For example, comparisons between liberal democracy and 
Confucianism often take the form of looking to some ancient texts and saying 
that some elements were similar or dissimilar to liberal democracy. The 
problem is that such arguments are often irrelevant because they ignore the 
particular context of the recovered references. The teachings of the ancient 




contemporary relevance of, say, the detailed ancient rituals prescribed in th  
Confucian Analects. (Bell, 1998a, p. 18 & 20) 
 
In short, Bell thinks that we cannot just apply the ancient texts of Confucianism 
directly into the human rights debate. Otherwise we may suffer from the problem that 
these ancient texts are not relevant in the contemporary era anymore.  
To avoid this problem, Bell believes that we should “bridge the gap between 
the political philosophy of the ancient texts and the political reality of contemporary 
society” (Bell, 1998a, p.20) by doing the following two things. First, he tries “to 
distinguish between traditional values which are still relevant today and others wich 
have been relegated to the ‘dustbin’ of history. That is, we need to know that values 
continue to have widespread impact on people’s political behavior in contemporary 
societies” (Bell, 1998a, p.20). Second, he also tries to “develop normative arguments 
which would explain why certain values should continue to remain influential and 
why others shouldn’t. Also, in light of the fact that even within East Asian societies 
there exist many differences, we should always remember to specify the relevant 
context for which we are developing the empirical, historical, and normative 
analyses” (Bell, 1998a, p. 20. My italics). In summary, some Confucian values are 
still relevant today, and they can be used to develop normative arguments in the East 
and West debate on human rights. In a word, Bell wants to find some “modernized 
traditional Confucian values” in East Asia. As I mentioned before, Bell also calls 




 Bell argues that these Confucian values or values in Asia are “community 
values,”43 and some examples of these community values include local values, 
national values, family values, etc. These community values in East Asia are 
Confucian values, or at least they are derived from Confucianism. Bell believes that 
these Confucian values are important to the East and West debate on human rights. 
For example, when he discusses r n (the most important moral virtue in 
Confucianism), he writes: “values similar to aspects of Western conceptions of 
human rights can also be found in Asian cultural traditions. The notion of ren in
Confucianism, for example, expresses the value of impartial concern to relive human
suffering…The same sort of idea, presumably, animates concern for human rights in 
Western countries” (Bell, 2000, p. 50. Bell’s italic).  
 Bell also thinks that some East Asian societies are Confucian societies 
because Confucian values are important to these societies. He believes that in these
societies, “Values originating from the Confucian tradition’s sacred texts continue to 
have widespread impact on people’s behavior…Confucianism is more than an official 
ideology manipulated by elites for their own purposes…[and] it is crucial that one be 
able to demonstrate (at least in principle) by means of an historical investigation 
precisely how it is that the values espoused in ‘high culture’ Confucian texts came to 
exert an influence on the culture of the people” (Bell, 1995, p. 19). For example, Bell 
discusses why Elites (or “Gentlemen”) pay more important roles in public service in 
Confucian societies (pp. 26-28). For another example, Bell discusses the importance 
of the family values in Confucian societies. Bell argues that “Confucian societies 
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place greater value on the family than their Western counterparts” (Bell, 1995, p. 21). 
He also argues that “Confucians say that the family is the first and most i portant 
school of virtue” (Bell, 1995, p.21); “Confucians say that proper behavior in the 
family context has important implications not just for ethics and everyday social life, 
but also with respect to politics” (Bell, 1995, p. 22); “Confucians say that family 
obligations should outweigh all other obligations, including one’s obligation to obey 
the law” (Bell, 1995, p.23); and “East Asian have supported and strengthened the 
family even at great cost” (Bell, 1995, p.24). In a word, Bell believes that 
Confucianism and its values play many important roles in East Asia, and they are 
important moral foundations in East Asia for human rights.44 
 Let me summarize what I have discussed in this section. I have discussed why 
Bell and others believe that Western liberalism is not a moral foundation in East Asi . 
I have also introduced some elements of Confucianism that are relevant to the East 
and West debate on Human rights. Specifically, I have discussed the distinction 
between the theoretical Confucian tradition and the practical Confucian tradition; I 
have also introduced the arguments from different scholars about the relationship 
between Confucianism and human rights. Lastly, I have also introduced why Bell 
believes that Confucian values (values in Asia) play important roles in East Asi . In 
the next section, I shall discuss how to put Confucianism and East Asian cultures 
together with the cultural justification of rights, and what roles they play in the East 
and West debate on human rights.  
 
                                                
44 It seems to me the Confucian values Bell prefers come from the practical Confucian tradition rather 





Section 2.5 Physical Securities and Liberties 
In the previous sections, I have discussed the cultural justification of rights
and the relevant East Asian cultural contexts (i.e., the Confucian tradition and its
values). I have summarized in section 2.3 that X is an East Asian right if and only if 
X is an interest of East Asians (i.e., the right-holders) that is weighty enough t place 
others under some duties; and X is such an interest if and only if X is a fundamental 
human good in East Asian cultures. In this section, I continue the discussion of Bell’s 
arguments in detail. Based on the cultural justification of rights and some Confucian 
values, Bell concludes that physical securities are East Asian rights and universal 
rights, but liberties are not. I shall explain how he argues for this conclusion.  
In the East and West debate on human rights, people wonder which moral 
rights are universal (human) rights and which rights are not. Bell and others beli ve 
that some moral rights are held by Western people (i.e., Western rights) and hey are 
justified by the Western cultures; some other rights are held by East Asi n (i.e., East 
Asian rights) and they are justified by the East Asian cultures. If some rights are only 
Western rights but not East Asian rights, then they are not universal rights, and hence 
they are not human rights. Bell admits that there are some universal rights in this 
world, but he also argues that some rights are not East Asian rights, and so they are 
not universal rights. What are these rights? Bell writes: 
 
[T]here is little debate over the desirability of a core set of human rights, such 




detention, and systematic racial discrimination. These rights have become part 
of international customary law, and they are not contested in the public 
rhetoric of the international arena. But political thinkers and activists around 
the world can and do take different sides on many pressing human rights 
concerns that fall outside what Michael Walzer terms the “minimal and 
universal code.” This gray area of debate includes criminal law, family law, 
women’s rights, social and economic rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, 
and the attempt to universalize Western-style democratic practices. (Bell, 
2006a, p. 79)  
 
 
From the above quotation, we find that Bell considers that the following moral 
rights are universal rights: rights against slavery, rights against geocide, rights 
against murder, rights against torture, rights against prolonged arbitrary detention, 
and rights against systematic racial discrimination. Bell has also discussed the list of 
universal rights somewhere else, and murder, torture, slavery and genocide are in the 
list everywhere in his writings.45 Most of these rights are related to physical 
securities. For convenience, I call them physical security rights.46 Bell’s position is 
                                                
45 Bell has also mentioned something similar in Bell (1996), p. 642 and Bell (2000), p. 3. The only 
difference is that prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination and women’s rights 
are not in the list in Bell (1996). He writes, “The disputed area of human rights therefore falls outside 
what Michael Walzer terms the ‘minimal and universal moral code’, namely rights against murder, 
slavery, torture, and genocide. This ‘grey’ area of debate includes criminal law, family law, social and 
economic rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the attempt to universalize Western-style 
democratic practices” (Bell, 1996, p. 642). For another example, Bell also writes, “There is a little 
public dispute over rights against murder, torture, slavery, and genocide” (Bell, 2006a, p. 72) Indeed, 
Bell has repeatedly mentioned these rights in his wr tings. 
46 I borrow this term from Shue (1996). Shue’s list of physical security rights includes “murder, torture, 
mayhem, rape, or assault” (p. 20). Although the list is not exactly the same as Bell’s list, they are quite 
similar. The only exception is the prohibition against slavery. Prohibition against slavery is sometims 




that physical security rights are universal rights because they are minimal and 
universal moral codes.  
Now let us focus on which rights are not universal rights. As I have quoted 
above, Bell claims that some moral rights are in a “grey area”: “This gray area of 
debate includes criminal law, family law, women’s rights, social and economic rights, 
the rights of indigenous peoples, and the attempt to universalize Western-style 
democratic practices” (Bell, 2006a, p. 79). For the purpose of this project, I only 
focus on the rights to “Western-style democratic practices.” Bell argues that Western-
style democratic practices are not universal rights. What are Western-style democratic 
practices?  
There are different Western-style democratic practices. It is rea onable to 
think that some democratic practices are relative to cultures. For example, Western 
countries have different electoral systems. Some countries, such as United States and 
United Kingdom, use majority methods (“winner-take-all” methods) in the election of 
congressperson; some other countries, such as Italy and Germany, use proportional 
representation methods (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 143-170). For another example, there are 
different political institutions in different countries. United States has a presidential 
system and divides the legislative power and the executive power sharply, but United 
Kingdom has a cabinet system and the prime minister is answerable to the House of 
                                                                                                                                          
also related to physical security as well. For convenience, I also put prohibition against slavery into the 




Commons.47 Although electoral systems and political institutions vary in Western 
countries, they are all considered as democratic practices.  
It may not be controversial to claim that East Asian countries and cultures can 
also have different electoral systems or political institutions. For example, some 
scholars try to develop what they call “Confucian democracy.”48 Bell even suggests 
that Chinese government should grant more power to the educated elites than 
popularly elected congressperson (Bell, 2000, pp.279-336; 2006a, pp. 152-179).49 
However, the real controversy here is not about electoral systems or political 
institutions; the controversy here is about some basic rights in democracy practices, 
especially the rights to the civil and political liberties.50  
Let me explain this further. Bell believes that protecting individual rights is 
one of the most important practices in Western-style democracy. He writes: 
 
Western democracies are constitutional democracies, meaning that their 
constitutional systems are meant to protect certain individual rights. These 
rights are held to be so fundamental that they ‘trump’ the ephemeral decisions 
of democratically elected politicians in case of conflict. When this notion is 
                                                
47 For different “patterns” or “models” of democracy, see Lijphart (1999). It seems to me that one of 
the implications of Lijphart’s book is that different patterns or models of democracy are relative to 
cultural factors.  
48 See Chang et al. (1958), He (1996), and Tan (2004, 2 10).  
49 But Bell’s proposal is controversial even from theperspective of Confucianism. For example, He 
claims that his proposal is based on the philosophy from an ancient Confucian, Huang Zongxi (1610-
1695 A.D.) (Bell, 2006a, pp. 164-165), but it is contr versial whether he interprets Huang’s philosophy 
correctly.  For an objection to Bell’s proposal, see Li (2000). 
50 I use the term “liberty” and “freedom” interchangeably in this dissertation. Roughly, these civil and 
political liberties are the social or civil liberties discussed in the tradition of liberalism. For example, 
Mill writes, “The subject of this essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will…but Civil, or Social 
Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 




exported abroad, it takes the form of campaigns to promote human rights, and 
non-Western governments are criticized for failing to live up to these 
standards. But is it really appropriate to uphold standards of human rights 
derived from the Western experience in East Asian societies? (Bell, 2006a, p. 
9. His italic) 
 
Among all individual rights, Bell mainly focuses on rights to civil and political 
liberties. For example, Bell discusses freedom of speech and freedom of political 
participation in Thailand, Singapore and mainland China.51 He believes that many 
people in Thailand, Singapore, Korea, and Mainland China also “question the 
‘American’ idea that individuals have a vital interest in speaking freely, so long as 
they do not physically harm others, along with the political implication that the 
government has a ‘sacred’ obligation to respect this interest” (Bell, 2006a, p. 73. See 
also pp. 73-76). In a word, he believes that these East Asian cultures deny freedom of 
speech as a right in East Asia.  
 Bell also discusses political rights in article 25 of the Int rnational Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. These political rights include rights to “take part in the 
conduct of public affairs,” rights to “vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
election,” and rights to “have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in 
                                                
51 For the discussion of Thailand, see e.g. Bell (2006a), pp. 73-74. For the discussion of Singapore, se 
e.g. Bell (2000), pp. 173-275; Bell (2006a), pp.74-75. For the discussion of Mainland China, see e.g.,




his country.”52 Bell explicitly criticizes these political rights in East Asia (Bell, 2004, 
pp.25-43; 2006b, pp. 180-205).  
In summary, for the purpose of our discussion, the “Western-style democratic 
practices” that I focus on are civil and political liberties. Particularly, I mainly focus 
on the following two rights: freedom of speech and freedom to political participation. 
Occasionally, Bell also describes these rights (especially freedom to political 
participation) as “democratic rights” (e.g. Bell, 2000, Chapter 2). However, it is hard 
to tell whether he wants to discuss democracy as a human right or democracy as a 
political institution. To avoid confusion and for the convenience of our discussion, I 
call freedom of speech and freedom to political participation “liberties” and their 
rights “liberal rights.”  
In Bell’s own expression, we should “limit the set of human rights for an East 
Asian context” (Bell, 2006a, p. 73). Liberal rights are the rights excluded from “the 
set of human rights.” Generally, Bell believes that liberal rights are only Western 
rights in Western cultural contexts. But the East Asian cultural contexts are quite 
different from the Western cultural contexts. Furthermore, Bell argues that liberal 
rights conflict with some East Asian cultural contexts (especially values in the 
Confucian tradition). I now discuss some examples in different East Asian regio s. 
These examples illustrate how liberal rights conflict with “values in Asia” in the 
Confucian tradition. 
 The first example is about liberties in China. According to Bell, some civil 
and political liberties conflict with values in Asia. For example, he discusses the 
                                                
52 For the full detail of these rights, see United Nation (1966a), the International Covenant on Civil and 




rights to political participation in Mainland China and Hong Kong (e.g. Bell, 2000, 
pp. 106-170, 279-334; 2006a, pp.152-179). He also discusses some conflicts between 
liberal rights and minority rights in Mainland China and Taiwan (Bell, 2006a, pp.180-
205). His point is that the local-knowledge or community values in China are quite 
different from the West, and hence not all Western values are suitable for China. 
Since Confucianism is beginning to revive in China (Bell, 2008), Bell and others 
usually refer to Confucianism to support their ideas about the community values in 
China. In these particular instances, liberal rights, especially rights to poli ical 
liberties, are forbidden because of the community values.53  
 The second example is about the political environment in Singapore. 
Singapore has universal suffrage, but Singaporeans are not free to express their 
political views and have no equal right to access public services. Bell thinks at the 
denial of liberal rights strengthens family and community values in Singapore (Bell, 
2000, pp.213-218; 236-270). He also thinks that liberal rights can be justified in 
Singapore only if they can contribute to the community values for families and the 
nation of Singapore. He writes, “On this communitarian view, democratic rightscan 
be justified on the ground that they contribute to strengthening ties to such 
communities as the family and the nation” (Bell, 2000, p. 16). But it appears that he 
also implies that the current violation of liberal rights in Singapore (or at least a part 
of it) is justified (Bell, 1996, p.664; 2000, pp. 173-275; 2004, pp. 39-40; 2006a, pp. 
74-75). In summary, he argues that Singaporean focuses more on the values of the 
                                                
53 I should emphasize that Bell does not deny all liberal rights in China in these instances. For example, 
he also agrees that democracy (or rights to politica  participation) is valuable. But he thinks that these 
rights should be different from the liberal rights in the West (see, e.g. Bell, 2006a, pp. 152-179 for 




family and the nation, and these values have their roots in the Confucian tradition. 
When such values and traditions conflict with some Western values (especially liberal 
rights), Singaporeans should follow their own values and tradition instead of the 
Western values.  
 The third example is taken from South Korea. Although South Korea is 
already a fully democratic state, it appears that some cultural habits violate individual 
liberal rights, but Bell thinks that these cultural habits are acceptable, and liberal
rights should be denied. For example, he writes: 
 
In democratic South Korea, each household is required to attend monthly 
neighborhood meetings to receive government directives and discuss local 
affairs. What may be viewed as a minor inconvenience in Korea would almost 
certainly outrage most U.S. citizens, and it is likely that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would strike down a governmental policy that forced citizens to 
associate for political purposes of this sort as a violation of the First 
Amendment. Once again there seems to be more willingness in East Asia 
among the general population to serve the common good by limiting 
individual freedom, perhaps as a residue of the Confucian cultural tradition. 
(Bell, 2006a, p. 75)54 
 
In other words, Bell believes that this kind of compulsory neighborhood meeting in 
South Korea is a violation of some civil and political liberties, but these policies are 
                                                




still justified in the Korean culture (and the Korean culture is also a Confucian 
cultural tradition). Therefore, some civil and political liberties are not rights in South 
Korea.  
 All of the above examples are taken from those regions in East Asia where 
Confucianism has played a special role in the communities. Although Bell focuses 
more on the Confucian tradition, he has also occasionally discussed other East Asian 
traditions. The following are two of these examples.  
Bell discusses freedom of speech in Thailand (Bell, 2000, pp.88-89; 2006a, 
pp. 73-74). Thais consider respecting their king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, a very 
important value. Freedom of speech to disrespect the king is forbidden not only 
legally but also morally in Thailand. For example, in 1992, when a pro-democracy 
leader, Dr. Sulak Sivaraksa, was charged by the dictator government in court, Dr. 
Sulak explicitly claimed that having democracy in Thailand “did not mean advocating 
the removal of the existing constraint on direct criticism of the Thai king” (Bell, 
2006a, p. 74). In 2007, a Swiss man, who was convicted of destroying images of the 
king publicly in Thailand, was sentenced to ten years in prison (he was pardoned by 
the king later). YouTube, a popular video sharing website, was also blocked in 
Thailand because it contained some video clips insulting the king.55 I  summary, 
freedom of speech (to disrespect the king) directly conflicts with the duty to respect 
the king, and so such a freedom is forbidden in Thailand. Bell suggests that this is 
                                                
55 For the news of the last two events, see New York Times (April 5, 2007), “Thailand Bans YouTube” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/business/worldbusine s/05tube.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogi
n&adxnnlx=1175918626-vLbSOqJXgus57fEEluNYWg and New York Times (April 13, 2007), “Man 






another example showing that if liberties conflict wi h some values in East Asia, then 
liberties are not East Asian rights.  
 The last example is about the conflict between liberties and the Islamic 
tradition in East Asia (Bell, 1996, pp. 664-665; 2000, pp. 93-95; 2006a, pp.75-76). 
Bell refers to the view from An-Na’im (1995, p. 34) and argues that Islamic criminal 
law “is endorsed in principle by the vast majority of Muslims today, whereas most 
Western liberals and human rights activists would almost certainly regard it as a 
violation of the human right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment” (Bell, 2006a, p.76). Indeed, this example is not only for 
East Asia but also for the whole Islamic tradition. But again, the point is that liberties 
are not East Asian rights because they conflict with the Islamic tradition in East Asia.  
In the previous sections, I have discussed the cultural justification of rights 
and the relevant East Asian cultural contexts (i.e., the Confucian tradition and the 
values in Asia). Now it is time to bring everything together. According to such an 
account, a right is justified when the interest of the right-holder is weighty enough to 
place others under some duty. Bell and others believe that culture is an important 
factor to determine which interests are so important. They conclude that fund mental 
human goods in different cultures are such important interests. Bell and others also 
argue that there are different fundamental human goods in East Asia and in the West 
(e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp.72-73). The examples I described in this section are about the 
fundamental human goods in East Asia. These fundamental goods in East Asia are 
values in Asia from the Confucian tradition or other East Asian traditions, or they are 




and these fundamental goods conflict. They conflict in the sense that some of these 
fundamental goods violate liberties. For example, Bell believes that compulsory 
attendance at the monthly neighborhood meeting in South Korea is a direct violation 
of civil and political liberties. The meeting is a cultural habit in Korea, and Bell 
believes that this is derived from the Confucian tradition, and it represents the family 
values and the national values in Korea. And liberties conflict with this cultural habit 
and the values behind it.  
Based on these empirical examples in different East Asian regions, Bell 
believes that liberties are not important human goods that must be protected in East 
Asian cultures and societies. The Confucian tradition and values in Asia have 
priorities in East Asia (e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp.55-62). Bell believes that liberties can be 
sacrificed and can be legitimately subject to trade-offs with the Confucia tradition 
and values in Asia. In short, liberties are not fundamental goods in East Asia. 
Therefore, they are not East Asian rights, and hence they are not universal right.   
 Now let me summarize what I have discussed so far. Bell argues that physical 
securities are East Asian rights while liberties are not East Asian rights. His argument 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
Argument 2 
(1) X is an East Asian right if and only if X is an interest of East Asians (i.e. the 
right-holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some duties. 
(2) X is such an interest if and only if X is a fundamental human good in East 




(3) Physical securities are fundamental human goods in East Asian cultures 
because they are “minimal and universal moral codes.”  
(4) Liberties are not fundamental human goods in East Asian cultures because 
they conflict with some East Asian cultural factors. 
(5) Therefore, physical securities are East Asian rights but liberties ae not East 
Asian rights.  
 
Premises (1) and (2) are statements summarized from the previous sections, 
and (3) to (5) are what I have discussed in this section. Notice that this argument only 
aims at East Asian rights but not universal rights. If liberties are not East Asian rights, 
then they are not universal rights as well. But even if physical securities are East 
Asian rights, this does not imply that they are also universal rights. Physical securities 
are universal rights only if we can construct the argument in another way. The 
argument can be written as follows: 
 
Argument 3 
(1) X is a universal right if and only if X is an interest of all people (i.e. the right-
holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some duties. 
(2) X is such an interest if and only if X is a fundamental human good in all 
cultures in the world.  
(3) Physical securities are fundamental human goods in all cultures in the world 




(4) Liberties are not universal rights because they conflict with some East Asin
cultural factors. 
(5) Therefore, physical securities are universal rights but liberties are not 
universal rights.  
 
These arguments summarize what Bell tries to argue in his project “the East 
Asian challenge to human rights.” In the next section, I shall discuss some 
significances and weaknesses of his arguments.  
 
 
Section 2.6 Why is it important to discuss the “East Asian Challenge to Human 
Rights”? 
 
In this section, I explain why Bell’s project is significant and unique, but I 
also argue that his project has some problems and explanatory gaps.  
One advantage of Bell’s project is that it does not only emphasize the 
importance of East Asian cultures in the human rights debate, but also avoids some 
traditional objections to those views that emphasize the importance of cultures (s ch 
as the view from Alasdair MacIntyre or Michael Walzer). To illustrate, I discuss 
Allen Buchanan’s view as an example. Buchanan (2004) argues against Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Richard Rorty (1991), Michael Walzer and others; specifically, Buchanan 
disagrees with them on the importance of cultures.56 Roughly, Buchanan does not 
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believe that different cultures provide different moral foundations to human rights, 
and he does not think that human rights are “relative” to cultures. Since Bell agres 
with MacIntyre, Walzer and others (especially Walzer) as well, it is important to see 
how Bell would reply to Buchanan’s arguments.  
Buchanan develops the following arguments to argue against these 
philosophers. First, Buchanan thinks that it is ambiguous to claim that different 
cultures have different moral foundations. He thinks that “different ethical values nd 
principles are also found within the same culture (Cultural groups are not monolithic 
in their values and principles, ethical or otherwise),” and “It could mean that some 
ethical values or principles that are encountered in some societies but not in others. 
Or it could mean that for each culture there is a different set of basicethical values or 
principles” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 148). Buchanan argues further that it is nearly 
impossible that different human cultures hold no common human values at all. He 
claims that “it would be very surprising if different cultures held no ethical princi les 
at all in common; they are after all, human cultures” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 148). The 
real problem is to identify what values are common values among different cultures. 
He argues that human rights are common values among different cultures. He writes, 
“Human rights are rather minimal moral requirements specifying whatis owed to all 
persons; hence agreement on them leaves open a great deal of room for disagreements 
on other ethical matters” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 149).57 In a word, cultural 
                                                                                                                                          
MacIntyre, Walzer and others (especially Walzer). Therefore, I do not use the term “cultural (ethical) 
relativism” here; instead, I directly discuss the callenge from Buchanan to these philosophers. See 
Brandt (1967) and Gowans (2004) for more details on cultural or ethical relativism.  
57 Buchanan argues further that if two conditions are satisfied, then at least some human rights can be 
considered as common values in different cultures. The first condition is that “the language of basic 




disagreements on ethical values and principles do not imply cultural disagreements on 
every human right. 
 Second, Buchanan thinks that different cultures can resolve at least some of 
their disagreements (on human rights or other ethical values) by reasoning. Buchanan 
argues that this is a direct challenge to MacIntyre, but this can also be a reply to other 
philosophers (such as Walzer) in general. Buchanan summarizes MacIntyre’s idea a
follows: “the justification of ethical judgments does occur, but can only occur within 
the framework of a cultural tradition, and that the differences that exist among 
cultural traditions make universally valid justifications for some ethical judgments 
impossible” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 152). In contrast with MacIntyre, Buchanan argues 
that cultural differences do not preclude a converging justification for ethical values. 
Particularly, Buchanan argues that cultural differences do not preclude rational 
agreements on human rights. If different cultures disagree on human rights, they can 
be changed in ways “that make such rational agreement [on human rights] possible” 
(Buchanan, 2004, p. 152).  
In summary, Buchanan concludes that different cultures either agree on the 
same list of human rights, or their disagreements can be resolved by reasoning 
(Buchanan, 2004, pp. 152-157). In other words, Buchanan thinks that (1) different 
cultures also have common values, and (2) different cultures can resolve their 
differences.  
 Now let me discuss how Bell would reply to Buchanan. Generally, Bell 
neither thinks that different cultures hold no common value at all, nor does he think 
                                                                                                                                          
condition is that “from an institutional standpoint, principles formulated in terms of human rights are
likely to do the best job of protecting the most important interests common to persons” (Buchanan, 




that none of the cultural disagreements can be resolved by reasoning. Therefore, it 
appears that Bell can reply to Buchanan’s view easily. Regarding Buchanan’s first 
point (i.e., different cultures have common values), Bell agrees that different cultures 
have some common values. Indeed, he argues that physical securities are common 
values between the East and the West. While Buchanan thinks that it is ambiguous to 
claim that different cultures have different ethical values or principles, Bll discusses 
such a difference clearly. The cultural difference between the East and the West is 
about the difference between Confucianism and liberalism. And the conclusion to 
such a cultural difference is that liberties are not human rights because liberti s 
conflict with East Asian cultures. In other words, he simply denies that liberties are 
common values between the East and the West.  
Regarding Buchanan’s second point (i.e., different cultures can resolve their 
differences), Bell may agree that different cultures can resolve some of th ir 
disagreements by reasoning and rationality. However, Buchanan cannot show that all 
cultural differences can eventually be resolved. Bell can still argue that the East and 
the West cannot resolve all differences. In this particular situation, Bell argues that 
the East and the West cannot resolve their differences on liberties. Bell can also argue 
that his argument is a rational argument. Although his argument is based on the 
cultural differences between the East and the West, it does not mean that the 
argument is not rational. It is simply the conclusion of his argument that liberties a e 
only Western rights but not East Asian rights (and hence not human rights). In other 
words, “liberties are not East Asian rights” is a conclusion of a rational argument, and 




The above example illustrates why Bell’s arguments are unique and 
significant. While Walzer and others claim that cultures are essential factors to the 
justification of human rights, Bell develops this claim further with substantial East 
Asian cultural contexts. And Bell’s arguments seem pri a facie reasonable. On one 
side, he neither thinks that cultures have no common values, nor they can never 
resolve their differences. Indeed, Bell thinks that physical securities are common 
values between the East and the West. Therefore, his arguments can avoid many 
challenges from human rights advocates. On the other side, he still emphasizes on the 
importance of East Asian cultures, and he concludes that liberties are not East Asian 
rights. Therefore, his arguments can satisfy those “cultural relativists” or other people 
who believe that cultures should play some roles in the human rights debate. In a 
word, his arguments can avoid the challenges from both sides. Therefore, his 
arguments are significant and unique.  
Now we have seen why Bell’s arguments are significant and unique, but there 
are also some problems and explanatory gaps in his arguments. He thinks that 
physical securities are universal rights. But why are physical securiti s universal 
rights? Or more precisely, why are they justified by every culture? Unfortunately, 
Bell does not explain that in detail. The only hint is that physical securities are “what 
Michael Walzer terms the ‘minimal and universal code’” (Bell, 2006a, p.79). But why 
is the “minimal and universal code” so important and sufficient to justify physical 
securities as universal rights? If physical securities are not East Asian rights, then 
they are not universal rights. Are physical securities East Asian rights? Particularly, 




explanation from Bell. I think this is a big explanatory gap in his argument. In the
next chapter, I shall discuss in depth how I am going to fill this gap.  
There are even more problems about his conclusion on liberties. He thinks 
that liberties are not East Asian rights, and hence they are not universal rights. 
Liberties are not East Asian rights because liberties conflict with somevalu s in Asia 
in the Confucian tradition. However, this explanation is not good enough. One may 
wonder if his examples are too biased or selective. There are so many different East 
Asian cultural factors. One may wonder if liberties conflict with all East Asian 
cultural factors. If not, then why should we just focus on those East Asian cultural 
factors that conflict with liberties? How should we choose between different East 
Asian cultural factors? Even if we limit the discussion to the Confucian tradition, the 
same problems still exist. As I have discussed in section 2.4, different scholars argue 
differently about the relationship between Confucianism and human rights. Since 
there are different parts of Confucianism, it is still unclear which parts of 
Confucianism should be selected. Even if we assume that the selection of East Asian 
cultural factors (or Confucian values) is not a problem, we can still ask another 
question. The question is: why liberties cannot be fundamental human goods in East 
Asia even if liberties conflict with some East Asian cultural factors? All of these 
questions require further explanation and analysis, but Bell has not successfully 
replied to any of these questions. Hence it appears that his arguments are still 
problematic because there are still many unsolved questions in his arguments. They 




The above questions focus on Bell’s two claims (i.e., physical securities are 
universal rights because they are minimal and universal codes; liberties are not 
universal rights because they conflict with some East Asian cultural contexts) 
independently. But even if we assume that each of these two claims has no problem at 
all, there are still some questions when we put them together. We can ask the 
following questions: Are liberties also minimal and universal codes? Do physical 
securities also conflict with some East Asian cultural contexts? If the answers for 
both of them are yes, then we shall raise another question: If both physical securities 
and liberties meet both of these conditions (i.e., they are minimal and universal codes; 
they conflict with some East Asian cultural contexts), then why are only physical 
securities universal rights but liberties are not universal rights? These ar  also the 
questions that Bell has not replied successfully. Again, I shall discuss them in the next 
chapters.  
In summary, I have discussed in this section the significances and the 
problems of Bell’s arguments. I have discussed that Bell’s arguments can avoid some 
traditional challenges to his side in the East and West debate on human rights. 
However, I have also discussed that his explanation is not clear enough, as to why 
physical securities are universal rights because they are minimal and universal moral 
codes. It is also not clear why liberties are not universal rights because they conflict 
with some East Asian cultural factors. It is even not clear how to put these two claims
together. All of them require further explanation, and Bell does not explain them 






Section 2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Bell and others try to argue that East Asian cultures have some specific roles 
in the East and West debate on human rights. Their goal is to limit the list of human 
rights for the East Asian cultural contexts. In this chapter, I have discussed two 
arguments which summarize and represent how they try to achieve such a goal.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I have discussed why human rights are 
universal rights. I have also shown that if X is not an East Asian right, then X is not a 
universal right. This means that the core part of the debate is about East Asian rights. 
And then I have discussed several essential elements appropriate to East Asian rights. 
I have discussed the philosophical account of the cultural justification of rights, and I 
have also discussed what East Asian cultural contexts are relevant to our discussion—
the relevant parts are Confucianism and its values.  
I have summarized Bell’s arguments in Argument 2 and 3. Bell argues that 
physical securities are East Asian rights or even universal rights because physical 
securities are minimal and universal codes. On the other hand, (civil and political) 
liberties are not justified in East Asia. Bell and others believe that there ar  different 
fundamental human goods in the West and in the East. Liberties are fundamental 
human goods in the West, but they are not fundamental human goods in the East. 
This is because liberties conflict with the Confucian tradition and values in Asia. In 
other words, liberties are not East Asian rights and hence they are not universal r ght . 
Therefore, Bell concludes that physical securities are human rights but liberties are 




 Such arguments about physical securities and liberties are quite significant 
and unique, and these arguments can avoid many challenges (such as the challenges 
from Buchanan). However, Bell and others have not successfully defended their 
arguments. It is unclear why the notion of a minimal and universal code is so 
important so that physical securities are universal rights. There are even mor  
questions for their arguments on liberties. Are liberties really in conflict with the 
Confucian tradition and values in Asia? And even if they are, does it really mean that 
liberties are not East Asian rights? We also have questions on how to put all of these 
conditions together. In short, there are many questions of why physical securities are 
East Asian (and universal) rights but liberties are not, but Bell has not answered th s  
questions successfully—indeed, he has not even answered or mentioned some of the 
questions I have discussed in this chapter.  
I would like to discuss these questions further in the next chapters. 
Specifically, I shall discuss physical securities and East Asian cultures in chapter 3, 
and then liberties and East Asian cultures in chapter 4. My aims are to analyze and 
improve the account of the cultural justification of rights, and I shall figure out 
whether it is really the case that physical securities are East Asian rights and universal 





Chapter 3: Physical Security Rights and East Asian Cultures 
 
Section 3.1 Introduction 
 If X is a universal right, then X is also an East Asian right. Since Bell argues 
that physical security rights are universal rights, and physical security righ s are 
universal rights only if physical security rights are East Asian rights, Bell also needs 
to show that physical security rights are East Asian rights. However, Bell’s arguments 
cannot successfully defend that physical security rights are East Asian rights. In this 
chapter, I discuss the problem of Bell’s arguments in detail, and I develop my own 
arguments to explain why physical security rights are both East Asian rights and 
universal rights.  
 Bell argues that liberties conflict with some Confucian values in Asia (i.e.,
values in the practical Confucian tradition). Similar to liberties, physical securities 
also conflict with some values in Asia. In section 3.2, I argue that physical securities 
also conflict with the practical Confucian tradition, but physical securities are 
compatible with the theoretical Confucian tradition. I argue that Bell cannot 
successfully explain the relationship between physical securities and different parts of 
Confucianism.  
 Bell mentions that physical securities are minimal values. However, he does 
not explain his idea further. I fill this explanatory gap in sections 3.3 and 3.4. In 
section 3.3, I discuss how minimal values are “embedded” in different maximal 




Confucianism. In section 3.4, I discuss what a minimal moral demand is, and why 
physical securities are minimal moral demands.  
 I develop two arguments in sections 3.5 and 3.6. I use the results from other 
sections in this chapter to defend the premises of these arguments. In section 3.5, I 
argue that the premises are a jointly sufficient condition for physical security rights 
being East Asian rights. In other words, this argument shows that physical security 
rights are East Asian rights because physical security rights meet all the premises of 
the argument. In section 3.6, I construct an argument to determine that physical 
security rights are universal rights. Moreover, an aim of these two sections is to 
develop some arguments that may also apply to liberties, which I discuss in the next 
chapter.  




Section 3.2 Physical Securities and Confucianism 
 Physical security rights are universal rights only if physical security rights are 
also East Asian rights. According to our discussion in chapter 2, this reasoning 
involves the account of the cultural justification of rights. A right is justified when the 
interest of the right-holder is weighty enough to place others under some duty, and 
the interest is a fundamental good in the right-holder’s culture. Are physical securities 
fundamental human goods in East Asian cultures? In the last chapter, I have describe  




fundamental human goods in East Asian cultures because physical securities are 
minimal and universal codes. I shall discuss this condition in the next sections. In thi  
section, I focus on the second condition, which says that liberties are not fundamental 
human goods in East Asian cultures because liberties conflict with some values in 
Asia. We may also ask the same question to physical securities: do physical securities 
conflict with some values in Asia? If physical securities conflict with some values in 
Asia, then physical securities are not East Asian rights as well.  
Since Bell thinks that physical security rights are universal rights (and hence 
East Asian rights), he probably would think that physical securities do not conflict 
with some values in Asia. However, this is unclear. In this section, I argue that 
physical securities conflict with some values in Asia, and I argue that this raises a 
problem for Bell’s arguments, i.e., what cultural factors are relevant to hisarguments? 
I explain this question clearly in this section. 
 In chapter 2, I mentioned that some scholars (such as Liu, 2007) divide 
Confucianism into different parts, such as a theoretical Confucian tradition and a 
practical Confucian tradition. Roughly, the theoretical Confucian tradition concerns 
the systematic thoughts of the metaphysics, ethics and political philosophy of 
Confucianism. On the other hand, the practical Confucian tradition is how 
Confucianism affects the real politics and people’s daily lives. Since Confucianism is 
the main tradition in East Asia, both theoretical and practical parts are important in 
East Asian regions. This division is important to our discussion because it seems that 
the theoretical Confucian tradition and the practical Confucian tradition treat physical 




values in the theoretical Confucian tradition, but physical securities also conflict with 
the practical Confucian tradition and with some values in this tradition.  
 Let me begin with the theoretical Confucian tradition. It seems that most of 
the Confucian philosophers agree that physical securities are important values in the 
theoretical Confucian tradition. Some scholars argue that the prohibitions against 
slavery, genocide, murder, torture, etc. (i.e., the list of physical securities we 
discussed before. See Bell, 2006a, pp. 23-51 &79) can be derived from basic 
Confucian virtues. Now let me use slavery and torture as two typical examples to 
illustrate such a view.58  
 Unlike Aristotle or some ancient Greek philosophers, no Confucian 
philosopher supports slavery explicitly. It even seems that slavery conflicts with ome 
basic Confucian virtues in the theoretical Confucian tradition. For example, humanity 
is a central concern in Confucianism, and some scholars believe that slavery conflicts 
with humanity.59 Slavery existed in ancient China for a long time, but some ancient 
Confucian philosophers tried to speak for the humane treatment to slaves. For 
example, Dong Zhongshu (179-104 B.C.), a Confucian philosopher in Han dynasty 
(206 B.C.-220 A.D.), argued that masters did not have the unequivocal power to kill 
their slaves; he also argues that law should have been made to prevent any cruelty to 
the slaves.60 Some contemporary scholars argue that slavery is incompatible with the 
theoretical Confucian tradition. For example, Leonard Shihlien Hsü writes, “The 
                                                
58 Due to the limited length of my dissertation, I only focus on slavery and torture. But the points I am 
going to make in this section are generally related to all physical securities.  
59 For example, in Hou Hanshu (Book of the Later Han), there is a Confucian saying “Of all things 
brought forth by Heaven, man is the most precious”. See the entry “Confucianism and Slavery” in 
Rodriguez (Ed.) (1997), pp. 186-187.  




Confucian School does not advocate slavery. In enumerating the six classes of people 
in the state… no mention is made of a slave class. According to the Confucian system 
of social organization, all the manual work should be done in the family by the 
children, in society, by young men; in the government, by the government employees. 
There is no need for slaves” (Hsü, 1932, p. 188). Most ancient Confucian 
philosophers not only disagreed with slavery, but they also had no slave.61 Hsü’s 
conclusion is that “Slavery has no place in the Confucian system” (p.197). Although 
this conclusion is debatable, it at least shows that slavery is controversial in the 
theoretical Confucian tradition, and at least some Confucian philosophers are inclined 
to reject slavery.  
 Now let us discuss torture in East Asia. For convenience, I only discuss 
torture in the laws of East Asia. Similar to slavery, torture is also denied in the
theoretical Confucian tradition. In the ancient China, torture was used in trials and 
legal punishment. Yet it is argued that the theoretical Confucian tradition rejects 
torture being used in both ways. Let me discuss two evidences here.  
 First, torture conflicts with the most basic Confucian virtue, ren. According to 
Mencius, “no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others 
[compassion]…whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human.” Mencius 
then further argues that “the heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence [ren].”62 
In other words, the beginning point of ren is compassion, that is, a mind that cannot 
                                                
61 For example, Hsü writes, “Confucius himself, for example, had no slave. The drivers of his carriage 
were his pupils; and he said that for himself he would ‘take up driving as a profession’. The idea is that 
everyone should learn the duties of a servant and thus serve himself” (Hsü, 1932, p. 188). Hsü also 
cites The Analects 10:2 to support his view. 




bear to see the suffering of others. Some scholars argue that torture directly conflicts 
with such compassion.63 Since every Confucian agrees that ren is the most basic 
virtue for everyone, and ren is based on such compassion, ideally Confucianism 
should reject torture in any circumstance.   
 Second, the theoretical Confucian tradition also rejects torture as a means in a 
trial or for legal punishment. In the theoretical Confucian tradition, legal punishment 
is often considered inferior to education and li (translated as rites or rituals). They 
argue that it is better to focus on education or li rather than legal punishment or legal
system in general. For example, Confucius writes, “Lead the people with government 
regulations and organize them with penal law (“xing”), and they will avoid 
punishments but will be without shame. Lead them with virtue and organize them 
through the li, and the people will have a sense of shame and moreover will become 
humane people of good character.”64 In short, scholars argue that law and legal 
punishment is not important in the theoretical Confucian tradition. Since torture 
conflicts with ren, and law and legal punishment are not that important in the 
theoretical Confucian tradition, scholars generally believe that Confucianism rejects 
torture as a tool in trials or legal punishment.65  
 We may conclude from the above examples that the theoretical Confucian 
tradition does not accept slavery or torture. In other words, the prohibitions of slavery 
and torture do not conflict with the theoretical Confucian tradition. In general, the 
                                                
63 For example, Sam Crane (2009) has informally discus ed this point in his blog: 
http://uselesstree.typepad.com/useless_tree/2009/04/mencius-on-torture.html   
Although he has not provided a solid argument there, I think it is worth considering such a possible 
interpretation to torture and ren. He also refers to Mencius 6A:14 and 7A:17 to support his point.  
64 The Analects 2:3. The translation is from Peerenboom (1998), p. 445.  




theoretical Confucian tradition also has the same attitude to other physical securities. 
That is, physical securities do not conflict with the values in the theoretical Confucia  
tradition or the tradition itself.  
Compared to the theoretical Confucian tradition, the practical Confucian 
tradition treated slavery and torture differently. Generally, slavery and torture 
happened frequently and regularly in the history of East Asia. And more importantly, 
slavery and torture were even considered as useful instruments to maintain order 
family and society. In other words, slavery and torture could be instruments to protect 
some values in Asia.  
 Slavery existed in East Asia for a long period. Some scholars suggests that 
slavery existed in China as early as the time of Xia dynasty (around 2205-1706 B.C.). 
Historians disagree on whether slavery really existed in China in such an early period, 
but they generally agree that slavery existed in China at least b fore Qin dynasty (i.e., 
before 221 B.C.). In the Han dynasty, when Confucian began to be the official 
ideology of ruler-ship in real politics, slavery was also legally establi hed in China. 
Since then, slavery has existed in every dynasty when Confucianism was the official 
ideology. There was state slavery and private slavery. State slaves were usually major 
criminals, family members or relatives of major criminals, prisoners of war, and the 
offspring of state slaves. Private slaves were traded in the market; owners er  
usually government officials, landlords, or rich merchants. Private slaves wer not 
used primarily for profit-making production. Private slaves were primarily used for 
household services. In other words, they were employed as personal servants and 




come until 1909 A.D. (and Confucianism, as the official ideology in China, was also 
criticized heavily at that time). Slavery also existed in other East Asian (Confucian) 
regions. For example, Korea had slavery until its abolition in 1895 A.D. In short, 
slavery existed in East Asia until recent decades (around a century ago).66  
 In the practical Confucian tradition, torture was approved and occurred 
frequently. Let me discuss two examples in the legal system of imperial China before 
1911 A.D. The first example is about confession in a trial. According to Conner, in 
order to determine if a defendant was guilty, a confession from the defendant was 
often required. Conner writes, “In theory, requiring confessions should have provided 
the highest protection for the innocent…in practice, of course, this insistence on the 
confession led inevitably and fatally to the use of torture, as did the requirement of a 
‘complete proof’ in the European inquisitorial system. In China, as in Europe, there 
developed jurisprudence of torture rather than simply of confessions or proof: the law 
of confessions was in reality the law of torture” (Conner, 1999, p. 181). There were 
many ways to torture a defendant, such as “the use of pressing sticks to squeeze the 
ankles or fingers [of the defendant]” (p. 182). The purpose of this kind of torture was 
to force the defendant to confess his or her crime whenever the evidence is clear and 
certain. Although there were regulations and codes to prohibit improper use of 
torture, torture was undoubtedly abused frequently.67  
 Torture was also used as a legal punishment in East Asia. The most famous 
torture penalty in China was called “lingchi” (translated as “slow slicing” or “death 
                                                
66 The history and information I discuss in this paragraph is taken from: entries of “China,” “Korea” in 
Finkelman & Miller (Eds.) (1998); entries of “China, Ancient,” “China, Later Imperial,” “China, 
Medieval,” “Confucianism and Slavery,” “East Asia,” and “Korea” in Rodriguez (Ed.) (1997).  




by a thousand cut”).68 Lingchi was a death penalty, but the purpose of this penalty 
was not only to kill the person, but also to cause great pain to the person. It involved 
some degree of dismemberment while the person was living. The execution consisted 
of cuts to different parts of the body, such as amputation of limbs. It was a penalty of 
both torture and execution. Although lingchi was so cruel and inhumane, it was not 
abolished in China until 1905 A.D.—only a bit more than a century ago.69 
 From the above examples, we find that slavery and torture were important 
tools in the practical Confucian tradition. State slavery was a legal punishment for 
criminals and prisoners of war. Private slavery was also important to many families in 
East Asia because these families had many members living in the same place, and so 
these families needed many domestic servants. And in the past, private slavery w s 
the only source of domestic servants. Torture was also an important tool in trial and 
legal punishment. One may argue that slavery and torture were important tools to 
protect and promote family values and national values in East Asia. In the practical 
Confucian tradition, physical securities are subject to trade-offs with these valu s in 
Asia. Physical securities, in this sense, conflict with some other values in the practical 
Confucian tradition.  
 I do not deny that this is an incomplete picture of how different parts of 
Confucianism treat physical securities differently. But the purpose here is not to 
discuss every detail of the history of physical securities and Confucianism in East 
Asia. The purpose of the above discussion is simply to conclude that physical 
securities are controversial in different parts of the Confucian tradition, and I believe 
                                                
68 It is unclear whether lingchi originated in China or in other countries. 




that I have already discussed enough details to support such a conclusion. Now let me 
put this conclusion back into our debate.  
At the beginning of this section, I have mentioned that the main debate here is 
whether physical securities are fundamental human goods in every culture so that 
physical security rights are universal rights. One question of this debate is whether 
physical securities conflict with some values in the Confucian tradition. We can now 
see that the answer to this question is complicated. We have already seen that “the
Confucian tradition” is a long name with different parts, and some parts may even 
conflict with others. Generally, it is quite common that culture itself has internal 
conflicts and contradictory social phenomenon.70 Different parts of a culture (or a 
tradition) may treat things differently, and the Confucian tradition is no exception in 
this. In this particular situation, physical securities conflict with the practic l 
Confucian tradition but not the theoretical Confucian tradition. This is a problem for 
Bell’s arguments. Bell thinks that X is not an East Asian right if X conflicts wi h 
some values in Asia. But it is always unclear which values should be selected, 
especially when some values in Asia may even conflict with some other values in 
Asia. Therefore, it is a general problem for Bell because he needs to explain how to 
select the cultural factors that are relevant to his arguments.  
Which part of the Confucian tradition is relevant here? And why is it relevant?  
Bell has mentioned that he wants to “modernize” Confucianism.71 He believes that 
we should “bridge the gap between the political philosophy of the ancient texts and 
the political reality of contemporary society,” and he tries “to distinguish between 
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traditional values which are still relevant today and others which have been rel gated 
to the ‘dustbin’ of history. That is, we need to know that values continue to have 
widespread impact on people’s political behavior in contemporary societies”; he also 
wants to “develop normative arguments which would explain why certain values 
should continue to remain influential and why others shouldn’t” (Bell, 1998a, p.20). 
In this particular situation, Bell would probably argue that when physical securiti s 
conflict with the practical Confucian tradition, East Asian should give up the practical 
Confucian tradition rather than physical securities. He probably would think that the 
practical Confucian tradition (especially the part against physical se urities) is a part 
of Confucian tradition that should be abandoned. Otherwise he cannot hold a position 
that physical securities are East Asian rights and universal rights. Since he thinks that 
physical securities are universal rights, he should give up the practical Confucian 
tradition.  
 It seems that most contemporary East Asian countries would agree with Bell. 
Nowadays, most East Asians do not believe in the values against physical securities 
anymore. In the past, most countries with the practical Confucian tradition 
implemented torture in the legal system, and slavery was essential to maintain the 
daily running of a big family. Nevertheless, in current East Asia, such a practical 
Confucian tradition is not a dominant ideology in politics and society anymore. With 
the exception of Singapore and Malaysia, many East Asian countries have changd 
their attitude to slavery and torture; most of them now legally prohibit slavery and 
torture.72 Indeed, every culture is continuously changing and developing. In the past, 
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slavery and torture were accepted in many cultures. But now, prohibitions of slavery 
and torture can be found in most countries in the world. These changes (from 
accepting to prohibiting slavery and torture) are occurring not only in East Asia but 
throughout the whole world (including the Western world). 
 Therefore, it seems that Bell is not mistaken to think that we should give up 
the practical Confucian tradition rather than physical securities. I also agree that we 
should give up the practical Confucian tradition rather than physical securities. But 
this does not solve all our problems here. Generally, it is unclear which cultural 
factors should be preserved, and which cultural factors should be abandoned. 
Particularly, we still need to ask why we should give up the practical Confucian 
tradition rather than other East Asian traditions or physical securities.73   
In summary, it is now clear why it is not easy to determine whether physical 
securities are important fundamental human goods in East Asian cultures (especially 
in the Confucian tradition). Bell and others believe that physical security rights are 
universal rights and hence East Asian rights. However, physical securities conflict 
with some values in the practical Confucian tradition. But it seems that these 
Confucian values can be changed or even abandoned in East Asia. So, how do we 
determine which cultural factors should remain influential, and which should not? 
Bell does not explain this further, but I think there is a hint here. The hint is that Bell 
claims that physical securities are “minimal and universal codes.” In the next 
sections, I shall discuss this in depth.  
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Section 3.3 Minimal Values and Maximal Theories 
 As discussed in the last section, it is not easy to figure out which East Asian 
cultural factors, especially which parts of Confucianism, are relevant to our 
discussion. And the main purpose of this chapter is to figure out why physical 
securities are universal rights (and East Asian rights), which we have not answered in 
the last section.  Bell has suggested a hint to answer both questions, but he has not 
elaborated it. The hint is that he thinks that physical securities are “minimal and 
universal moral codes.” 
 In chapter 2, I have discussed a passage from Bell, which says that “there is 
little debate over the desirability of a core set of human rights, such as prohibitions 
against slavery, genocide, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and 
systematic racial discrimination,” and these rights are not controversial because they 
are “what Michael Walzer terms the ‘minimal and universal moral code’” (B ll, 
2006a, p.79).74 What is “minimal and universal code”? Unfortunately, Bell does not 
explain this term at all. All we know is that it is from Walzer (e.g. 1987, 1994). So, 
the first step here is to figure out what Walzer says about minimal and universal code.  
 Here is what Walzer says: 
 
It is nonetheless true that the moral question is commonly put in more general 
terms than the legal question. The reason for this can only be that morality is 
                                                
74 There is a footnote after the term “minimal and universal code” in this quotation from Bell. The 
footnote says that the references are Walzer (1987), p. 24 and Walzer (1994). Therefore, I mainly focus 




in fact more general than law. Morality provides those basic prohibitions—of 
murder, deception, betrayal, gross cruelty—that the law specifies and the 
police sometimes enforce…These prohibitions constitute a kind of minimal 
and universal moral code. Because they are minimal and universal (I should 
say almost universal, just to protect myself against the odd anthropological 
example), they can be represented as philosophical discoveries or inventions. 
(Walzer, 1987, pp. 23-24)  
 
 
Before I begin the discussion of Walzer’s idea, I need to clarify one point. 
Although Walzer uses the term “minimal and universal moral code” in his early 
writings (e.g., Walzer 1987), Walzer mainly focuses on the notion of “minimal” only; 
it does not matter whether it is a moral code or not. Indeed, in his later writings (e.g. 
Walzer 1994), Walzer also uses other terms such as “minimal morality,” 
“minimalism,” “minimal moral values,” “thin account of morality,” etc. It seems to 
me that Walzer uses all of these terms interchangeably. Therefore, in this dissertation, 
I also consider them meaning the same, and only use the term “minimal values.”  
Walzer discusses minimal values in many different ways. For the purpose of 
our discussion, three questions are especially important: (1) How are minimal values
relevant to cultural factors? (2) What are minimal values? (3) Why physical se urities 
are universal rights because they are minimal values? None of these questions can be 
answered in a simple way. Therefore, I discuss each of them in detail in different 
sections. In this section, I discuss the first question. I discuss the second question in 




Walzer focuses a lot on how minimal values are relevant to cultural factors. 
The core idea from Walzer is that minimal values are embedded in maximal theories. 
Walzer points out that a main difference between minimal values and maximal 
theories is that minimal values are realized in all cultures, but maximal theories are 
particular and unique in each culture. Walzer does not think that minimal values and 
maximal theories are two independent moralities. In his early writings (e. ., Walzer 
1987), Walzer used the term elaboration to explain the relationship between minimal 
values and maximal theories. He once believed that minimal values are elaborated as 
different maximal theories in different cultures, but later thinks that elaboration 
cannot catch his meaning completely.75 Walzer changes his mind and believes that 
maximal theories are not based on minimal values; the reverse is more likely—that is, 
minimal values come from maximal theories. Each culture has its own maximal 
theories, and maximal theories in every culture have the same set of moral values, 
which are minimal moral values. Walzer thinks this is what is meant by saying that 
minimal values are mbedded in maximal theories. To illustrate, let me discuss two 
examples from Walzer to explain his idea in depth.  
The first example is about the protest in Prague in 1989. Walzer claims that he 
understands the signs “truth” and “justice” in the protest. For example, he writes, “It 
is a picture of people marching in the streets of Prague; they carry signs, some of 
which say, simply, ‘Truth’ and others ‘Justice’. When I saw the picture, I knew 
                                                
75 He writes, “Philosophers most often describe it [the dualism of minimalism and maximalism] in 
terms of a (thin) set of universal principles adapted (thickly) to these or those historical circumstances. 
I have in the past suggested the image of a core moality differently elaborated in different 
cultures. …But our intuition is wrong here. Morality s thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, 
fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned to 




immediately what the signs meant—and so did everyone else who saw the same 
picture” (Walzer, 1994, p. 1). But he also claims that we (non-Prague people) know 
some extra meanings of these signs from our own cultural perspectives. He argues 
that “while we march in spirit with the men and women of Prague, we have in fact 
our own parade” (Walzer, 1994, p. 8).  
According to Walzer, “we march in spirit with the men and women of Prague” 
is a minimal value, but “we have in fact our own parade” is a maximal theory. More 
precisely, Walzer believes that some minimal values of justice are very simple, such 
as “an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law enforcement, the abolition of 
the privileges and prerogatives of the party elite—common, garden variety justice” 
(Walzer, 1994, p.2). These minimal values can be found in both maximal moral 
theories of Prague and maximal moral theories of America. Nevertheless, Walzer also 
emphasizes that those maximal moral theories in America are different rom hose in 
Prague. For example, he believes that maximal theories in Prague are different from 
some American theories of Justice, such as “utilitarian equality or John Rawls’ 
difference principle or any philosophical theory of desert or merit or entitlement” 
(Walzer, 1994, p.2). In short, Walzer believes that people from different cultures have 
different maximal moral theories. Although the maximal theories are different, some 
minimal values are shared by both cultures. He therefore also believes that we can all 
agree that there can be some minimal values of justice and truth shared by different 
cultures.  
Perhaps the second example, the development of democracy in China, is more 




and human rights in China from the Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
Then he argues the following: 
 
But this readiness reflected a morally (and politically) minimalist position: 
solidarity with all the students, despite the disagreements among them, against
the tyrants. I certainly did not believe then that American political idealism 
was about to be realized in China, or that it should be realized. Nor did I have 
an abstract and universal theory of ‘true democracy’ to urge upon the 
Chinese…I do defend the minimal rights of Chinese, as of Czech, 
demonstrators. But there are unknown and therefore abstract individuals: 
minimal rights are all they have… Since I know very little about their socety, 
I cannot foist upon the Chinese this or that set of rights—certainly not my own 
preferred set. So I defer to them as empirical and social individuals. They 
must make their own claims, their own codifications (a Chinese bill of 
rights?), and their own interpretative arguments. (Walzer, 1994, pp. 59-61) 
 
In this example, something such as “against the tyrants” is a minimal value; 
something such as “American political idealism” is only a maximal theory in 
America. Walzer argues that such an American maximal theory should not be 
realized in China, and there should be other maximal theories in China. In general, 
Walzer emphasizes the importance of maximal theories; he argues that eac  culture 
has its own maximal theories and one should not apply maximal theories of one 
culture to another culture. But Walzer also agrees that there are minimal values




that Chinese culture probably has some unique claims on these minimal values as 
well, and these minimal values are limited and rely on maximal moral theories. In 
short, he believes that minimal values such as minimal rights and against the tyrants 
can be found in maximal theories of both American and Chinese cultures.  
 Although Walzer’s main purpose is to emphasize the importance of maximal 
theories, Walzer does not deny minimal values at all. In summary, Walzer uses the  
examples to illustrate how minimal values are embedded in maximal theories. 
Generally, Walzer believes that everyone in the world would agree that something 
like justice, minimal rights, against the tyrants, etc. are important. But their agr ement 
is very limited —they only agree that these minimal values are important, but they do 
not agree on why and how they are important. In other words, they do not agree on 
those maximal moral theories in different cultures. In this sense, Walzer emphasizes 
the importance of maximal theories, and he points out that minimal values have their 
limits. In addition to the minimal values, we also need maximal theories. Maximal 
theories can be some interpretations of minimal values, or they may be reasons and 
arguments to support minimal values. This is why Walzer believes that minimal 
values are “not the foundation of the maximalism, only a piece of it” (Walzer, 1994, 
p.18). This is how Walzer thinks that minimal values are embedded in maximal 
theories, and how minimal values are relevant to different cultural factors.  
Now let me put all of these points back into our discussion of physical 
securities and East Asian cultures. Bell believes that physical securities a e minimal 
values. Are they? Walzer has listed different minimal values in his writings. For our 




see whether physical securities are minimal values. As I have discussed at th  
beginning of this section, Walzer lists prohibitions of murder, deception, betrayal, and 
gross cruelty as “minimal and universal codes” (Walzer, 1987, pp.23-24). He also 
recognizes elsewhere that prohibitions of torture, slavery, and genocide are also 
minimal values (e.g. Walzer, 1977; 1995, p. 293). Therefore, it is safe to conclude 
that Walzer agrees that physical securities are minimal values. And it is now easier 
for us to understand why Bell agrees with Walzer. This is because Bell may use 
Walzer’s notion to support his argument. Bell wishes to conclude that physical 
securities are universal rights, and then the main question is whether physical 
securities are fundamental human goods that are weighty enough to place others 
under some duty. Bell can answer that physical securities are such fundamental 
human goods because physical securities are minimal values. Therefore, physical 
securities are universal rights.76 
But if physical securities are universal rights, then how are physical securiti s 
related to East Asian cultures, especially Confucianism? As I discussed in ction 3.2, 
a problem is that the Confucian tradition has internet conflicts on this issue; that is,
different parts of the Confucian tradition treat physical securities differently. While 
the theoretical Confucian tradition can accept physical securities as important values, 
the practical Confucian tradition denies physical securities, especially when physical 
                                                
76 Although Walzer thinks that the language of rights is the language of Western moral maximalism, he 
also believes that the language of rights is “translatable” to other cultures. Therefore, it is likely that 
Walzer will agree with Bell that physical securities are universal rights. Walzer writes, “Perhaps the 
end product of this effort will be a set of standards to which all societies can be held… Among 
ourselves, late twentieth century Americans or Europeans, these standards will probably be expressed 
in the language of rights, which is the language of our own moral maximalism… But that is not a bad 
way of talking about injuries and wrongs that no one should have to endure, and I assume that it is 
translatable” (Walzer, 1994, p. 10). Moreover, Walzer has also argued elsewhere that life, liberty, and 
subsistence are human rights (Walzer, 2007, pp. 251-263). I discuss Walzer’s view on liberties further 




securities conflict with national values and family values. In short, physical se urities 
conflict with the practical Confucian tradition but are quite compatible with the 
theoretical Confucian tradition. How should we explain the relationship between 
physical securities and different parts of Confucianism?  
Walzer would probably say that physical securities are minimal values, but 
they are also embedded in maximal moral theories of different cultures; particularly, 
they are embedded in Confucianism. But we need to explain how physical securities 
are embedded in Confucianism. Walzer does not explain this very precisely, even 
though he emphasizes the importance and particularity of each culture. I need to 
explain this further for him. It seems to me that two important points are especially 
relevant to the explanation of how physical securities are embedded in Confucianism. 
Let me discuss them one by one.  
The first point is that Walzer does not directly explain how many maximal 
moral theories there are in each culture, but a reasonable assumption is that there can 
be more than one maximal moral theory in each culture. For example, Walzer argues 
in his Prague example that maximal theories in Prague or Czech are probably 
different from maximal theories in America, such as utilitarianism or Rawls’s theory 
of justice (Walzer, 1994, p. 2). I think Walzer assumes that utilitarianism, Rawls’s 
theory of justice, or even some other moral and political theories, are all maximal 
moral theories in American or Western cultures. This means that there can be my 
different maximal moral theories in each culture. In general, when Walzer claims that 
minimal values are embedded in maximal theories, this only means that minimal 




each culture. There can be different maximal moral theories in a culture, and they 
may be incompatible. It is not necessary to assume that minimal values are embedd d 
in all maximal moral theories of each culture.  
Now let me put this idea back into our discussion of Confucianism. As I have 
already discussed, physical securities conflict with the practical Confucian tradition 
but not the theoretical Confucian tradition. Walzer or Bell has not directly discussed 
how many maximal theories there can be in Confucianism or East Asian cultures. Bt 
it is reasonable to assume that there can be many maximal theories in the practical 
Confucian tradition and maximal theories in the theoretical Confucian tradition. I 
think Walzer would agree that physical securities are only embedded in some 
maximal theories in the theoretical Confucian tradition but not embedded in other 
maximal theories in the practical Confucian tradition.  
 The second point is more complicated. Walzer thinks that minimal values are 
shared by all cultures; we always find minimal values somewhere in each culture. But 
it seems that he treats maximal theories differently; all he requires is that t is possible 
to develop some maximal theories of the minimal values in the culture. Let me 
discuss an example to illustrate this view.  
Walzer mentions that “against the tyrants” is a minimal value shared by both 
Western and Chinese cultures (Walzer, 1994, pp. 59-61), but he has not explained 
how “against the tyrants” is embedded in some maximal theories in Chinese culture, 
especially in Confucianism. I agree that “against the tyrants” is a minimal value in 
Confucianism; some Confucian philosophers have proposed such a value. For 




the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” (Mencius, 
2003, p. 315). For another example, in Mencius 1B:8, Mencius also shows that he is 
strongly against the tyrants: 
 
King Hsüan of Ch’I [King Xuan of Qi] asked, “Is it true that T’ang [Tang] 
banished Chieh [Jie] and King Wu marched against Tchou [Zhou]?” 
“It is so recorded,” answered Mencius. 
“Is regicide permissible?” 
“He who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator; he who cripples 
rightness is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an 
‘outcast.’ I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Tchou 
[Zhou],’ but I have not heard of any regicide.” (Mencius, 2003, p. 43)77 
 
In this passage, Mencius even claims that killing a tyrant (King Tchou [Zhou]) is not 
a problem at all; this shows that Mencius is strongly against the tyrants.78 Mencius is 
not the only philosopher who proposes the value of “against the tyrants.” Confucius 
also has a similar thought; one may even argue that Mencius’ idea on “against the 
tyrants” comes from Confucius.79 It seems that it is safe to conclude that “against the 
tyrants” is a minimal value in the theoretical Confucian tradition.  
However, in the history of East Asia (such as China, Korea, and Japan), there 
was no fully developed maximal theory of “against the tyrants” in Confucianism. 
                                                
77 D.C. Lau translates all these names by the Wade-Giles system; hence I also provide the pinyin 
translation in square-parentheses.  
78 See also Wing-Tsit Chan (1963), pp. 63&76 for his comments on Mencius. 
79 For example, Confucius thinks that it does not matter to say something that is true but offensive  to 




Indeed, Confucianism, or at least the practical Confucian tradition, was always used 
as a school of thought to support tyrants in history. But it is possible to develop a 
Confucian maximal theory based on the minimal value “against the tyrants.” For 
example, Fung (1948) interprets Mencius’ philosophy in this way:  
 
If a ruler lacks the ethical qualities that make a good leader, the people have 
the moral right of revolution. In that case, even the killing of the ruler is no 
longer a crime of regicide. This is because, according to Mencius, if a 
sovereign does not act as he ideally ought to do, he morally ceases to be a 
sovereign and, following Confucius’ theory of the rectification of names, is a 
“mere fellow.” as Mencius says. … These ideas of Mencius have exercised a 
tremendous influence in Chinese history, even as late as the revolution of 
1911, which led to the establishment of the Chinese Republic. It is true that 
modern democratic ideas from the West played their role too in this event, but 
the ancient native concept of the “right of revolution” had a greater influence 
on the mass of the people. (Fung, 1948, p. 74)  
 
In the above passage, Fung discusses how the idea from Mencius (i.e., the idea of 
“against the tyrants”) influences the revolution and establishment of Chinese 
Republic in 1911.  This is an example of how it is possible to develop a Confucian 
maximal theory in Chinese culture. Fung is not the only philosopher who develops a 
Confucian maximal theory of the minimal value “against the tyrants.” For another 




possible to develop a maximal theory of human rights and democracy in East Asia, 
and such a theory is against the idea that “Asian values” conflict with democracy and 
human rights. For example, he writes, “Indeed, the reading of Confucianism that is 
now standard among authoritarian champions of Asian values does less than justice to 
the variety within Confucius’s own teachings. Confucius did not recommend blind 
allegiance to the state. … Confucius is not averse to practical caution and tact, but 
does not forgo the recommendation to oppose a bad government” (pp.234-235).80 
These examples show that it is possible to develop some maximal theories of 
“against the tyrants” in East Asian cultures. We do not always have a maximal theory 
of a minimal value, but all we need here is simply a possibility to develop a maximal 
theory of a minimal value. This means that it is also good enough when it is possible 
to develop a maximal theory of physical securities in the theoretical Confucia  
tradition. This possibility is all we need to say that physical securities are embedded 
in some maximal theories of the theoretical Confucian tradition.  
There are different possibilities to develop a maximal theory of a minimal 
value, but all of them must fulfill the following two requirements. The first 
requirement is like this. It does not matter whether a minimal value is in the main 
stream of the culture, but at least we find the minimal value somewhere in the cultur . 
For example, the minimal values such as “against the tyrants,” “against torture,” or 
“against slavery” were not major values in the history of Confucianism (especially in 
the practical Confucian tradition). However, we still find them in the philosophy of 
                                                
80 See Sen (1999), pp. 227-248 for more details. Some contemporary Chinese philosophers, such as 
Hsu Foo-kwan, Mou Chung-san and T'ang Chun-I, also rgue that Confucianism has the “seed” of 




Confucius and the philosophy of Mencius. In other words, we find these values in 
Confucianism. Therefore, the first requirement is fulfilled.  
The second requirement is that every maximal theory is required to be 
logically consistent with its minimal value. A maximal theory says something more 
than its minimal values does, but they do not have any conflict. In the above example, 
the maximal theories from Fung and Sen are all consistent with the minimal value 
“against the tyrants.” The maximal theories of physical securities in the theoretical 
Confucian tradition (such as the one from Hsü, 1932) are all consistent with the 
minimal values such as “against slavery,” “against torture,” etc. In this sense, the 
second requirement is also fulfilled. It is possible to develop a maximal theory of a 
minimal value only when these two requirements are fulfilled.  
In summary, I have clarified two points here.  I have shown that minimal 
values are embedded in maximal theories if (1) it is po sible to develop (2) some (i.e., 
at least one) maximal theories of the minimal values. I also have shown that why it is 
possible to develop some maximal theories of physical securities in the theoretical 
Confucian tradition. This answers one of our questions (i.e., how are minimal values 
relevant to cultural factors?). However, we still need to answer other questions. We 
need to explain what a minimal value is, and we also need to discuss why physical 
securities are East Asian rights and universal rights. I shall discuss them one by one in 






Section 3.4 From Minimal Moral Demand to Human Dignity 
Walzer focuses a lot on how minimal values are embedded in maximal 
theories. But what is a minimal value? A suggestion is that it is a minimal mor l
demand. In this section, I discuss what a minimal moral demand is, and then I discuss 
why physical securities are minimal moral demands.   
Walzer emphasizes in his writings that the word “minimal” does not refer to 
anything minor or unimportant. Indeed, he thinks that “the opposite is more likely 
true,” that is, minimal morality is something so basic and important that no one 
should violate or deny it. He writes:  
 
I want to stress (though it should already be obvious) that ‘minimalism’ does 
not describe a morality that is substantively minor or emotionally shallow. 
The opposite is more likely true: this is morality close to the bone…the 
minimal demands that we make on one another are, when denied, repeated 
with passionate insistence. (Walzer, 1994, p. 6)  
 
In other words, minimal value is a minimal moral demand. Such a moral demand is 
minimal in the sense that no one should deny this demand because it is “close to the 
bone.” But what is “close to the bone”? And what demands are so “close to the bone” 
and hence no one should deny them? Furthermore, we know that Walzer and Bell 
believe that physical securities are minimal moral demands, so we can ask this further 




 It is not easy to find the answers simply based on Walzer’s idea. He has only 
briefly mentioned the idea of minimal moral demand, and then he focuses more on 
how it is embedded in maximalism. In addition to Walzer’s idea, I want to discuss 
other ideas as well. Since this is a debate on human rights, I am going to focus on the 
ideas about what minimal moral demands are relevant to human rights. Let me 
discuss the works from some philosophers (e.g., Shue, 1996; Li. 2006; and Nickel, 
2007) as examples of these ideas. 
Henry Shue’s basic rights (physical security, subsistence, and liberty) are 
human rights. He believes that basic rights protect people that are too weak to protect 
themselves and that this protection is a moral shield. He writes, “Basic rights are a 
shield for the defenseless against at least some of the more devastating and more 
common of life’s threats…Basic rights are the morality of the depths. They specify 
the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink” (Shue, 1996, p. 18). Shue also 
thinks that such a protection of the defenseless should be extended to everyone. He 
argues that basic rights are “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest 
of humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no 
self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept” (Shue, 1996, p. 19).81 
Xiaorong Li (2006) generally shares a similar view with Shue.82 She also thinks that 
“no human being should be allowed to sink below the minimal threshold of human 
life, where a life would be so deprived or harmed to be minimally good or dignified” 
                                                
81 Shue himself focuses more on the following claim: “rights are basic in the sense used here only if 
enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights” (Shue, 1996, p. 19). However, we 
are not discussing the relationship of rights here. I discuss Shue’s idea further in chapter 4, section 4.3.  
82 Notice that unlike Shue, Li thinks that liberal rights are neither basic nor minimal rights (in her 
terminology, liberal rights are extrinsic rights but not inherent rights). Their views are similar in terms 
of the meaning of the minimal moral demand, not the list of minimal rights. For further detail of the 




(Li, 2006, p. 132). Li also writes that “this fundamental value claim, ‘it is right (or 
good) to safeguard the essential necessities of a minimally decent human life,’ will be 
referred to as the minimalist conception of human good or human dignity, i.e. the 
notion that the necessary conditions for a minimally good or dignified life are a 
common fundamental value” (Li, 2006, p. 132). Note that many human rights 
advocates generally agree on the concept of minimal moral demand (though they may 
disagree on the content of it). For example, James Nickel also thinks that human 
rights provide a minimal protection to people. He writes, “Human rights set minimum 
standards; they do not attempt to describe an ideal social and political world. They 
leave most political decisions in the hands of national leaders and electorates. Still, 
they are demanding standards that impose significant constraints on legislation, 
policy-making, and official behavior” (Nickel, 2007, p. 10). In summary, their 
general claim, which may be called a “minimal account of human rights,” is that 
human rights provide a minimal protection to everyone, and no one should be allowed 
to sink below a minimal threshold of human life.83  
 For the purpose of this section, we do not need to discuss why and how human 
rights provide a minimal protection to everyone. The important part is that the 
minimal threshold of human life is a line that no one should sink below. When 
Walzer thinks that no one should deny a minimal moral demand, Shue and Li argue 
that such a demand is a line that no one should sink below it. When Walzer thinks 
that minimal moral demands are moral values that are “close to the bone” (Walzer, 
                                                
83 Other philosophers who also hold a minimal account f human rights include Michael Ignatieff 
(2001) and Joshua Cohen (2004).  On the other hand, Joseph Raz (2010) and Charles Beitz (2009) 
argue against such a minimal account of human rights. I discuss Beitz’s idea further in chapter 5, 




1994, p. 6), Shue and Li have shown us that one of these “bones” is a minimal 
threshold of human life. We can combine their points together and summarize into the 
following statement: a minimal moral demand is a minimal threshold of human life 
which no one should sink below. 
 The above statement helps us to understand further why physical securities are 
minimal moral demands. Physical securities are minimal moral demands if phys cal 
securities are minimal thresholds of human life, and no one should sink below these 
minimal thresholds. For example, prohibition to slavery and torture are all minimal 
thresholds of human life and no one should sink below these lines (i.e., no one should 
be enslaved, tortured, etc.).  But we need further explanations about what it means by 
saying that something is a minimal threshold of human life.  
 The minimal threshold of human life is not only about the necessary 
conditions for survival. For example, air is a necessary element for the survival of 
human beings, but this is not our concern here. The minimal threshold of human life 
is a line that if anyone sinks below it, he or she “would be so deprived or harmed to 
be minimally good or dignified” (Li, 2006, p. 132). In other words, the minimal 
threshold of human life is about how to protect the dignity of every individual.  
The term “dignity” appears frequently in many international human rights 
documents. In these documents, dignity seems to be recognized as a moral foundation 
of human rights. In other words, human rights are based on dignity or derived from 
dignity. For example, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which was 
adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on June 25th, 1993, recognizes 




human person.”84 In the preamble and article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the authors write: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world…All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights” A similar idea is also written in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights85 and many other international human rights documents.86 
In a word, according to these documents, human dignity is a basic moral foundation 
of human rights; human rights are derived from human dignity.  
These international documents show us why dignity is so important. Some 
philosophers of human rights develop their own arguments in order to explain how 
human rights are derived from the dignity.87 In this sense, it is not surprising to see 
that some of them consider that a dignified life is a minimal threshold of human life. 
The next questions is, in the East and West debate on human rights, do philosophers 
who emphasize the importance of cultures (such as Bell and Walzer) also agree th t 
dignity is important? 
I cannot find any direct answer from them, but it is quite likely that they do 
not deny the importance of dignity in general. For example, Walzer mentions the 
importance of dignity when he develops his just war theory (e.g., Walzer, 1977, p. xi, 
                                                
84 See United Nations (1993a) for the detail.  
85 In the preamble, the document says, “Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed 
in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world… Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
(United Nations, 1966a) 
86 An example relevant to the East Asian countries is the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights. See 
United Nations (1993b) in Davis (1995), pp. 205-209. 




120, 205). Bell also recognizes the importance of dignity in the human rights debate 
(e.g., Bell, 2000, p. 56, 98; 2006a, p. 62, 66). The only possible objection from them 
would be: is dignity merely a Western concept? For a classic example, dignity is a 
central concept in Kant’s moral philosophy (The Kantian tradition connects dignity to 
autonomy); for a contemporary example, Dworkin also believes that one purpose of 
rights is to protect dignity (Dworkin, 1977, p. 198). We know that dignity is an 
important concept in the Western philosophy, but is dignity also recognized in the 
East Asian cultures? Some philosophers argue that dignity is merely a Western 
concept.88 If dignity is only recognized in the West but not the East, then a dignified 
life may not be a minimal threshold for everyone.  
To reply to this possible objection, let me discuss two examples of dignity in 
the Chinese tradition. The first example is from Irene Bloom (1999) and the second 
example is from John Fitzgerald (1999). The Chinese term of dignity, “zunyan,” did 
not exist in the ancient China tradition.89 Nevertheless, Bloom argues that a notion in 
Mencius’ philosophy is close enough to be an ancient Chinese version of dignity. 
This notion is the “nobility of heaven” (Bloom, 1999, pp. 104-111; see also The 
Analects 4:5 and Mencius 6A: 10, 16 & 17). For the second example, Fitzgerald 
discusses a unique understanding of dignity in modern China. He argues that national 
prestige is emphasized as a dignity for everyone in modern China, and this national 
prestige is based on national defense. This understanding of dignity is probably based 
                                                
88 For example, Onuma Yasuaki (1999) has such an idea, and Taylor also agrees with Onuma Yasuaki 
that dignity is a Western concept only (Taylor, 1999, p. 125).  
89 Bloom also mentions that classical Greek also lacks a term for “dignity”. Indeed, he also mentions 





on the history that China was frequently conquered by Western countries (and Japan) 
from the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century. Since China was 
so weak in the past, most Chinese consider that a strong national defense is important 
to the national prestige, which is important for their dignity. Note that this idea is also 
recognized in some other East Asian countries (except Japan) because all of them 
share a similar history of being conquered by Western countries.90  
I do not know whether the interpretations of dignity in these two examples are 
the only interpretations of dignity in East Asian cultures. But my intention here is not 
to discuss all interpretations of dignity in East Asia. My intention here is simply to 
illustrate that dignity is not only a Western concept; East Asians also discuss that a 
dignified life is suitable for them. I cannot rule out the possibility that there ar  
cultural differences for the interpretations of dignity; the East and the West may treat 
dignity differently. But we do not need to discuss these cultural differences, nor 
would these cultural differences affect our discussion here. The reason is that no 
matter how many interpretations of dignity there are among different cultures (o  
even different interpretations within one culture), there must be at least some 
common points among all interpretations, otherwise they cannot be all considered as 
interpretations of dignity. It seems that one of the common points among them is that 
there are essential necessities of a dignified life.  
Let me explain what an essential necessity is. Physical securities a e sential 
necessities of a dignified life; this means that without physical securiti s, no one can 
really have a dignified life. Protecting one’s physical securities is a necessary 
                                                




condition for one having a dignified life. It is impossible for one having dignity 
without having physical securities. For example, no one can have dignity if one is 
being tortured. Notice that I do not mean that such a relationship needs to be as strong 
as a logical or analytical impossibility. I am not sure if it is logically or analytically 
possible for one having dignity without having physical securities. I cannot rule out 
the chance that one may be able to conceive some logical situations in which one is 
having dignity without having physical securities. However, in our real world, one 
cannot have a dignified life if one is (for example) being tortured. This is more like a
causal or empirical impossibility. That is, most (if not all) evidences in human history 
show that dignity and physical securities do have a causal or empirical relationship. It 
is safe to conclude from the trend of human history that it is causally, empirically, or 
practically impossible for one having dignity without having physical securities. For 
convenience, instead of saying “causal, empirical, practical, and not logical r 
analytical necessities,” I simply call them “essential necessiti .” This is what I mean 
when I say that physical securities are essential necessities of dignity.  
This explanation is not controversial in the East and West debate on human 
rights.  Both sides agree that physical securities are important. No one in the debate 
really tries to deny that physical securities are essential necessities for every kind of 
decent life, including a dignified life. Bell and others focus a lot of on the empirical 
findings; they probably would agree that it is empirically impossible for one having 
dignity without having physical securities. And they would think that the logical 
possibility is not an issue here91. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that physical 
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securities are essential necessities of dignity—at least this is not co troversial in the 
East and West debate on human rights.  
Let me summarize what I have discussed in this section. A minimal moral 
demand is a minimal threshold of human life that no one should sink below. We also 
find that an essential necessity of dignity is such a minimal moral demand. Hence w  
can summarize all of these points in the following statement: X is a minimal mor
demand if X is an essential necessity of dignity. Since physical securities a e sential 
necessities of dignity, physical securities are minimal moral demands. In the next 
sections, I shall discuss why this conclusion is important in the East and West debate 
on human rights.  
   
 
Section 3.5 Are Physical Securities East Asian Rights? 
 In the previous sections, I have discussed what a minimal moral demand is, 
and how it is embedded in some maximal theories in different cultures. In this 
section, I develop an argument based on the materials we have discussed in chapter 2 
and the previous sections in this chapter. Bell believes that physical securities are 
universal rights, which means that physical securities are also East Asi n rights. But 
why are physical securities East Asian rights? The aim of this section is to develop an 
argument with the conclusion that physical securities are East Asian rights. This 
argument can also solve the problem I have discussed in section 3.2; that is, if 
                                                                                                                                          
Therefore, it is safe to assume that Bell would accept an empirical approach which shows that physical 




different East Asian cultures (the theoretical and the practical Confucia traditions) 
treat physical securities differently, how can physical securities be East Asian rights?  
 Let me discuss the argument first, and then I shall defend each of its premises. 
The argument is like this: 
 
Argument 4 
(1) X is an East Asian right if X is an interest of East Asians (i.e. the right-
holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some duty. 
(2) X is such an interest if X is a fundamental human good in East Asian cultures.  
(3) X is such a fundamental human good if X is a minimal value in East Asia.  
(4) X is a minimal value if (i) X is embedded in some maximal theories in East 
Asian cultures and (ii) X is a minimal moral demand.  
(5) X is embedded in some maximal theories of East Asian cultures if it is 
possible to develop a maximal theory of X in East Asian cultures.  
(6) X is a minimal moral demand if X is an essential necessity of dignity.  
(7) It is possible to develop a maximal theory of physical securities in the 
theoretical Confucian tradition. 
(8) Physical securities are essential necessities of dignity.  
(9) (Conclusion) Physical securities are East Asian rights. 
 
This is a valid argument. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true 
as well. Now let me discuss and defend each of these premises.92  
                                                
92 Raz thinks that “An interest is sufficient to base a right on if and only if there is a sound argument of 




Premise (1) and (2) are statements from the materials we have discussed in 
chapter 2. Bell believes that “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” 
(e.g., Bell, 2006b, p. 267). In other words, Bell (and others) holds an account of the 
cultural justification of rights. As I have discussed in chapter 2, this cultural 
justification of rights is also an interest account of rights. According to this interest 
account of rights, a right is justified if and only if the correlative interest is weighty 
enough to place others under some duty. For the sake of the argument, I only need 
half of the formula, i.e. a right is justified if the correlative interest is weighty enough 
to place others under some duty. In addition, the cultural justification of rights also 
tells us that the fundamental human goods in the culture are weighty-enough interests. 
Particularly, premise (1) and (2) are limited to East Asian cultures. They tell us that if 
X is a fundamental human good in East Asian cultures, then X is an East Asian right.  
After arguing for the cultural justification of rights, Bell and others focus on 
why civil and political liberties are not fundamental human goods in East Asian 
cultures. They have not explained why physical securities are fundamental human
goods in East Asian cultures. The only hint from them is that Bell has mentioned that 
physical securities are minimal values (e.g., Bell, 2006a, p79). As I have said at the 
beginning of this chapter, this is the gap that I intend to fill in here, and premises (3) 
to (8) serve this purpose.  
                                                                                                                                          
of some interest of the right-holder, the other premis s supplying grounds for attributing to it the 
required importance, or for holding it to be relevant to a particular person or class of persons so that 
they rather than others are obligated to the right-holder. These premises must be sufficient by 
themselves to entail that if there are no contrary considerations then the individuals concerned have the 
right” (Raz, 1986, p. 181). I borrow this idea to construct my own argument. In other words, I want to 





Bell thinks that there are different fundamental human goods that are weighty 
enough to place others under some duty. He also thinks that physical securities are 
minimal values. Premise (3) joins them together. There may be many fundamental 
human goods in East Asia, but something that is a minimal value is also an important 
fundamental human good that can be a right. It seems that this premise is not 
controversial. The main point of this premise is that we are asking for something that 
is weighty enough to place others under some duty, and something that is a minimal 
value seems to be weighty or important enough. Why is a minimal value so important? 
This is explained by premises (4) to (8).  
Premise (4) to (8) are from section 3.3 and section 3.4. Premise (4) tells us a 
minimal moral demand that is embedded in some maximal theories is minimal. 
Premises (5) and (7) conclude my analysis in section 3.3, and premises (6) and (8) 
conclude my analysis in section 3.4. After we have all these premises, the reasoning 
of this argument is very clear. We can join premises (7) and (8) together, and then we 
can apply the logical rule Modus Ponens to the previous premises. We then get a 
conclusion that physical securities are East Asian rights.   
Note that the aim of this argument is to construct a jointly sufficient condition 
for X being an East Asian right. In other words, if X meets all the conditions 
described in these premises, then X is an East Asian right. But this argument does ot 
tell us any necessary condition for X being an East Asian right. In other words, even 




still be an East Asian right93. In short, the purpose here is simply to figure out why 
and how physical securities can be East Asian rights, and so we only need to focus on 
the sufficient conditions. The necessary conditions for physical securities being East 
Asian rights do not concern us here.  
As introduced at the beginning of this section, one advantage of this argument 
is that it can solve the problem I discussed in section 3.2. Roughly, the problem is that 
some East Asian cultural factors (the practical Confucian tradition) deny physical 
securities, while some other cultural factors (the theoretical Confucian tradition) 
accept physical securities. This conflict causes a problem because Bell b lieves that 
“cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” (e.g. Bell, 2006b, p. 267), while 
there are conflicting cultural factors that can affect the justification of rights with 
different results. The argument here explains how we can solve this problem.  
The key to solve this problem is that physical securities are minimal values. 
As I said in premise (4), X is a minimal value in East Asia if (i) X is embedded in 
some maximal theories in East Asian cultures and (ii) X is a minimal moral demand. 
Part (i) explains how cultural factors can affect the justification of rights. As I 
discussed in section 3.3, minimal values are embedded in maximal theories, and 
maximal theories are developed from some cultural factors. Therefore, we kno  that 
when some cultural factors become maximal theories, they can affect the justification 
of rights (premise (1) to (3)). However, Walzer (or others) never requires a minimal 
value to be embedded in all maximal theories; some maximal theories are already 
sufficient. In other words, it is not a requirement to include all conflicting cultural 
                                                
93 I do not exclude the possibility that some of these premises are also necessary conditions for 
physical securities being East Asian rights. But the argument itself only focuses on the sufficient 




factors into our consideration. In our particular discussion, we do not require that 
physical securities are embedded in all maximal theories in both the theoretical and 
the practical Confucian traditions. We only require that physical securities are 
embedded in at least one of them (i.e., a part of Confucianism). So, the next question 
is: which tradition is more important? Since we know that the theoretical Confucian 
tradition accepts physical securities, we prefer the theoretical Confucia  tradition. But 
why we should choose the theoretical Confucian tradition? 
We can find the answer in part (ii) of premise (4), premise (6), and premise 
(8), i.e. the premises related to the notion of minimal moral demand. As I discussed in 
section 3.4, a minimal threshold of human life, which no one should sink below, is a 
minimal moral demand. The essential necessities of dignity are such a minimal 
threshold of human life (premise (6)). Physical securities are essential necessities of 
dignity (premise (8)).  Therefore, physical securities are minimal moral demands. 
Notice that this reasoning is independent from any conflict in the East Asian cultures, 
and so it is not a circular reasoning. That is, once we know that physical securities are 
minimal moral demands, we select the cultural factors that are relevant to them. In 
other words, minimal moral demand is the standard for us to judge which cultural 
factors are relevant. In our particular case, this means that we may select th  
theoretical Confucian tradition rather than the practical Confucian tradition. This is 
because physical securities are minimal moral demands, and the theoretical 
Confucian tradition is compatible with these minimal moral demands, while the 




Some may argue that this explanation is too “Western” or too “culturally 
imperialistic.” They may think that minimal moral demand is a Western concept and I 
am using it to deny some East Asian cultural factors (i.e., the practical Confucian 
tradition). I have two replies to this possible objection. First, even Walzer and Bell 
emphasize the importance of minimal moral demand. As I quoted before, Walzer 
thinks that the minimal moral demands are “close to the bone” and “when denied, 
repeated with passionate insistence” (Walzer, 1994, p. 6), and Bell thinks that “there 
is little debate over the desirability of a core set of human rights…what Michael 
Walzer terms the ‘minimal and universal code’” (Bell, 2006a, p. 79). Some may think 
that dignity is only a Western concept (e.g., a Western concept from Kant). But I have 
already discussed in section 3.4 that dignity is prima facie recognized and accepted 
globally, and some essential necessities of dignity are universal. In a word, the 
concept of minimal moral demand is not merely a Western concept.  
My second reply is that some East Asian cultural factors (i.e., the theoretical 
Confucian tradition) play important roles in this argument (e.g., premise (7)). My 
explanation here is not about the conflict between East Asian cultures and Western 
cultures. It is only about the conflict within the East Asian cultures (i.e., the conflict 
between the theoretical Confucian tradition and the practical Confucian tradition). I 
simply suggest a way to select one East Asian cultural tradition over another. So this
is not a Western argument or cultural imperialism whatsoever. It is simply not true to 
say that I use some Western concepts (minimal moral demands, dignity, etc.) to deny




In summary, I have constructed an argument in this section (Argument 4) to 
explain why physical securities are East Asian rights. More precisely, I have argued 
that the premises of this argument are a jointly sufficient condition for physical 
securities being East Asian rights. This argument explains why physical securities are 
East Asian rights, and it also tells us what and how East Asian cultural factors can 
affect the justification of rights. In a word, this argument fills the explanatory gap in 
the East and West debate on physical security rights.  
 
 
Section 3.6 Are Physical Securities Universal Rights? 
 The discussion in the last section focuses merely on East Asian rights. 
However, Bell (and even Walzer) thinks that physical securities are not only East 
Asian rights but also universal rights. Bell thinks that physical securities are universal 
rights because they are minimal values. In this section, I extend the argument in the 
last section; I discuss why physical securities are also universal rights because they 
are minimal values. I explain the significances and weaknesses of the argument, and I 
explain the role it plays in the East and West debate on human rights.  
The argument here is quite similar to Argument 4. The only difference is that 
this argument is about universal rights, and so it is related to (almost) all cultures 








(1) X is universal right if X is an interest of all individuals (i.e. the right-holders) 
that is weighty enough to place others under some duties. 
(2) X is such an interest if X is a fundamental human good in all cultures.  
(3) X is such a fundamental human good if X is a minimal value.  
(4) X is a minimal value if (i) X is embedded in some maximal theories of all 
cultures and (ii) X is a minimal moral demand.  
(5) X is embedded in some maximal theories of all cultures if it is possible to 
develop a maximal theory of X in all cultures.  
(6) X is a minimal moral demand if X is an essential necessity of dignity.  
(7) It is possible to develop a maximal theory of physical securities in all cultures. 
(8) Physical securities are essential necessities of dignity.  
(9) (Conclusion) Physical securities are universal rights. 
 
Argument 5 is a valid argument; if, in addition, all the premises are true, then 
it is a sound argument, and hence the conclusion is also true as well. Are these 
premises true? It is quite obvious that Argument 5 resembles Argument 4. Since the 
reasoning of Argument 5 is basically the same as the reasoning of Argument 4, I do 
not need to repeat most of the points here. The only difference between them is that 
Argument 5 is about universal rights and all cultures, while Argument 4 is just about 
East Asian rights and East Asian cultures. So, let me now focus on the discussion of 




Let me clarify the word “all” in this argument. Some may wonder whether it 
is really about every culture in the world without any exception. But it seems that 
what Walzer wants is simply “almost universal”. As he writes, “they ar minimal and 
universal (I should say almost universal, just to protect myself against the odd 
anthropological example)” (Walzer, 1987, pp. 23-24). In other words, it seems that 
Walzer (or even Bell) can allow some rare exceptions. But they do insist that physical 
securities are embedded in almost all cultures (especially almost all major cultures). I 
have to admit that Walzer does not explain in detail what cultures are considered 
“major” and what are “minor.” But for the purpose of our discussion, all we need to 
know is that it does not matter whether it is strictly about all cultures without a single
exception; some rare examples (e.g., “odd anthropological example”) are allow d 
here. The word “all” in Argument 5 only means “almost all cultures”. So, when we 
are talking about all (or every) cultures, the question here will actually be: are 
physical securities, as minimal values, are embedded in nearly all different major 
cultures?  
It is quite hard to show directly that physical securities are embedded in every 
culture. One obvious problem is that I cannot discuss every culture in this project. So, 
what I need to do here is to defend this argument in an indirect way. Let me discuss 
an indirect way by discussing premise (7) in Argument 5 more precisely. Premise (7) 
in Argument 5 is quite similar to premises (7) in Argument 4. However, while 
premise (7) in Argument 4 focuses only on East Asian cultures (especially 
Confucianism), premise (7) in Argument 5 focuses on more cultures; it says that it is 




Although it appears that “all cultures” is a very strong requirement, it is 
actually not too hard to meet this requirement. This is because the real requirement 
here is that it is possible to develop some (i.e., at least one) maximal theory of 
physical securities in every culture. In other words, the requirement of “all cultures” 
is weakened by a possibility (it is possible to develop) and an existential quantifier 
(some maximal theories). And we know that physical securities are essential 
necessities of dignity. It seems that it is reasonable to assume that every culture has at 
least one maximal moral theory that may be compatible with physical securities. It is 
reasonable to make this assumption because it is quite likely that at least some 
maximal moral theories may prefer essential necessities of dignity. In other words, 
based on this reasonable assumption, it is very likely that premise (7) is true. This is
an indirect defense to premise (7). In other words, although I cannot directly disuss 
every culture here, such a reasonable explanation shows that premise (7) is true.  
I admit that what I am saying here is not a conclusive reason. At most I can 
only say that it is likely that physical securities are embedded in some maximal 
theories of all cultures, and hence it is most likely that physical securities are 
universal rights. This may be considered as a weakness of Argument 5. Nevertheless, 
Bell and others agree that physical securities are universal rights, and they have not 
discussed every culture in detail as well. Indeed, physical securities are not 
controversial in the East and West debate on human rights; both sides agree that 
physical securities are universal rights. Therefore, I assume that physical securities 
are at least most likely to be universal rights.94  
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The main concern between the two sides of the East and West debate on 
human rights is about whether liberties are universal rights. The aim to discuss 
physical securities in this chapter is to find out the reasons why they agree that 
physical securities are universal rights, and then I shall figure out whether the same 
reasons can also apply to liberties. It seems that Argument 5 is already good enough 
to serve this purpose. It gives us a jointly sufficient condition for physical securiti s 
being universal rights. In other words, when physical securities meet all of the
premises (conditions), then physical securities are universal rights.  
Similar to Argument 4, Argument 5 does not say that the premises are also 
necessary conditions. In other words, Argument 5 does not say that if physical 
securities are universal rights, then physical securities meet all of these pr mises. The 
argument does not tell us whether physical securities are or are not universal rght  if
physical securities do not meet any of these premises. Argument 5 is only one way to 
show that physical securities are universal rights, but it does not exclude the 
possibility that there may also be other ways. In this sense, the premises of th e 
arguments are only “positive conditions” (i.e., if physical securities meetall of them, 
then physical securities are universal rights) but not “negative conditions” (i.e., if 
physical securities do not meet all of them, then physical securities are not universal 
rights).  
Argument 5 also refutes the following statement: if physical securities conflict 
with some cultural factors, then physical securities are not universal rights. The 
general reasoning behind this statement is that conflicting with some cultural factors 




conflicts with some cultural factors, then X is not a universal right. According to this 
reasoning, physical securities cannot be universal rights because physical securities 
also conflict with some cultural factors (e.g., the practical Confucian tradition). 
However, such reasoning is refuted by Argument 5. I have shown that when physical 
securities fulfill all premises of Argument 4, they are East Asian rights; when 
physical securities fulfill all premises of Argument 5, they are universal rights. These 
arguments refute the reasoning that physical securities are not universal rights when 
they conflict with some cultural factors.  
In the next chapter, I shall discuss whether liberties are also East Asian rights 




Section 3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
 At the beginning of this chapter, we wondered whether physical securities ae 
East Asian rights and universal rights. The aim of this chapter is to develop 
persuasive arguments to show that physical securities are East Asian rights and 
universal rights.  
 To do so, I have begun the discussion from the evaluation of Bell’s argument. 
Bell believes that any moral value that conflicts with East Asian cultural factors is not 
an East Asian right. I have argued in section 3.2 that physical securities conflict with 




theoretical Confucian tradition. I have argued that Bell cannot successfully exp ain 
the relationship between physical securities and different parts of Confucianism.   
 Bell and others also believes that physical securities are universal rights 
because physical securities are minimal. In section 3.3 and 3.4, I have discussed the 
notions of minimal value in depth. I have argued in section 3.3 how minimal values 
are embedded in maximal theories of different cultures, especially how physical 
securities are embedded in some maximal theories in the theoretical Confucian 
tradition. I have argued in section 3.4 what a minimal moral demand is, and why 
physical securities are minimal moral demands.   
 I have developed two arguments (Argument 4 and Argument 5) in section 3.5 
and 3.6.  The premises of these arguments are jointly sufficient conditions for 
physical securities being East Asian rights and universal rights. These arguments also 
tell us how to select the relevant cultural factors, and hence it solves the problem in 
section 3.2. These arguments are important to the East and West debate on human 
rights. They argue that physical securities are East Asian rights and universal rights. 
One may wonder whether a similar reasoning can also apply to liberties as w ll. I 








Chapter 4: Liberal Rights and East Asian Cultures 
 
Section 4.1 Introduction  
 In the last chapter, I have discussed two arguments to explain why physical 
securities are East Asian rights and universal rights. In the following sections of this 
chapter, I argue why liberties are also East Asian rights and universal rights. I develop 
two arguments to explain why liberties are East Asian rights and universal rights; 
these two arguments are similar to the arguments I have developed in the last capter. 
I also argue why my arguments for physical securities and liberties a e important to 
the East and West debate on human rights.  
 I develop an argument in section 4.2. The reasoning of this argument is 
similar to the argument I have defended in chapter 3. I shall focus on two premises of 
this argument. In section 4.3, I focus on why liberties are essential necessiti s of 
dignity. In section 4.4, I argue that although liberties conflict with the practical 
Confucian tradition, liberties are compatible with the theoretical Confucian tradition. 
Bell cannot successfully explain the relationship between physical securities and 
different parts of Confucianism; similarly, Bell also cannot successfully explain the 
relationship between liberties and different parts of Confucianism. I argue that it is 
also possible to develop some maximal theories of liberties in East Asian cultures 
(i.e., the theoretical Confucian tradition). My conclusion of these two sections is that




In section 4.5, I discuss whether liberties are universal rights. I argue that if 
physical securities are universal rights because they are minimal values, then liberties 
are also universal rights. Since it is most likely that physical securities are universal 
rights, it is also most likely that liberties are also universal rights.  
In section 4.6, I compare my arguments with Bell’s arguments. I explain why 
my arguments can contribute to the East and West debate on human rights in a better 
way. My arguments show not only that physical securities and liberties are East Asian 
rights and universal rights, but also that Bell’s project, “the East Asian challenge to 
human rights,” is mistaken and problematic.  
 
 
Section 4.2 Are Liberties East Asian Rights? 
 Before I begin the discussion, let me review very briefly what I have 
discussed in the previous chapters. As I said in chapter 2, we limit our discussion to 
liberties to freedom of speech and political liberties (such as freedom to vote, freedom 
of political participation, etc.).95  I have also discussed Bell’s arguments in chapter 2, 
and I have pointed out that some of his claims are not clear enough. Roughly, he 
claims that liberties are not fundamental human goods in East Asia because liberties 
conflict with some values in the Confucian tradition. Based on the cultural 
justification of rights, he believes that liberties are not weighty-enough interests in 
East Asia, and hence liberties are not East Asian rights.96 However, as I have already 
pointed out in chapter 2, it is unclear how he draws from the conflicts between 
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liberties and some East Asian cultural factors to get to the conclusion that liberties are 
not East Asian rights.  
 On the other hand, Bell also thinks that physical securities are universal rights 
because physical securities are minimal values. Bell himself has not explain d this 
view further. In chapter 3, I have elaborated this view in detail. I have developed two 
arguments that show that physical securities are East Asian rights and universal 
rights. In addition, I have also shown that even though physical securities conflict 
with some East Asian values, physical securities are still East Asian rights. In this 
chapter, I argue that the same reasoning also applies to liberties. That is, I develop 
similar arguments to show that liberties are East Asian rights and universal rights, 
even though liberties conflict with some East Asian values.  
 The first step here is to develop an argument that shows that liberties are East 
Asian rights. This argument is similar to Argument 4 in Chapter 3, section 3.5.  The 
only difference is that Argument 4 focuses on physical securities, while the argument 
here focuses on liberties. The argument is as follows:  
 
Argument 6 
(1) X is an East Asian right if X is an interest of East Asians (i.e., the right-
holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some duty. 
(2) X is such an interest if X is a fundamental human good in East Asian cultures.  
(3) X is such a fundamental human good if X is a minimal value in East Asia.  
(4) X is a minimal value if (i) X is embedded in some maximal theories in East 




(5) X is embedded in some maximal theories of East Asian cultures if it is 
possible to develop a maximal theory of X in East Asian cultures.  
(6) X is a minimal moral demand if X is an essential necessity of dignity.  
(7) It is possible to develop a maximal theory of liberties in the theoretical 
Confucian tradition. 
(8) Liberties are essential necessities of dignity.  
(9) (Conclusion) Liberties are East Asian rights. 
 
This argument is similar to the argument I defended in chapter 3. They are 
similar in terms of the cultural justification of rights and the idea that both physical 
securities and liberties are minimal values. We get premises (1) and (2) from the 
cultural justification of rights. Premises (1) to (3) together tell us that if liberties are 
minimal values, then liberties are also East Asian rights. In chapter 3, we have used 
exactly the same reasoning to explain why physical securities are East Asi n rights. In 
other words, the idea here is that physical securities are East Asian rights because 
physical securities are minimal values; if liberties are also minimal values, then by the 
same reasoning, liberties are also East Asian rights.  
Since we have discussed Walzer’s idea on physical securities, let me also 
begin the discussion of liberties from his idea. Walzer argues that physical securities 
are minimal values. Does Walzer also think that liberties are minimal values? 
Unfortunately, it seems that the answer to this question is complicated. Walzer argu s 
in his Just and Unjust Wars that “individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the 




“It is enough to say that they are somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to 
be a human being. If they are not natural, then we have invented them, but natural or 
invented, they are a palpable feature of our moral world” (Walzer, 1977, p. 54). 
Walzer also argues elsewhere that life, liberty, and subsistence are all hum n rights 
(Walzer, 2007, pp. 251-263). Some scholars, such as Orend, argue that Walzer’s just 
war theory is about some minimal values (Orend, 2002, p. 76), and individual rights 
to life and liberty are also recognized as minimal values (Orend, 2000, pp.35-37). 
However, it is not clear what “individual rights to life and liberty” are. Are they also 
rights to civil and political liberties? Or are they simply some rights to physical 
securities, such as liberties against slavery or torture? It seems that Walzer has not 
provided a clear answer.97 Therefore, it is hard to use his idea to determine whether 
liberties are minimal values or not.  
I argue that liberties are minimal values in another way. Premise (4) here tells 
us how liberties can be minimal values. Following the reasoning of the argument, our 
real concern is whether premises (7) and (8) are true.  If they are both true, then 
liberties are minimal values. If liberties are minimal values, then the conclusion is 
also true, i.e., liberties are East Asian rights. So, I need to discuss premises (7) and (8) 
in depth.  
It is not easy to defend these premises. Premise (7) says that liberties can be 
somehow related to Confucianism, while premise (8) says that liberties are sential 
necessities of dignity. While both sides in the East and West debate on human rights 
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basically agree that physical securities are East Asian rights (and universal rights), 
they disagree on whether liberties are East Asian rights. It turns out that they disagree 
on how liberties are related to Confucianism, and they also disagree on whether 
liberties are so essential. Therefore, the defense for liberties (i.e., liberties are East 
Asian rights) is more complicated than the defense for physical securities. For 
example, people generally agree that physical securities are essential n cessities of 
dignity, and hence in the last chapter, I did not focus a lot on why physical securities 
are essential necessities of dignity. But people disagree on whether liberties are also 
essential necessities of dignity. Therefore, I need to spend more effort on defending 
such a view by defending premises (7) and (8). 
I shall discuss each of these premises in detail in the following two sections. I 
shall discuss these premises in a reverse order; that is, I shall discuss premi e (8) in 
section 4.3 and then premise (7) in section 4.4. If both of these two premises are true, 
then by the inference of Modus Ponens, we can reach to the conclusion that liberties 
are East Asian rights.  
 
 
Section 4.3 Liberties as Minimal Moral Demands 
An essential necessity of dignity, as I have argued in chapter 3, is a minimal 
threshold of human life, which is a minimal moral demand. Physical securities are 
essential necessities of dignity. The absence of physical securities guarantees the 
absence of dignity. Therefore, it is not so controversial to claim that physical 
securities are essential necessities of dignity. Liberties, on the other hand, are more 




necessities of dignity? In this section, I am going to argue that they are essential 
necessities of dignity. I first introduce some arguments from different philosophers. 
These philosophers independently argue why liberties are important. After 
introducing their arguments, I put their points together and argue that liberties are 
essential necessities of dignity.  
The first argument is from Henry Shue (1996). Shue argues that liberal rights 
are “everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity” (Shue, 
1996, p. 19) because they are basic rights. Basic rights are basic “only if enjoymet f 
them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights” (Shue, 1996, p. 67). Shue also 
discusses the relationship between physical security rights and liberal rghts. He 
writes: 
 
Not only does the enjoyment of rights to some liberties depend upon the 
enjoyment of security and subsistence, but the enjoyment of rights to security 
and subsistence depends upon the enjoyment of some liberties…And if, as I 
will now try to show, the enjoyment of some liberties is an essential 
component of enjoying security and subsistence as rights, then one also has 
equally basic rights to those liberties.” (Shue, 1996, p. 70)98  
 
Shue then argues why liberties are so important to physical security rights and 
subsistence rights (Shue, 1996, pp. 71-87).99 In other words, liberties are important 
because their rights are essential to the enjoyment of all other rights, including 
                                                
98 Shue discusses liberties to political participation in Shue (1996), pp. 71-78.   




physical security rights. At least a part of his argument is empirical because Shue uses 
some empirical evidence to show that liberties are essential to other rigts (e.g., Shue, 
1996, pp.71-78).100 In other words, Shue argues that liberties or liberal rights are 
empirically essential to other rights.   
This shows that liberties are relevant to dignity in the following ways. First, as 
I have argued in chapter 3, physical securities are essential necessiti s of dignity. If 
Shue is correct, then liberties are at least indirectly important to dignity because the 
enjoyment of physical security rights depends upon the enjoyment of liberties and 
their rights. We may say that liberties are indirectly essential to dignity in this sense. 
Second, many human rights documents say that human rights are derived from 
dignity. If liberal rights are basic rights, then liberal rights are also es ential to all 
human rights to dignity. Shue’s idea alone cannot show that liberties are essential 
necessities of dignity, but his idea can support what I want to argue in this section. 
After I introduce the arguments from other philosophers, I discuss how to combine all 
of their points together and show that liberties are an essential necessity of dignity.  
The second argument is from Allen Buchanan (1989, 2004). Buchanan also 
argues that cultural values are important to the interest-based justification of rights 
(e.g., Buchanan 1989, pp. 878-880; 2004, pp. 152-155). But, he argues further that 
values of culture or community will be preserved in a better way if people have 
liberal rights (Buchanan, 1989, pp.865-871). As he argues, liberties and their rights 
“allow individuals to partake of the alleged essential human good of community by 
protecting existing communities from interference from without and by givin  
                                                




individuals the freedom to unite with like-minded others to create new communities” 
(Buchanan, 1989, p. 858). In other words, liberties are important because liberal 
rights protect community or cultural values. For the purpose of our discussion, all we 
need to know is that this implies that liberties and liberal rights protect East Asian
cultures.  
The third argument is from Amartya Sen (1999).101 Sen has developed a 
famous argument on the relationship between famine and democracy. Roughly, he 
argues that famines do not occur in democratic countries. His argument is much more 
complicated than this general claim, but what I want to focus on here is how he 
emphasizes the importance of liberties in his argument. He argues for the causal 
relationship between civil and political liberties and the avoidance of famine. For 
example, he argues that the freedom of information exchange is essential for the 
avoidance of famine. He discusses “the Great Leap Forward” period in China (around 
1959-1962) as an example. In that period, a widespread famine caused up to thirty 
millions of deaths. Sen argues that a cause of this famine is the lack of democracy 
(especially liberties) in China. He even quotes the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, to 
support his claim. Sen writes, “Interestingly enough, even Chairman Mao, whose 
radical hopes and beliefs had much to do with the initiation of, and official 
persistence with, the Great Leap Forward, himself identified the informational role of 
democracy, once the failure was belatedly acknowledged” (Sen, 1999, p. 182).102 In a 
                                                
101 Sen has developed his own theory of human rights (e.g., Sen, 2004). He has also replied to the 
Asian values debate (e.g., Sen, 1997). Here I only f cus on his idea on the importance of freedom. 
102 Sen cites the following words from Mao to support his view. Mao writes, “Without democracy, you 
have no understanding of what is happening down below; the situation will be unclear; you will be 
unable to collect sufficient opinions from all sides; there can be no communication between top and 




word, Sen emphasizes the importance of liberties (especially freedom of information 
exchange, freedom for political participation, etc.) because he thinks that liberties are 
essential to the avoidance of famine.  
The last argument is from Michael Doyle (1983a, b; 1997). Doyle generally 
agrees with Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795/2006) and argues that 
democracy promotes peace.103 More precisely, Doyle argues that what he calls 
“liberal countries” never or almost never go to war with other liberal countries.104 
Liberal countries are not only countries with universal suffrage, but also holding a 
basic principle, which is “the importance of the freedom of the individual.” As he 
writes, “above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to 
be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, not as objects or means only. 
A commitment to this principle has generated rights and institutions” (Doyle, 1997, p. 
207). He argues that much historical evidence supports his liberal peace proposal. He 
lists all liberal states from the 18th century to 1990 (Doyle, 1997, pp. 261-264) and 
international wars from the 18th century to 1980 (Doyle, 1997, pp. 266-267). He 
concludes that historically, liberal state do not go to war with each other. In a word, 
Doyle thinks that liberties are important because liberties are essential to the 
promotion of peace.  
                                                                                                                                          
issues, thus you will find it difficult to avoid being subjectivist; it will be impossible to achieve unity 
of understanding and unity of action, and impossible to achieve true centralism” (Schram (Ed.), 1974, 
pp. 277-278) 
103 Kant distinguishes “republic” from “democracy,” but Doyle does not make such a difference. For 
our purpose, it does not matter whether Doyle interprets Kant correctly on this point. See Kant 
(1795/2006), pp. 74-78 and Doyle (1997), pp. 251-300.  
104 Doyle also notices that although empirically liberal countries are peace-prone to each other, they are 




I only introduce these arguments briefly because not every part of their 
arguments is relevant to our discussion. The focus here is that each of them tells us an 
importance factor of liberties. Let me summarize these factors here: 
 
(1) Shue suggests that liberties (and their rights) are essential to the enjoym t 
of other rights (including physical security rights).  
(2) Buchanan suggests that liberties are essential to the promotion of cultural 
values (including values in East Asian cultures) 
(3) Sen suggests that liberties are essential to the avoidance of famine.  
(4) Doyle suggests that liberties are essential to the promotion of peace.  
 
Liberties are “essential” to all of these factors in the sense that liberties a e 
necessary causal and empirical conditions for these factors, and it is impossible r 
unlikely to have these factors without liberties. The absence of liberties causes the 
absence of these factors as well. Notice that this relationship is an empirical 
relationship. Liberties are empirically necessary for these factors.105 The absence of 
liberties will have the consequences of the absence of these factors. I have no reason 
to reject any of this empirical evidence. Therefore, I simply assume that their 
empirical findings are accurate, and if their empirical findings are accur te, then 
liberties do have these consequences (i.e., essential to these factors).  
All the factors listed above (the enjoyment of physical security rights, the 
promotion of peace, etc.) are important because they are also essential to dignity. That 
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discussion do not refer to something so strong as logical possibility or analytical possibility. They are 




is, no one can really have a dignified life without these factors. For example, one can 
easily lose his or her dignified life if there is a widespread famine in the soci ty. The 
above factors are basic or fundamental factors for a dignified life.  This is an 
empirical approach. This approach tells us why liberties are essential necessities of 
dignity. An essential necessity of dignity is that the absence of such a necessity will 
cause the absence of dignity. Now, we have already seen that the absence of liberties
causes the absence of the above factors, and the absence of these factors causes the 
absence of dignity. Therefore, the absence of liberties causes the absence of dignity. 
Again, this reasoning is based on empirical evidence. If we do not have any objection 
to argue against this reasoning or the empirical evidence behind it, then we may 
conclude that liberties are essential necessities of dignity. In a word, base  on the 
above empirical evidence, we may conclude that liberties are minimal moral 
demands.  
Although this conclusion mainly relies on empirical evidence, this is already 
good enough in the East and West debate on human rights because Bell’s approach 
also relies on empirical findings. For example, he argues that liberties empirically 
conflict with some East Asian cultural factors (see my discussion on his examples in 
chapter 2, section 2.5). For convenience, we may simply think that the empirical 
approach is acceptable, or it is considered as an assumption in the debate. Therefore, 
in the East and West debate on human rights, it is acceptable to use some empirical 
findings to argue that liberties are minimal moral demands.106  
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But we need to reply to an important objection to the above explanation. One 
may wonder if I am simply using a “Western perspective” to construct this 
explanation. One may even point out that most (if not all) of the scholars and their 
arguments I discussed above are from the West.107 Some may think that their 
arguments may only apply in the West but not the East, and hence liberties may only 
be essential necessities of dignity in the West but not in the East.  
I have two replies to this objection. My first reply is that the arguments and 
empirical evidence from these scholars cannot be simply considered as “Western 
perspectives.” I do not deny that these arguments are originated from the West. 
However, as I have discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4, the origin of an argument (or 
the nationality of a scholar) cannot be a reason to determine whether an argument is 
Western or not. For example, Angle, Bell, Walzer, etc., are all from the West, but 
their arguments are not merely “Western perspectives.” An argument is a We tern 
argument when it focuses only on the Western cultures but not other cultures (such as 
East Asian cultures).  So, the real question is: Do these arguments only focus on the 
Western cultures? 
It is quite obvious that Sen’s and Doyle’s arguments do not focus only on the 
Western cultures. For example, Sen discusses famine in China (e.g., Sen, 1999, pp. 
181-182). Doyle has collected a set of data of the international wars occurred between 
18th century to 1980 (e.g., Doyle, 1997, pp. 266-267), and his data includes the 
international wars occurred in East Asia. In other words, they collect the empirical 
                                                                                                                                          
approach, and my arguments are also based on Bell’sown assumption (i.e., the empirical approach), 
we do not need to start another debate in this project.  
107 Shue, Buchanan, and Doyle are all Westerners. Sen is an Indian, but he has spent a lot of time in the 




evidence globally. One may argue whether their arguments are good or bad, but their 
arguments are not only good in the West but bad in the East. Shue’s and Buchanan’s 
arguments are more philosophical and they do not discuss a lot of empirical evidence 
in detail.108 But their arguments do not just accept Western cultures and deny East 
Asian cultures. If their arguments are good, then they are good in both East and West; 
if their arguments are bad, then they are also bad in both East and West. In general,
all of these four arguments do not argue against or deny East Asian cultures. They 
simply argue that liberties have some good consequences, and this applies globally
rather than applies only in the Western world.  
My second reply to the above objection (i.e., the arguments from Shue, 
Buchanan, Sen and Doyle are only Western perspectives) is that their views only 
support one premise but not the whole Argument 6. I am not arguing for a simple 
inference that their arguments are good and so liberties are East Asian rights. Instead, 
I am using some parts of their arguments to support only one premise (premise (8)). 
Premise (8) focuses on whether liberties are essential necessities of dignity. These 
arguments provide some empirical evidence, which show that liberties have some 
good consequences, and then we can use them to support premise (8). Although the 
reasons to support premise (8) do not emphasize East Asian culture, they do not 
emphasize Western cultures as well. Indeed, none of these reasons denies East Asian 
cultures. As I shall argue in the next section, Argument 6 in general is also related to 
East Asian cultures. It is just that premise (8) alone does not emphasize the 
importance of East Asian cultures. However, this does not mean that the reasons I u e 
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mentions the Asian values debate (Shue, 1996, p. 66). Buchanan also mentions China and Asia (e.g. 




here are Western perspectives, nor does this mean that Argument 6 in general denies 
the importance of East Asian cultures.  
In summary, I have argued why liberties are minimal moral demands in this 
section. Liberties are minimal moral demands because they are empirically mportant 
to dignity. This explains why premise (8) in Argument 6 is true. In the next section, I 
shall discuss premise (7) in Argument 6.  
 
 
Section 4.4 Liberties and Confucianism 
Premises (5) and (7) in Argument 6 are relevant to East Asian cultures. I have
already argued for the reason to support premise (5) in chapter 3, section 3.3. That is, 
minimal values are embedded in maximal theories if the minimal value can be found 
or developed in some maximal theories. In this particular case, we need to know 
whether liberties can be found or developed in a maximal theory in East Asian 
cultures. Premise (7) serves this purpose. If this premise is true, then it is possible to 
develop liberties in the theoretical Confucian tradition. The defense to premise (7) in 
Argument 6 is quite similar to the defense to premise (7) in Argument 4. Similar to 
physical securities, liberties are also embedded in the theoretical Confucian tradition 
but not in the practical Confucian tradition. I argue that both physical securities and 
liberties can be found or developed in the theoretical Confucian tradition. To do so, I 
need to discuss the relationship between liberties and Confucianism in detail.  
 Let me begin the discussion from some objections to Bell’s idea. I have 




cultural factors (especially some values in Confucianism). Do liberties always 
conflict with Confucianism? I am going to discuss some arguments that show that 
liberties do not conflict with some other East Asian cultural factors. Indeed, some
arguments even show that liberties are important values in some East Asian cultures. 
Then there is a question: Which East Asian cultural factors should be selected? This 
question is quite similar to the question we have discussed in chapter 3, section 3.2. In 
other words, both physical securities and liberties are treated differently in different 
parts of East Asian cultures, and hence both securities and liberties face the same 
problem. 
 In chapter 2, I have introduced some philosophers who share similar views 
with Bell on the cultural justification of rights. They all believe that East Asian 
cultures play or should play some roles in the justification of rights. However, not all
of them believe that liberties conflict with East Asian cultures. Some of them ev n 
believe that at least some liberties are East Asian rights. Now let me discuss the 
works from some of these philosophers.  
 Stephen Angle (2002) argues that there is a distinctive discourse on rights 
(and human rights) in China. His arguments rely heavily on historical research. He 
does not think that liberties are an alien concept in China; he believes that the 
situation is quite the opposite. He discusses different concepts of liberties in the 
history of Chinese philosophy. For example, he quotes and analyzes a Chinese 
scholar’s argument on freedom in Confucianism and Daoism.109 He also discusses 
some important debates on freedom and human rights in the history of China. For 
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example, he discusses the debate on “freedom and popular authority” or “freedom 
and popular rights” in the 19th century in China (Angle, 2002, pp. 101-139). Angle 
also introduces some early cross-cultural dialogues on liberties and human rights. For 
example, he discusses how John Dewey affected the debate of freedom and rights in 
China during and after Dewey’s visit in China in 1919 (Angle, 2002, pp. 194-200; see 
also pp.178-193). Although Angle mainly focuses on China, he also discusses other 
East Asian countries. For example, he discusses the discourse of freedom and rights 
in Japan in the 19th century (Angle, 2002, pp. 115-123).110 Based on his historical 
research in China and East Asia, he denies that East Asian cultures put greater stress 
on social and economic rights than civil and political rights (Angle, 2002, pp. 239-
249).111 For the purpose of this section, I only need to introduce Angle’s arguments 
briefly. My purpose here is not to discuss his arguments in detail. I simply want to 
point out that liberties are not an alien concept in the history of East Asian 
philosophy.  
Angle is not the only one who argues for this point. For example, de Bary also 
argues for a similar view. He writes: 
 
Both in early China and in later imperial China the Confucians emphasized 
the benefits of free political discussion and open criticism of those in 
power…We have here some of the elements of free speech and glimpses of 
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documents in 1900-2000 in China. Svensson shares a simil r view with Angle that historically, 
Chinese culture affirms freedom and human rights. See vensson (2002) for details.  
111 Bell argues against Angle’s claim. Bell thinks that E st Asian cultures put greater stress on social 




how a civil society might be conceived in China. It would be easy to cite other 
evidence in Chinese history of a Confucian tradition that supports and protects 
liberal human values—especially in schools and ruling councils—but usually 
defines them in terms of consensual rites, not legal compulsion. (de Bary, 
1998a, p.53).112  
 
Both Angle and de Bary emphasize the importance of East Asian cultures in the 
human rights debate, but they do not think that liberties were alien in the history of 
East Asian cultures. In other words, their arguments show that liberties and East 
Asian cultures (such as Confucianism) were not so distant in history. This conclusi 
corrects the common (but wrong) assumption that liberties are completely foreign to 
East Asia. However, the application of this conclusion is very limited. The arguments 
from Angle and de Bary are mainly related to the history of East Asia. We may use 
these arguments as supplemental materials for our discussion here, but these 
arguments do not directly show us whether liberties conflict with Confucian values. 
In other words, they do not directly reply to Bell’s arguments. In the following 
paragraphs, I shall discuss some arguments that focus directly on whether liberties 
conflict with Confucian values.  
Let me discuss freedom of expression as an example. Joseph Chan argues that 
Confucianism plays important roles in the human rights debate (Chan, 1999, pp.212-
227), and he discusses how Confucianism can affect the rights to freedom of 
expression. He argues that only some but not all liberties are compatible with 
                                                




Confucian values. When he discusses freedom of expression, he writes, “If freedom 
of expression is generally conducive to …the pursuit of ren, there is no reason why 
the Confucian perspective would reject it outright” (Chan, 1999, p. 229. His italics). 
In general, Chan believes that Confucianism can accept the liberties that can promote 
ren or other Confucian values. However, he also argues that Confucianism only 
accepts freedom of “good” expression but denies freedom of “bad” expression. He 
writes, “We have rights only insofar as we use them to promote the ethical life of ren. 
The Confucian perspective would find it hard to recognize the rights of people who 
would use them to promote the bad instead of the good” (Chan, 1999, p. 230. His 
italics). He extends this view to the justification of rights, and concludes that 
Confucianism denies that “individuals have the moral right to say or do debased 
things” (Chan, 1999, p. 232). In summary, he believes that only freedom of good 
expression would be allowed in Confucianism; Confucianism does not tolerate any 
bad expression because freedom of bad expression conflicts with Confucian values.  
It seems that his argument is not clear enough; it is not clear how to decide 
whether an expression is good or bad. Chan uses pornography as an example of bad 
expression, and he argues that there is a cultural difference between the East and 
West on pornography. That is, he believes that Western liberalism affirms the 
freedom to pornography while Confucianism denies such a freedom (Chan, 1999, pp. 
230-232 & 234). But pornography is also controversial in the West.113 It is hard to see 
why the debate on pornography becomes a cultural debate between liberalism and 
Confucianism. Even if there could be such a cultural debate, it still would not explain 
                                                
113 For example, see the debate on pornography between Altman and Brison in Cohen & Wellman 




what freedom to good expression would be accepted and what freedom to bad 
expression would be denied by Confucianism.114 Nevertheless, Joseph Chan at least 
shows us that freedom of expression does not always conflict with Confucianism.  
 Some scholars explain the role of liberties in Confucianism with better 
arguments. For example, Seung-hwan Lee introduces Berlin’s positive liberties and 
negative liberties to the discussion of liberties and Confucianism (Lee, 1996).115 
Roughly, Lee argues that Confucianism focuses more on positive liberties than 
negative liberties. For example, Lee writes, “The Confucian conception of freedom 
consists in self-overcoming and self-realization. It derives from the desire of human 
beings to be able to make their own decisions. Confucians, as proponents of positive 
freedom, want their lives and decisions to depend on the higher-self, not on the lower-
self. According to the Confucian self-realization view of freedom, mere absence of 
external constraints cannot be accepted as a sufficient condition of being free” (Le , 
1996, p. 371). Lee’s explanation is better than Chan’s explanation because Lee tells 
us more on how liberties (as positive liberties) are involved in Confucianism. 
 Although the above arguments mainly focus on freedom of expression, their 
reasoning generally applies to all civil and political liberties.116 But my intention here 
                                                
114 In another article (Chan, 2002), Chan explains the limitation of liberties in Confucianism by 
discussing the East and West cultural differences on “moral autonomy”. His argument in Chan (2002) 
is more precise than his argument in Chan (1999), but the problem of the distinction between good 
expression and bad expression remains unsolved.  
115 See also Lee (2002), In addition to Lee Seung-Hwan, T’ang Chun-I and He Xinquan also express a 
similar view in Chinese language. See T’ang (1988); T’ang (1974), pp. 323-381 and He (1996), 
pp.100-108, 176-194 for further detail. For Berlin’s distinction on positive liberty and negative liberty, 
see Berlin (1969/1997).  
116 Bell and Chan have discussed political liberties (e.g. freedom to vote) when they discuss democracy 
and meritocracy. See Bell (2000), pp.106-172; Bell (2006a), pp. 152-179, and Chan (2007).  Some 
philosophers believe that Confucianism should promote p litical liberties and democracy. For 




is not to evaluate these arguments in detail; my intention is to argue that they all share 
an important point for our discussion—they show that liberties do not always conflict 
with Confucian values. Joseph Chan argues that freedom of good expression (no 
matter what it means) should not be rejected by Confucianism. Lee even argues that 
Confucianism emphasizes positive freedom. All of these points suggest that at leas
some liberties do not conflict with some Confucian values.  
 As I have discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.5, Bell lists and discusses some 
situations in which liberties conflict with values in Asia and the Confucian tradition. 
When we compare Bell’s arguments with the arguments I discussed above, we will 
find that Bell has not shown us the whole picture of the relationship between liberties 
and Confucianism. Assuming that Bell has accurately described those conflicts 
between liberties and Confucianism, we can still conclude from the above arguments 
that sometimes Confucianism emphasizes the importance of liberties. We can roughly 
divide this difference into the theoretical Confucian tradition and the practical 
Confucian tradition. On the one hand, Angle, de Bary, Chan, Lee and others focus 
more on the philosophical or theoretical part of Confucianism. They analyze concepts 
in the Confucian philosophy, and argue about the relationship between these concepts 
and liberties. On the other hand, Bell focuses more on the practical situations. He 
discusses politicized Confucianism and popular Confucianism in East Asia. For 
example, he discusses the political systems in Mainland China and Singapore (e.g., 




discusses the cultural habit in South Korea (e.g., Bell, 1996, pp.664; 2000, pp. 92-
93).117 All of them belong to the practical Confucian tradition.  
 As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the question of liberties we are 
discussing here is quite similar to the question of physical securities we discussed in 
Chapter 3, section 3.2. While the theoretical Confucian tradition inclines to accept 
that physical securities and liberties are important values, the practical Confucian 
tradition inclines to deny that physical securities and liberties are important values. 
This is a problem for Bell’s arguments. Bell thinks that liberties are not universal 
rights because liberties are not East Asian rights. Liberties are not East Asi n rights 
because liberties are not fundamental human goods in East Asia; and liberties ar not 
fundamental human goods in East Asia because liberties conflict with some 
Confucian values. Now it is also clear what Bell argues is that liberties a e not 
accepted in the practical Confucian tradition. However, the theoretical Confucia  
tradition treats liberties differently. This means that Bell’s reason to deny liberties as 
universal rights is not conclusive. So, we may ask the following question: Which 
Confucian tradition, the theoretical or the practical, is more important for our human 
rights debate? 
 Bell has a reply to this problem. He wonders why we should care about the 
part of Confucianism that is compatible with liberties. He realizes that some
philosophers argue that liberties are essential to some good consequences. He also 
realizes that some scholars try to develop a Confucian theory for liberties. But he 
challenges them by arguing that all of them are too “Western.”  
                                                




For example, as I have discussed in the last section, Buchanan thinks that 
liberties are essential to the protection and promotion of cultural values (Buchanan 
1989). Bell thinks that Buchanan’s view is that only cultural values that are 
compatible with liberties can be protected and promoted by liberal rights. Bell argues 
that this is a Western and liberal view. He writes:  
 
This is the view that liberal individual rights in fact protect and facilitate 
genuinely communal ways of life … But this is a peculiar response—liberal 
individual rights seem alive and well in contemporary Western societies, and 
yet atomistic tendencies seem to be getting stronger as well, communal 
relationships not coming about as a happy by-product of individual rights any 
more than socially desirable results have inevitably come about as a result of 
the (now largely lost) liberal faith in the unhampered workings of the free 
market. (Bell, 1993, pp. 12-13) 
 
We may understand Bell’s argument as follows. Bell believes that “atomistic 
tendencies” and “communal relationships” are two kinds of cultural values, and they 
are incompatible. Liberal rights only promote the former but not the latter. In other 
words, Buchanan merely shows that liberal rights can protect or promote cultural 
values that are compatible with liberties. Bell thinks that Western liberalsm is 
“atomistic” while East Asian cultures (especially Confucianism) are “communal” 




is a Western argument because it does not show that liberties and liberal rights can 
protect or promote East Asian cultures.118  
The following passage from Bell may express his idea more clearly. Bel uses 
the term “Liberal Confucianism” to refer to those views that try to develop a 
Confucian theory of liberties. He writes: 
 
One such is “Liberal Confucianism” promoted largely by scholars outside of 
mainland China. According to “liberal Confucians,” Confucianism need not 
conflict with values such as human rights and democracy; it can be used to 
promote those values. But that’s also the problem: liberalism is used as the 
moral standpoint to evaluate Confucianism. The parts of Confucianism that 
are consistent with liberalism should be promoted, and the parts that conflict 
should be rejected. But this sort of approach doesn’t take Confucianism 
seriously as a tradition that can enrich and challenge the liberal tradition. Is it 
not possible that Confucianism can offer a compelling alternative to Western 
liberalism? Liberal Confucianism tends to reject such possibilities and, not 
surprisingly, is not popular among Chinese intellectuals. Confucianism is not 
just a vehicle to promote liberal values. (Bell, 2010a, pp. 92-93) 
 
 
                                                
118 An-Na’im also argues how freedom of speech is essential to the guarantee of cultural norms (An-
Na’im, 1999, pp. 151-157). The reasoning from An-Na’im is basically the same as the reasoning from 
Buchanan. Bell has a similar challenge to An-Na’im as the one he challenges Buchanan.  See Bell 





In this passage, Bell seems to assume that liberties (or “liberal values”) ar  only 
values in Western liberalism. Although he realizes that liberties are compatible with 
some parts of Confucianism (e.g., the theoretical Confucian tradition, or what he calls 
“Liberal Confucianism”), he denies that we should choose these parts of 
Confucianism. It appears that he assumes that this is a choice between Wester 
liberalism and Confucianism. He also thinks that Western liberalism is the real moral 
foundation of Liberal Confucianism; Confucianism is only a supplement and is not 
important in Liberal Confucianism. Therefore, Liberal Confucianism is still only a 
Western perspective; Liberal Confucianism does not emphasize the East Asian 
cultures enough, especially Confucianism.  
 Both of the above examples show that Bell denies the importance of liberties 
in East Asian cultures, especially Confucianism. He thinks that we should not choose 
the theoretical Confucian tradition simply because the theoretical Confucia  tradition 
is consistent with liberal values. However, his argument actually contains several 
problematic assumptions. He assumes that this is a problem between East Asian 
cultures and Western cultures (especially between Confucianism and Western 
liberalism). He assumes that we should not use Western values to evaluate 
Confucianism. He also assumes that liberties are merely Western values. In the 
following, I shall explain why none of these assumptions has a solid ground.  
 First, the problem we are discussing here is not exactly a problem between the 
East and the West, or Confucianism and Western liberalism. This is more like an 
internal conflict between different parts of Confucianism. The conclusion here is that 




Confucian tradition. This conclusion is independent from Western liberalism. No 
matter which Confucian tradition we choose, theoretical or practical, we are still 
choosing between different parts of Confucianism. It is simply not a selection 
between Confucianism and Western liberalism whatsoever.  
 Second, I cannot see any ground to support that we should not use any 
Western value to evaluate or even to challenge Confucianism. In the history of 
Confucianism, Confucianism always faces many challenges from others. Sometimes, 
Confucianism even changes its concepts and theories in response to the challenges. 
For example, Buddhism once challenged Confucianism a thousand years ago. In 
response to the challenges from Buddhism, the first-stage Confucianism has 
developed into the second-stage Confucianism (or Song-Ming Confucianism), which 
absorbed some Buddhist values and concepts into its own theory.119 Now 
contemporary Confucianism is facing the challenge from the West. Why should we 
assume that Confucianism should not be changed in response to the challenge from 
the West? In a word, there is nothing wrong with evaluating Confucianism by some 
Western values.   
 Indeed, it seems that Bell is contradicting himself on this matter. He favors 
some parts of Confucianism, especially politicized Confucianism in the practical 
Confucian tradition. In order to put Confucianism back into the mainstream of 
political philosophy in China, he suggests some possibilities to combine 
Confucianism with socialism. He calls it “Left Confucianism” or “Social 
Confucianism” (Bell, 2009; 2010a, b). However, as Walzer points out, “Left 
                                                




Confucianism, as Bell wishes for it, seems heavily dependent on Western 
ideologies—at least as dependent as the ‘liberal Confucianism’ that he criticizes” 
(Walzer, 2010, p. 100). In other words, Bell’s approach is simply another way to use 
Western values (socialism) to evaluate Confucianism. Therefore, he is contradicting 
himself. One possible way for him to avoid this contradiction is to argue that 
socialism has already developed uniquely in China, and so we may consider it as 
“Chinese socialism” rather than “Western socialism.” But, if socialism can be 
developed in China, why can’t liberalism? 
 Despite arguing that liberties are Western values, Bell does not provide any 
other reason against the promotion of liberties in East Asia. But now it is clear that 
the problem is not whether liberties are Western values. Indeed, liberties are al o 
important in some East Asian cultures (e.g., the theoretical Confucian tradition). The 
problem is whether we have any reason to reject liberties in East Asia. It seems that 
Bell cannot successfully provide any reason to reject liberties in East Asi . He also 
has not shown that liberties are not important in all parts of Confucianism (i.e., 
liberties are at least important in some parts of Confucianism).   
 Let me summarize what I have discussed so far. Bell thinks that liberties 
conflict with some values in the practical Confucian tradition. Even if we assume that 
he is correct, it still does not mean that liberties conflict with all Confucian values. 
On the other hand, some scholars (e.g., Angle, de Bary) argue that we can find the 
concepts of liberties in the ancient Chinese culture, especially in Confucianism. Some 
scholars (e.g., He, Lee, and T’ang) even argue that there is a Confucian maximal 




liberties are at least important in some maximal theories in the theoretical Confucian 
tradition.  
 We can use this important conclusion to support premise (7) in Argument 6. 
This premise does not say that liberties are important to all East Asian cultural 
factors. It only says that it is possible to develop a maximal theory of liberties in 
Confucianism. In other words, what is needed here is a possibility to link liberties 
with some parts of Confucianism. The works from the scholars discussed above have 
sufficiently proved what is needed. In other words, their works have already shown 
that liberties can be found and developed in the theoretical Confucian tradition; it is 
possible that liberties are important values in some parts of Confucianism. With this 
possibility, we can conclude that premise (7) is true.  
 In chapter 3, I have argued that even though physical securities also conflict 
with some values in Confucianism, physical securities are still East Asian rights 
because physical securities meet all the conditions in Argument 4. Now, the same 
reasoning applies to liberties as well. As I have already argued in the las  section, 
liberties are essential necessities of dignity, and so liberties are minimal moral 
demands (i.e., premises (6) and (8)). This is an independent reason for the promotion 
of liberties in East Asia. And we now know that liberties can be found or developed 
in the theoretical Confucian tradition. In other words, liberties meet all the conditions 
in Argument 6. Therefore, we can reach to the conclusion that liberties are East Asian 
rights. This argument also shows that liberties are still East Asian rights even if 








Section 4.5 Are Liberties Universal Rights? 
 Bell thinks that liberties are not universal rights because liberties are not East 
Asian rights. Now, I have already developed an argument that shows that liberties are 
East Asian rights. However, it does not imply that liberties are universal rights. We 
need another argument that shows that liberties are universal rights. In this section, I 
argue whether liberties are also universal rights. My conclusion is a conditional 
statement, which is: If physical securities are universal rights becaus  they are 
minimal values, then liberties are also universal rights. I explain the significance and 
weakness of this argument, and I also explain the role it plays in the East and West 
debate on human rights.  
 The argument I am going to discuss here is similar to Argument 5 in chapter 3, 
section 3.6. The argument is as follows:  
  
 Argument 7 
(1) X is universal right if X is an interest of all individuals (i.e., the right-holders) 
that is weighty enough to place others under some duties. 
(2) X is such an interest if X is a fundamental human good in all cultures.  




(4) X is a minimal value if (i) X is embedded in some maximal theories of all 
cultures and (ii) X is a minimal moral demand.  
(5) X is embedded in some maximal theories of all cultures if it is possible to 
develop a maximal theory of X in all cultures.  
(6) X is a minimal moral demand if X is an essential necessity of dignity.  
(7) It is possible to develop a maximal theory of liberties in all cultures. 
(8) Liberties are essential necessities of dignity.  
(9) (Conclusion) Liberties are universal rights. 
 
Argument 7 is a valid argument; if all the premises are true, then it is a sound 
argument, and hence the conclusion is also true as well. Are these premises true? 
It is quite obvious that Argument 7 resembles Argument 5. Indeed, premises 
(1) to (6) are exactly the same in both arguments. The only difference between them 
is that Argument 7 is about liberties but not physical securities. This means that I 
have already discussed most of these premises. Premises (1) to (6) are the same in 
Argument 5, and premise (8) is just the same in this argument and in Argument 6. In 
other words, I have discussed these premises in chapter 3 and section 4.3 in this 
chapter already. The only one left is premise (7). Premise (7) is probably the most 
controversial premise in Argument 7.  
Premise (7) says that liberties are related to all cultures in the world. More 
precisely, it says that liberties can be found or developed in some (i.e., at least one) 
maximal theories of every culture. As I said in chapter 3, we may accept some 




almost all major cultures in the world. This is what Walzer says about physical 
securities (Walzer, 1987, pp. 23-24. See also chapter 3, section 3.6); liberties are th 
same here as well. 
Let me list what cultures I have discussed so far. I have already discussed East 
Asian cultures (especially Confucianism). It is also not controversial to assume that 
liberties are important in Western cultures (especially liberalism). Some scholars 
argue that liberties are important in some other cultures as well. For exampl , Charles 
Taylor (1999) argues that liberties are compatible with Buddhism in Thailand,120 and 
An-Na'im (1995) argues that liberties are important in Islam. However, there ar  still 
many other cultures in this world, and I have not discussed all of them. Indeed, it is 
also quite obvious that I cannot discuss all major cultures in this dissertation. In a 
word, it is hard to discuss every culture directly. We need another way to defend 
premise (7).  
It seems that it is possible to defend premise (7) indirectly. I argue for premise 
(7) in a way that is similar to my discussion of physical securities in chapter 3, section 
3.6. Although I cannot prove that premise (7) is absolutely true, I argue that based on 
some conditions, it is most likely that premise (7) is true.  
As I said in chapter 3, although it appears that “every culture” is a very strong 
requirement, it is actually not so hard to meet this requirement. This is because the 
real requirement here is that it is possible to develop some (i.e., at least one) maximal 
theories in every culture. In other words, the requirement of “every culture” is 
weakened by a possibility (it is possible to develop) and an existential quantifier 
                                                




(some maximal theories). Indeed, this is how I argued that liberties are related to 
Confucianism in the last section. Liberties do not need to be found or developed in all 
maximal moral theories in East Asia; they only need to have a possibility to be found 
or developed in the theoretical Confucian tradition (a maximal moral theory in East 
Asia). This is only a possibility. It seems that this reasoning can be easily repeated in 
every other culture. That is, in every culture, if we find that liberties have a possibility 
to be found or developed in at least one maximal theory, then the requirement is met.  
I have discussed in section 4.3 that liberties are minimal moral demands 
because liberties have many good consequences. According to Shue (1996), liberties
are basic rights with respect to all other rights (including physical security rights and 
subsistence rights). According to Buchanan (1989), liberties are essential to the 
protection and promotion of cultural values. According to Sen (e.g., 1999), liberties 
are essential to avoiding famine. According to Doyle (e.g., 1997), liberties are 
essential to promoting peace. Based on these consequences, liberties are essential 
necessities of dignity, and hence liberties are minimal moral demands. Since we 
already know that liberties have a lot of good empirical consequences and hence they 
are minimal moral demands, it is reasonable to assume that every culture has at least 
one maximal moral theory that may be compatible with liberties. It is reasonable to 
make this assumption because it is most likely that at least some maximal moral 
theories may prefer those good consequences from liberties. In other words, based on 
this reasonable assumption, it is most likely that premise (7) (i.e., it is possible to 




This is what I call an indirect proof to premise (7). In other words, although I 
cannot discuss the detail of every culture here, such a reasonable explanation 
indirectly shows that premise (7) is true. I admit that this is not a conclusive reason. 
But this is also exactly the same way I argue for physical securities in chapter 3. I try 
to argue that both physical securities and liberties are minimal moral deman s, i.e., 
they are essential necessities of dignity. Since they are so essential, I argue that it is 
most likely that they can be found or developed in some maximal theories in every 
culture. In other words, both premises (7) in Argument 5 and Argument 7 are most 
likely to be true.  
Bell and others think that physical securities are universal rights. I have 
argued in chapter 3 that physical securities are universal rights because they are 
minimal values, even though physical securities also conflict with some cultural 
factors. Now I am simply using exactly the same logic for liberties. In other words, 
liberties are universal rights because they are also minimal values, and this is exactly 
the same reason that physical securities are universal rights.  
Therefore, it seems that I have at least indirectly showed that liberties are 
universal rights. I have argued that it is most likely that it is possible to develop some 
maximal theories of liberties in all cultures (i.e., it is most likely that premise (7) is 
true). I have also showed that liberties are universal rights in the same wy that 
physical securities are universal rights. In other words, if physical securities are also 
universal rights because they are minimal values, then liberties are also universal 
rights because they are also minimal values. I realize that what I have argued here 




indirectly argued that liberties are also universal rights. More importantly, what I 
have argued here is already sufficient to refute Bell’s “East Asian challenge to human 
rights.” In the next section, I shall explain this point in depth.  
 
 
Section 4.6 Why is the “East Asian Challenge to Human Rights” not really a 
Challenge? 
  
In the previous sections, I have argued that liberties are East Asian rights and 
universal rights. In this section, I summarize these arguments and use them to explain 
why Bell’s “the East Asian challenge to human rights” is not really a “ch llenge.”    
 The main issue in the East and West debate on human rights is to argue how 
and why East Asian cultures can affect human rights and in what sense they are 
affected. Bell himself thinks that “it would be a mistake to assume that nothing of 
theoretical significance has emerged from East Asia” (Bell, 2006b, p. 266), and he 
aims to “get beyond the rhetoric that has dogged the human rights debate and identify 
relatively persuasive East Asian criticisms of traditional Western appro ches to 
human rights” (Bell, 2006a, p. 53). In general, his project, “the East Asian challenge 
to human rights,” begins from “cultural factors can affect the justification of rights” 
(e.g., Bell 2004, pp. 29), and concludes that we should be “limiting the set of human 
rights for an East Asian context” (e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp. 73-76).  More precisely, he 
and many others argue for a philosophical account of the cultural justification of 




physical securities are universal rights; liberties are not universal rights because 
liberties are not East Asian rights. Liberties are not East Asian rights because liberties 
conflict with some values in the practical Confucian tradition.  I have summarized his 
view on physical securities and liberties into the following statements in Argument 3 
(in chapter 2, section 2.5): 
 
(1) X is universal right if and only if X is an interest of everyone (i.e., the 
right-holders) that is weighty enough to place others under some duty. 
(2) X is such an interest if and only if X is a fundamental human good.  
(3) Physical securities are fundamental human goods because they are 
minimal values.  
(4) Liberties are not fundamental human goods because they conflict with 
some East Asian cultural factors (i.e., values in the practical Confucian 
tradition). 
 
(1) and (2) express the cultural justification of rights, and (3) and (4) are the 
reasons that physical securities are universal rights (and also East Asian rights), and 
liberties are not East Asian rights (and hence not universal rights). However, 
according to my arguments in chapter 3 and 4 (i.e., Argument 4 to Argument 7), the 
following two statements are also true: 
 
(5) Physical securities conflict with some East Asian cultural factors.   





When we put statements (5) and (6) together with the above statements, we 
can see why Bell’s argument is problematic. If physical securities ar  universal rights 
because they are minimal values, then liberties are also universal rights becau e they 
are also minimal values. If liberties are not East Asian rights because they conflict 
with some East Asian cultural factors, then physical securities are not East Asi n 
rights as well because they also conflict with some East Asian cultural factors. 
In general, Bell has suggested two conditions in “the East Asian challenge to 
human rights.” The positive condition says that X is a universal right (and an East 
Asian right) when X is a minimal value. The negative condition says that X is not an 
East Asian right (and hence not a universal right) when X conflicts with some East 
Asian cultural factors. However, Bell has not discussed which condition is more 
important, and he does not realize that both physical securities and liberties meet both 
of these conditions. As I have argued, it seems that he underestimates the importance 
of the positive condition and overestimates the importance of the negative condition. 
Therefore, his arguments do not support his conclusion that physical securities are 
universal rights and East Asian rights but liberties are not East Asian rights and 
universal rights.  
My arguments, on the other hand, show that only the positive condition is 
important. Argument 4 and Argument 6 focus on East Asian rights. I have argued that 
X is an East Asian right if X meets all the premises. In other words, my premises are 
a sufficient condition for X being an East Asian right. I have also argued why X can 




In other words, it is possible for an East Asian right to conflict with some East Asian
cultural factors. In short, I have argued that if X meets all the premises, then even if X 
also conflicts with some East Asian cultural factors, X is still an East Asian right.  
I have applied this general reasoning to the cases of physical securities and 
liberties. Although both physical securities and liberties conflict with the practical 
Confucian tradition, they are quite compatible with the theoretical Confucian 
tradition. I have argued that both physical securities and liberties are minimal values, 
and they are embedded in the theoretical Confucian tradition in different ways. 
Therefore, although both physical securities and liberties conflict with the practical 
Confucian tradition, they are still East Asian rights.  
Arguments 4 and 6 focus on East Asian rights only. They show that both 
physical securities and liberties are East Asian rights, and the justification of these 
rights does not undermine the importance of East Asian cultures. If physical securities 
or liberties are not East Asian rights, then they are not universal rights. This is why 
we need to confirm that they are East Asian rights. But even if they are East Asi n 
rights, it does not imply that they are universal rights. This is why I also develop 
Arguments 5 and 7 to argue that physical securities and liberties are probably 
universal rights as well. The idea of these arguments is that if we apply the same 
reasoning of Arguments 4 and 6 to all major cultures in the world, then we may be 
able to show that both physical securities and liberties are universal rights. Since I
cannot discuss all major cultures in this project, I can only argue indirectly tha  
physical securities and liberties are universal rights. But it seems to me hat it is 




First, this is because Bell’s project is also an empirical approach. It is quite enough to 
refute his project by indirectly showing that physical securities and liberties are 
universal rights. Second, this is because Bell also agrees that physical securities are 
universal rights because physical securities are minimal values. Since I hav shown 
that liberties are also minimal values, according to the logic for physical se urities 
being universal rights, liberties are also universal rights as well. In other words, 
liberties are as likely as physical securities to be universal rights.  
In short, my argument contributes to the East and West debate on human 
rights in the following ways. First, I have showed that physical securities and liberties 
are East Asian rights, even though both of them conflict with some East Asian 
cultural factors. Second, I have also shown that both physical securities and liberties 
are also universal rights. Therefore, I can conclude that Bell’s “the East Asian 
challenge to human rights” is not really a challenge to the list of human rights 
because it does not show that liberties are not universal rights.  
 
 
Section 4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have constructed some arguments that show that liberties are 
East Asian rights and universal rights. I have shown that liberties are essential 
necessities of dignity, and I have shown that liberties do not conflict with all East 
Asian cultures. Liberties are quite important in the theoretical Confucian tradition, 
and it is possible to develop some maximal theories of liberties in Confucianism. 




securities and liberties are universal rights. Therefore, Bell is mistaken to claim that 
liberties are not universal rights because they are not East Asian rights.  
 But I cannot finish my project here. People argue for different positions in the 
East and West debate on human rights. Bell’s project represents a position that 
emphasizes the importance of East Asian cultures but denies liberties as univeral 
rights. But Bell has also argued against some positions in other East and West debates
on human rights. In the next chapter, I shall discuss these debates between Bell and 
other philosophers, and I shall also explain how my arguments can contribute to these 
debates.  












Chapter 5:  Other Debates on Human Rights 
 
Section 5.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapters, I have discussed Bell’s arguments and argued against 
them. Roughly, Bell argues that liberties are not universal rights because they are not 
East Asian rights. They are not East Asian rights because they conflict with 
Confucian values. In chapters 3 and 4, I have developed four arguments (Argument 4 
to Argument 7); these arguments explain why both physical securities and liberties 
are East Asian rights and universal rights. In this chapter, I explain further the 
applications of these arguments. In other words, I explain how these arguments 
contribute to other debates on human rights.  
 In this chapter, I first discuss two debates between Bell and other 
philosophers: the debate between Bell and Charles Taylor and the debate between 
Bell and Jack Donnelly. Taylor calls his approach “an unforced consensus on human 
rights” (Taylor, 1999); Donnelly uses some notions in Western philosophy (such as 
“equal concern and respect,” “overlapping consensus,” etc.) to argue for human 
rights. Bell argues that both of their approaches are problematic and mistaken. In 
section 5.2 and 5.3, I discuss their debates in detail. I argue that Bell has succesfully 
challenged the approaches from Taylor and Donnelly. But it does not mean that Bell 
has refuted all of their conclusions as well. I argue that my arguments can save their 
conclusions from Bell’s challenge.  
 In section 5.4, I summarize what my arguments can do, and explain how my 






Section 5.2 The Debate between Bell and Taylor 
 In this section, I discuss an approach to human rights which is called “an 
unforced consensus on human rights” (Taylor, 1999). I first discuss what it is, and 
then discuss the challenge to this approach from Daniel Bell. I argue that both 
Taylor’s approach and Bell’s approach are problematic. I also explain how my 
arguments contribute to their debate—how my arguments can save Taylor’s 
conclusion.  
 Taylor thinks that people in different cultures would come to a consensus on 
human rights. He writes:  
 
What would it mean to come to a genuine, unforced international consensus 
on human rights? I suppose it would be something like what Rawls describes 
in his Political Liberalism as an “overlapping consensus.” That is, different 
groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding 
incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and 
so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern 
human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of 
its profound background conception. We would agree on the norms while 
disagreeing on why they were the rights norms, and we would be content to 
live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying 





From this passage, we know that Taylor mentions the idea of “overlapping 
consensus” from Rawls (1993). But Taylor does not explain how Rawls’ idea is 
affecting his approach. The only thing relevant to Rawls is that Taylor thinks that all 
cultures in the world agree on something about human rights, despite the fact that 
these cultures have different views on “theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so 
on.” It seems that his aim is simply to argue for an unforced consensus on human 
rights among different cultures. He does not discuss how Rawls’ idea is involved in 
this debate, and he does not mention other relevant notions from Rawls (e.g., 
comprehensive doctrines, political conception of justice, etc.). In a word, Taylor 
wants to argue for a consensus on human rights among different cultures; it does not 
matter whether Taylor’s approach is really based on Rawls’ idea.  
 In general, Taylor divides human rights into three parts. He writes:  
 
It might help to structure our thinking if we made a tripartite distinction. What 
we are looking for, in the end is a world consensus on certain norms of 
conduct enforceable on governments. To be accepted in any given society, 
these would in each case have to response on some widely acknowledged 
philosophical justification, and to be enforced, they would have to find 
expression in legal mechanisms. One way of putting our central question 
might be this: what variations can we imagine in philosophical justifications 
or in legal forms that would still be compatible with a meaningful universal 







In other words, his “tripartite distinction” is as follows. The first is “the legal forms of 
human rights,” the second is “the philosophical justifications of human rights,” and 
the third is “the norms of human rights.” Taylor thinks that different cultures may 
have different legal forms and different philosophical justifications of human rights. 
Sometimes, legal forms or philosophical justifications in different cultures ar  even 
incompatible. But, he also argues that different cultures have a consensus on the 
norms of human rights. Taylor also discusses the Buddhist tradition in Thailand. He 
uses the Thailand example to illustrate his view and to support his conclusion (Taylor, 
1999, pp.133-137). Next, I shall discuss the tripartite distinctions and the Thailand 
example in further detail.  
 It is not too hard to understand what the legal forms of human rights are. They 
are about how a state enforces human rights by its legal or even political system. 
Taylor argues that different legal systems enforce human rights in different ways. For 
example, he compares the situations in America and Thailand.121 He argues that in 
many Western countries, “the judges and the judicial process enjoy in general a gre t 
deal of prestige and respect. In some countries, this respect is based on a long 
tradition in which some notion of fundamental law played an important part, and 
hence in which its guardians had a special place” (Taylor, 1999, pp. 131-132). But, in 
Thailand, judges or even the judicial process do not enjoy such a moral prestige. 
Instead, Taylor argues that the king of Thailand has a very high moral prestige in 
                                                
121 Taylor also discusses Confucianism in Singapore (Taylor, 1999, pp. 129-131). But he generally 
thinks that Singapore’s legal and political system violates some norms of human rights, and so it is not 




Thailand; indeed, the king has some special roles in the history of Thailand. Taylors 
writes:  
Averting to another tradition, we note that in Thailand, at certain crucial 
junctions, the immense moral prestige of the monarchy has been used to 
confer legitimacy and force on moves to end military violence and repression 
and return to constitutional rule. This was the case following the student 
demonstrations in October 1973, and again in the wake of the popular 
reactions against the seizure of power by General Suchinda Kraprayoon in 
May 1992. In both cases, a military junta responded with violence, only to 
find its position unsustainable and to be forced to give way to a civilian 
régime and renewed elections. In both these cases, King Bhumibhol played a 
critical role. The king was able to play this role because of elements in the 
traditions that have contributed to the Thai conception of monarchy, some of 
which go way back. For example, the conception of the king as dh rmaraja, 
in the tradition of Asoka, sees the ruler as charged with establishing dharma in 
the world. (Taylor, 1999, p. 132. Taylor’s italics) 
 
Taylor’s point, in summary, is that the king of Thailand can enforce some human 
rights (or some values of human rights) in Thailand. He stopped the military violence 
in 1973, and even protected and promoted democracy in 1992. In other words, some 
physical securities or even liberties were enforced in Thailand because of the king. 




Taylor argues that this is an acceptable cultural difference. In a word, Taylors thinks 
that it is acceptable to have different legal forms of human rights in different 
cultures.122  
Taylor also discusses “the philosophical justification of human rights”. He 
thinks that we should allow different philosophical justifications of human rights in 
different cultures. He discusses the natural law and natural rights tradition as a 
philosophical justification of human rights in the Western cultures (Taylor, 1999, 
pp.126-129),123 and then he argues that there are different philosophical justifications 
of human rights in other cultures. He discusses Buddhism in Thailand as an example. 
He thinks that the major religion in Thailand, Theravada Buddhism, can also be a 
philosophical justification to democracy and human rights (Taylor, 1999, pp. 136). 
For example, he argues that the concept of ahimsa (the avoidance of violence) in 
Buddhism may develop a philosophical justification to physical security rights 
(Taylor, 1999, pp. 133-137). He also argues that Buddhism may help us to understand 
some controversial concepts (such as equality) in a better way (Taylor, 1999, pp. 137-
140). In a word, he thinks that Buddhism in Thailand can also be a philosophical 
justification of human rights, and hence we should allow such a cultural difference 
between the East and the West.  
The third distinction is the norms of human rights. Taylor thinks that different 
cultures have an overlapping consensus on the norms of human rights. What are these 
                                                
122 Note that Taylor also realizes that this tradition in Thailand may lead to some bad consequences as 
well. He discusses another example: in 1976, the right–wing groups in Thailand attacked democracy 
with the slogan “Nation, King and Religion” (Taylor, 1999, p. 132). But he still thinks that in general, 
the traditional role of the king of Thailand can protect or even enforce human rights in Thailand.  
123 Notice that Taylor seems to think that human dignity is solely a Western concept (e.g., Taylor, 
1999, p. 125). I have argued against this point in chapter 3, section 3.4, so that discussion won’t be 




“norms of human rights”? Taylor does not provide a complete list in his article, but he 
has mentioned several of them when he talks about the legal forms and the 
philosophical justifications of human rights. For example, he discusses “security of 
person” when he talks about the differences of the legal and political forms in 
Thailand and America (Taylor, 1999, p. 132). He thinks that if we realize that the 
king of Thailand can also protect “human beings from violence and oppression”, then 
“we would have in fact achieved convergence on the substance of human rights, in 
spite of differences in form” (Taylor, 1999, p. 133). He also talks about democracy, 
liberties and immunities as norms of human rights throughout his discussion on the 
legal forms and philosophical justifications of human rights (Taylor, 1999, pp.126-
143). This dissertation focuses on physical securities and liberties; it seemsthat 
Taylor also agrees that physical securities and liberties are also norms of human 
rights.  
In summary, he concludes that the “example drawn from Thailand provides 
one model for what the path to world consensus might look like—a convergence on 
certain norms from out of very different philosophical and spiritual backgrounds” 
(Taylor, 1999, p. 137). In other words, Taylor’s approach is that different cultures 
have a consensus on the norms of human rights, even though different cultures have 
different legal forms and philosophical justifications of human rights.  
 How does Bell reply to Taylor’s approach? Bell has discussed Taylor’s 
approach in his writing (Bell, 2006a, pp. 81-83). It seems that Bell would agree with 
Taylor partially, i.e., Bell would agree with Taylor that there are cultural differences 




does not agree with Taylor’s unforced consensus on the norms of human rights. In 
general, Bell does not think that there is such a consensus. Bell mainly has two 
reasons to argue against Taylor’s approach.  
First, Bell wonders whether it is possible to separate the norms of human 
rights from the legal forms and the philosophical justifications of human rights. Bell 
thinks that Taylor’s approach is trying to “abstract” the norms from the legal forms 
and the philosophical justifications. That is, Bell thinks that Taylor’s approach is 
trying “to abstract from those beliefs for the purpose of working out an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ of human rights norms”. And then Bell writes: “For one thing, it may not 
be realistic to expect that people will be willing to abstract from the values they care 
deeply about during the course of a global dialogue on human rights. Even if people 
agree to abstract from culturally specific ways of justifying and impleenting norms, 
the likely outcome is a withdrawal to a highly general, abstract realm of agreement 
that fails to resolve actual disputes over contested rights” (Bell, 2006a, p. 81). In 
short, Bell’s idea is that we cannot really separate the norms of human rights from the 
other parts of a culture. In other words, we may not be able to separate the norms 
from the legal forms or the philosophical justifications.  
For example, he thinks that even though both American and Singaporeans use 
the name “political participation”, they understand this term very differently because 
they have a lot of cultural differences. Bell wonders whether it is really possible to 
find any consensus on the abstract norms of political participation between Singapore 
and America. He writes that  “participants in a cross-cultural dialogue can agree on 




in practice: a Singaporean official may argue that competitive elections are sufficient, 
whereas a Western liberal will argue that meaningful elections must be accompanied 
by the freedoms of speech and association”  (Bell, 2006a, p. 81). In summary, Bell 
would agree that there are cultural differences on the legal forms and the 
philosophical justifications of human rights. However, Bell wonders whether we can 
really separate the norms from other parts of the cultures. Bell would argue that if the 
legal forms and the philosophical justifications are different, then the norms are also 
different.  
  Bell’s example on Singapore and America is also related to the second reason 
against Taylor’s approach. Bell argues that the cross-cultural dialogue betw en the 
East and the West can only realize their differences rather than any consensus on 
liberties. As he argues, American and Singaporeans have different ideas on the rights 
to political participation. It is quite obvious that they have different legal forms and 
philosophical justifications, but it is hard to see how they can have a consensus on the 
norms of human rights. He also writes:  
 
In the last decade or so, there have been many attempts to put forward truly 
universal moral values, and the response has ranged from hostility to 
indifference. None has come even close to supplanting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a normative frame of reference, 
notwithstanding the ongoing controversy regarding the “Westcentric” 
perspective of this document… In short, the aspiration to develop values of 




cultural dialogue will lead to either empty platitudes or politically 
controversial conclusions likely to be rejected by affected constituents. (Bell, 
2006a, pp. 82-83) 
 
 
In general, Bell agrees that it is good to have some cross-cultural dialogues, 
but he does not believe that such dialogues can reach any consensus on liberties. 
Instead, he thinks that people from different cultures and traditions should tolerate 
and respect each other on the perspective on liberties. Bell believes that the cross-
cultural dialogue between the East and the West only confirms that “Wesern rights” 
(especially liberal rights) cannot be East Asian rights (and hence not human rights).
He believes that “the main aim [of a cross-cultural dialogue] would be to identify 
areas of justifiable moral difference… as well as learning from other cultures with the 
aim of improving flaws in one’s own culture” (Bell, 2006a, p. 83).  
 In summary, Bell wonders if it is possible to abstract the same norms from 
different legal forms and philosophical justifications in different cultures, and he also 
thinks that cross-cultural dialogues between the East and the West can only confirm
the differences between these cultures. Based on these two objections, Bell concludes 
that the East and the West has no consensus on the norms, philosophical 
justifications, or legal forms of liberties. Therefore, Bell concludes that Taylor’s 
unforced consensus on human rights (especially on liberal rights) is problematic and 
mistaken.  
 Bell has provided some strong objections against Taylor’s approach on human 




mean that the purpose of Taylor’s approach is totally defeated, and it does not mea 
that Bell’s approach is better than Taylor’s. In below, I shall argue that both 
approaches have some problems.  
Their debate is mainly about whether there is any consensus on liberties 
among different cultures. While Taylor thinks that there is a consensus on the norms, 
Bell thinks that cross-cultural dialogues will only confirm the differences among 
cultures. They both discuss some cultural factors in Thailand to support their own 
view. It seems that both of them only focus on the part of the Thai culture that fits 
into their arguments; they ignore or discuss very little on the part of the Thai culture 
that does not fit into their arguments. However, as we have discussed in the previous 
chapters, we may divide every culture into different parts, and different parts of  
culture may even conflict with each other. It seems that every culture has such an 
“internal conflict”. For example, I have discussed that the theoretical Confucia  
tradition and the practical Confucian tradition treat physical securities and liberties 
differently. The Thailand example is also like this. Both Taylor and Bell discusses 
some special roles of the king of Thailand. While Taylor focuses on how the king 
may stop military violence and protect democracy (Taylor, 1999, pp. 131-133), Bell 
focuses on how the freedom of speech may be forbidden in Thailand because people 
respect the king (e.g. Bell, 2006a, pp.73-74. See also chapter 2, section 2.5). It seems 
that both of them are only taking a part of the Thailand culture to support their own 
view, which presents a problem for both of them.  
In the previous chapters, I have already discussed this problem for Bell’s 




liberties conflict with some East Asian cultural factors. However, I have argued that 
liberties are also important in some East Asian cultural contexts. The problem is how 
we should decide which cultural factors are important, and Bell has not provided a 
satisfied answer. Taylor’s approach is also refuted by this problem. Since there are 
internal conflicts within a culture, it is hard to see how to get a consensus on human 
rights (or the norms of human rights) within a culture; and this means that it is even 
harder to get a consensus among different cultures. In other words, a main problem of 
Taylor’s approach is that he wants to have a consensus among different cultures, 
which is quite hard to achieve.  
But why do we want a consensus on human rights? I suppose Taylor’s answer 
is that some values of human rights (such as physical securities and liberties) are 
important, but he also realizes that there are cultural differences on human rights. He 
wants to ensure both the importance of human rights and the importance of cultural 
factors. However, his consensus approach cannot successfully defend this conclusion. 
It seems that it is better to have another approach to defend such a conclusion, and my 
arguments can defend his conclusion. Let me explain.  
According to the arguments I have discussed in the previous chapters, 
physical securities and liberties are human rights (i.e., universal rights) even though 
there are cultural differences between the East and the West. Physical securities and 
liberties are human rights because they are minimal values. I have argued that 
physical securities and liberties are minimal moral demands, and they can be found or 
developed in some maximal theories. I ask for neither a consensus among different 




within a culture (such as the differences between the theoretical Confucian tradition 
and the practical Confucian tradition), but I also argue that such conflicts cannot deny 
that liberties are human rights. In other words, I believe that the human rights deba e
is not about whether there is a consensus among different cultures; this is only about 
whether a minimal moral demand can be found or developed in some maximal 
theories in cultures. My approach can avoid the problem of consensus, and my 
approach can refute Bell’s challenge, yet it still does not ignore the role of cultures in 
the human rights debate.   
 In summary, I have discussed in this section why both Bell’s approach and 
Taylor’s approach are mistaken and problematic. Taylor argues for a consensus on 
the norms of human rights, but Bell argues that it is impossible to have such a 
consensus. It seems that to me both of their approaches are problematic, and I have 
explained why my arguments solve the problem better than both of their approaches.   
 
 
Section 5.3 The Debate between Bell and Donnelly  
 Bell has a debate with Donnelly on human rights. In this section, I discuss this 
debate in detail. I first introduce Donnelly’s original argument on human rights, and 
then I discuss Bell’s challenge to Donnelly’s argument. I then discuss Donnelly’s 
replies, and finally I explain my view. The aim of this section is to show how my 
arguments can contribute to their debate. I show that Bell has successfully challenged 
Donnelly’s approach, but Donnelly’s conclusion can be saved by my arguments.  
 I have discussed in chapter 3 that many human rights philosophers agree with 




Human Right) that human rights are derived from dignity. Donnelly is also one of 
these human rights philosophers. He argues that human dignity is a universal value 
(Donnelly, 1989, pp. 66-87). He explains further that human rights are “rooted in an 
attractive moral vision of human beings as equal and autonomous agents living in 
states that treat each citizen with equal concern and respect”; he also argues that “a 
certain kind of liberalism provides, if not the best, then at least a good justification for 
this system of rights” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 38). Donnelly also believes that the list of 
human rights is exactly the same as the list in the Universal Declaration of Human 
rights; he calls his view “the Universal Declaration model” (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 23-
37). I now explain his view in detail.  
First, Donnelly believes that “equal concern and respect” is a reason why 
some moral rights (such as liberal rights) are human rights. Concurring with D orkin 
(1977), Donnelly argues that every government should treat every citizen with equal 
concern and respect (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 43-45). Roughly, this is because we are all 
moral individuals and so we deserve equal concern and respect. Note that “equal 
concern and respect” is a controversial notion. Some may argue that it is only one of 
the many interpretations of equality. For example, one may interpret equality as some 
forms of equal opportunity. Dworkin is actually aware of the ambiguity and 
vagueness of the notion of equal concern and respect, and he has explained it further 
(e.g. Dworkin, 1977, pp.180-181). But it seems that Donnelly does not explain this 
notion in detail. I simply assume that Donnelly agrees with Dworkin. Donnelly 
writes, “I want to suggest that it is something very much like Ronald Dworkin’s idea 




state must treat each person as a moral and political equal. Inequalities in goods or 
opportunities that arise directly or indirectly from political decisions must be 
compatible with a political conception of justice founded in equal concern and 
respect” (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 43-44). 
Second, Donnelly also borrows some notions from Rawls. For example, he 
borrows the notion of “overlapping consensus” from Rawls (1993, 1999). Although 
both Taylor and Donnelly claim that they are using this notion in their own approach, 
they use this notion differently. Donnelly argues that different societies and cultures 
do not only have an overlapping consensus on human rights, but they also have an 
overlapping consensus on equal concern and respect. He writes, “Today…the basic 
moral equality [equal concern and respect] of all human beings is not merely acc pted 
but strongly endorsed by all leading comprehensive doctrines in all regions of the 
world. This convergence on egalitarian comprehensive doctrines, both within and 
between civilizations, provides the foundation for a convergence on the rights of the 
Universal Declaration” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 41). In other words, Donnelly thinks that 
equal concern and respect is a “political conception of justice” to which most 
“comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” consent (Donnelly, 
2003, p. 43). Donnelly argues further that “equal concern and respect, understood as a 
political conception of justice, can be endorsed by a variety of comprehensive 
doctrines. I turn now to one, liberalism” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 46). He discusses 
different versions of liberalism and defends his version of “equalitarian liberalism”. 




this political conception of justice (i.e., equal concern and respect) (Donnelly, 2003, 
pp. 46-51).  
Finally, he uses all these notions to support his argument on human rights, i.e., 
human rights are universal, equal and inalienable rights, and the list of human rights 
is exactly the list in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (p. 45-46). For 
example, he writes, “It is a relatively simple matter to derive the full list of rights in 
the Universal Declaration from the political principle of equal concern and 
respect…To treat someone with concern and respect, an individual must first be 
recognized as a moral and legal person. This in turn requires certain basic personal 
rights” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 45).  
It is unclear whether Donnelly has used the notions from Dworkin and Rawls 
accurately. Donnelly does not explain that further. For example, Donnelly wants to 
argue for the whole list of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but Rawls only supports a shorter list of human rights (e.g., Rawls, 1999, 
p.65), so it is hard to tell whether Donnelly completely agrees with Rawls or not. 
Although Donnelly sometimes claims that he is using Rawls’ ideas to develop his 
argument, he also once says that his argument “is Rawlsian in inspiration but notthat 
of John Rawls” (Donnelly, 2007, p. 289n22). It is hard to tell what “inspiration” 
Donnelly wants from Rawls, so, it is not really clear whether Donnelly describes 
Rawls’ ideas accurately enough. But the aim here is not to evaluate whether Donnelly 
describes Dworkin’s view and Rawls’ view accurately; the aim here is to see how 




although I cannot discuss every detail of Donnelly’s argument, this sketch of his 
argument is sufficient enough for our discussion.  
I now discuss how Bell challenges Donnelly’s view. Bell’s challenge focuses 
on East Asian cultures. In general, Bell thinks that Donnelly’s view (especially 
Donnelly 1989, 1999, & 2003) is solely a “West-centric perspective.” Bell claims that 
Donnelly does not emphasize on the importance of East Asian cultures. Bell writes:
 
There are a number of West-centric perspectives which simply assume that 
their views are universally applicable to other cultures…For example, Jack 
Donnelly, who I think represents the best of human rights activists and 
theorists, never allows for the possibility that non-Western values could shape 
international human rights regime. Western political theorists also claim th t 
their theories are universal, but only draw on the moral practices and moral 
aspirations found in Western societies…The problem with these West-centric 
outlooks is that they block the development of a truly international human 
rights regime that can accommodate the ends and aspirations of non-Western 
peoples, and that they fail to allow for the possibility of areas of justifiable 
difference between “the west” and “the rest.” (Bell, 1998a, pp. 14 & 16) 
 
 
Note that Bell is not criticizing Donnelly for not mentioning East Asian 
cultures. The real challenge from Bell is that Donnelly does not realize or does not 
agree that East Asian cultures are important or even essential in the human rights 




Donnelly borrows Dworkin’s notion of “equal concern and respect” to support his 
view. Even if we assume that Donnelly describes Dworkin’s view correctly, Bell 
thinks that Dworkin’s view is also a West-centric perspective. Bell writes, “Dworkin 
made no serious attempt to learn about Chinese philosophy, to identify aspects worth 
defending and learning from, and to relate his own ideas to those of Chinese political 
traditions such as Confucianism and Legalism…Dworkin merely put forward his own 
ideas and identified fellow ‘liberal’, and the ‘debate’ rarely moved beyond this 
starting point” (Bell, 2006a, p. 4). It seems that this criticism to Dworkin also applies 
to Donnelly. For another example, Donnelly also borrows Rawls’ notion of 
overlapping consensus to argue that different cultures have a consensus on the 
concept of human rights. No matter whether Donnelly has used Rawls’ ideas 
accurately, Rawls’ ideas are considered as Western, and so Donnelly is still using 
some Western perspectives to support his argument; at least this is what Bell thinks 
about Donnelly’s argument. This is why Bell argues against Donnelly’s view.  
In summary, Donnelly uses notions of “equal concern and respect,” 
“equalitarian liberalism,” etc. as the main notions for his argument; he does not focus 
on East Asian cultures. Donnelly simply thinks that his argument on human rights is 
universal, but Bell believes that Donnelly has not shown that his argument “works” in 
East Asia as well. In other words, Bell thinks that the real problem for Donnelly is 
that he does not realize or agree that East Asian cultures are dete mining factors for 
East Asian rights or even human rights. Therefore, Bell thinks that Donnelly’s 




Donnelly thinks that his argument is not merely a West-centric perspective, 
and he has several replies to the cultural challenge. The first reply can be found in 
Donnelly (1999), but it seems that Donnelly may have misunderstood the cultural 
challenge there. Donnelly (1999) believes that the concept and language of human 
rights were foreign to East Asian. He writes, “The idea that all human beings, s mply 
because they are human, have inalienable political rights was foreign to all major 
premodern societies” (Donnelly, 1999, p. 62).124 However, he argues that this should 
not be a problem for non-Westerners. He argues that the origin of human rights is not 
relevant to the “applicability” of human rights in East Asia. He writes: 
 
I want to emphasize that the “Western” origins of human rights ideas and 
practices is a simple historical fact. It is not a matter for praise (or blame). 
Human rights initially emerged—were created or “discovered”—in Europe 
not because of superior Western virtue or insight but because, for better or 
worse, modern states and capitalism first appeared there. This history does not 
make these rights any more irrelevantly “Western” than the origins and initial 
spread of both Newtonian and quantum physics makes them “Western” 
physics inapplicable to Asia. Whatever applicability—or inapplicability – 
internationally recognized human rights have is independent of their place of 
origin. (Donnelly, 1999, p. 69) 
  
                                                




How does Bell reply to Donnelly? Bell disagrees with Donnelly that human 
rights are “essentially foreign to traditional Asian political thought as well as to 
premodern Western political thought” (Bell, 2006a, p. 62).125 Bell discusses several 
historical events in East Asia in the last two centuries. He also discusses som  
traditional concepts in East Asia (Bell, 1996, pp. 650-651; 2000, pp. 49-55; 2006a, 
p.62-65). His conclusion is that “the claim that the concept of human rights is foreign 
to East Asian political traditions may be out of date” and “the functional equivalents 
of some human rights practices can be found in Asian traditions” (Bell, 2006a, pp. 
62-65). Specifically, Bell actually agrees with Donnelly that it does not matter 
whether the origin is in the West. Indeed, Bell thinks that the origination is not a 
problem; otherwise his view and other views (such as Walzer’s view) are all 
problematic because they also originate from the West. The real problem is, using 
Donnelly’s term, whether human rights are only “applicable” in the West but not in 
the East. Bell argues that the East Asian traditions affect the “applicability” of human 
rights in East Asia. He argues that East Asian traditions are important because these 
traditions determine that some rights (such as liberal rights) do not “apply” in East 
Asia. No matter what “applicability” means, Bell disagrees with Donnelly because 
Donnelly thinks that East Asian traditions have nothing to do with the current debate 
of human rights in East Asia.126 It is obvious that Donnelly’s claim on the origins and 
his analogy on quantum physics does not save his argument from Bell’s challenge—
his claim and his analogy are irrelevant to Bell’s challenge at all.  
                                                
125 Bell’s point here is a reply to Donnelly (1999), p. 62.  




Donnelly has another reply (e.g., Donnelly, 2003, 2007) that focuses more on 
the “strategic consideration.” Bell has also discussed this strategic consideration. Bell 
thinks that Western views may hurt the promotion of human rights in East Asia. He 
argues that “if the ultimate aim of human rights diplomacy is to persuade others of the 
value of human rights, it is more likely that the struggle to promote human rights can 
be won if it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge, local cultural 
traditions” (Bell, 2006a, p. 65). Indeed, he thinks that if we simply use liberalism or 
other Western cultures as the only moral foundations for human rights, then there will 
be several drawbacks (Bell, 2006a, pp. 65-72). This is why strategically, it is bet er to 
promote human rights in East Asia based on some East Asian cultural contexts.127  
 Bell’s strategic consideration is thoughtful and considerate to people in non-
Western societies. Donnelly once pointed out that this strategic consideration is at 
most “a practical, not a theoretical argument”, and this strategic consideration does 
not show that “culture trumps international norms” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 100). But it 
seems that Donnelly also wants to give cultures several “strategic” roles in the human 
rights debate, and so he introduces a “three-tiered scheme” to human rights: the 
concept or substance of human rights; the interpretations of human rights, and the 
implementation or form of human rights (Donnelly, 2003, pp. 93-98; 2007, p. 299). 
Donnelly’s general idea is that cultures can affect the interpretations and the 
implementation of human rights, but cultures do not affect the concept or substance of 
human rights.  
                                                
127 For further detail of this strategic consideration, see Bell (1996), pp. 652-660; Bell (2000), pp. 55-




 What does he mean by the concept or substance of human rights? Donnelly 
introduces it in Donnelly (2003) and explains it further in Donnelly (2007). Roughly, 
he thinks that human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
universal, equal and inalienable rights. He believes that this list is universal and 
different cultures have a consensus on such a concept or substance of human rights. 
This is also where he applies the notions of “equal concern and respect,” “overlapping 
consensus,” etc. For example, he claims that “The Universal Declaration generally 
formulates rights at the level of what I will call the concept, an abstract, general 
statement of an orienting value…Only at this level do I claim that there is a consensus 
on the rights of the Universal Declaration, and at this level, most appeals to cultural 
relativism fail” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 94. His Italics).  
 The interpretations and implementation of human rights are comparatively 
more relative to different cultures. He believes that there can be different 
interpretations of human rights among different cultures. He writes, “Particul r 
human rights are like ‘essentially contested concepts,’ in which there is a substntial 
but rather general consensus on basic meaning coupled with no less important, 
systematic, and apparently irresolvable conflicts of interpretations… I such 
circumstances, culture provides one plausible and defensible mechanism for selecting 
interpretations (and forms)” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 96). He also thinks that there are 
different ways to implement human rights in legal and political practices (Donnelly, 
2003, pp. 97-98).  
In general, it seems that he can allow cultural differences in the level of 




universality only at the level of the concept” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 97); “Human rights 
are (relatively) universal at the level of the concept, broad formulations such as the 
claims in Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration that ‘everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of person” and “the right to social security’” (Donnelly, 
2007, p. 299. His italics). In a word, he has a “strategic consideration” that cultures 
may affect the interpretations and implementation of human rights, but the concept or 
substance of human rights is still universal.  
Note that even some human rights advocates think that Donnelly’s three-tiered 
scheme to human rights is controversial. For example, Michael Goodhart thinks that 
he agrees with “many of Donnelly’s substantive arguments” (Goodhart, 2008, p. 184), 
but he also disagrees with this three-tiered scheme to human rights.128 But for the 
purpose of the discussion here, I only focus on Donnelly and Bell. Can this three-
tiered scheme successfully reply to Bell’s challenge? Although Donnelly thinks that 
his idea is affected by Bell,129 it seems that Donnelly cannot reply to Bell successfully. 
Although Bell would probably agree that the interpretations and implementation of 
human rights can be affected by cultural factors, he would not agree that the concept 
or substance of human rights cannot be affected by cultural factors. More precisely, 
the challenge from Bell is that Donnelly’s concept of human rights in this three-tier d 
scheme is Western-centric. Donnelly replies that the interpretations and the 
implementation can be affected by cultures, but this reply is not really to the point. At 
                                                
128 For the debate between Goodhart and Donnelly, see Goodhart (2008) and Donnelly (2008) for 
further details.   
129 In Donnelly (2007), Donnelly says that “The tone of this essay owes much to a long conversation 
with Daniel Bell and Joseph Chan in Japan nearly a decade ago. I thank them for the sort of deep 
engagement of fundamental differences that represents one of the best and most exhilarating features 




least, Donnelly needs a further explanation on why the concept or substance of human 
rights is universal.  
Such a further explanation can be found in another reply to Bell in Donnelly 
(2007). No matter whether Donnelly describes Rawls’ ideas accurately, Donnelly 
wants to argue that “human rights can be grounded in a variety of comprehensive 
doctrines… Over the past few decades more and more adherents of a growing range 
of comprehensive doctrines in all regions of the world have come to endorse human 
rights—(but only) as a political conception of justice” (Donnelly, 2007, p. 290). That 
is, his aim is to show that comprehensive doctrines in different cultures have an 
overlapping consensus on the list of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e., 
the concept or substance of human rights). He also realizes that some values in 
different cultures may be incompatible to human rights or may even reject human 
rights. But he also reminds us that “virtually all Western religious and philosophical 
doctrines through most of their history have either rejected or ignored human rights”
(Donnelly, 2007, p. 290), but now human rights are accepted in the West. He thinks 
that other cultures may also be in a similar situation. For example, he writes: “Asian 
values—like Western values, African values, and most other sets of values—can be, 
and have been, understood as incompatible with human rights. But they also can be 
and have been interpreted to support human rights, as they regularly are today in 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. And political developments in a growing number of 
Asian countries suggest that ordinary people and even governments are increasingly 
viewing human rights as a contemporary political expression of their deepest ethical, 




words, he thinks that Asian values either are being changed or can be changed, and so 
he thinks that human rights are more and more acceptable in East Asia.  
It seems that this reply from Donnelly is better than his other replies because 
Donnelly realizes that although values in some cultures conflict with human rights, 
those values can be changed. Thus, he thinks that now more and more 
“comprehensive doctrines” in different cultures have an “overlapping consensus” on 
human rights. All of these points have at least partially responded to the challenge 
that his argument is too West-centric. However, this reply still has several weaknesses. 
One weakness is that it is not clear what Asia values (or values in other cultures) can 
be changed and what values cannot be changed. Bell would probably argue that when 
Asian values conflict with human rights, we should accept Asian values and deny 
human rights. Since Bell considers that some human rights (such as liberal rights) are 
only Western rights, he would probably argue that changing Asian values for these 
rights is still too West-centric. At least, Donnelly needs a better explanation here. In 
other words, Donnelly needs to explain further how and why some Asian values can 
be changed when they conflict with human rights. Another weakness is that Donnelly 
has not explained further what those “comprehensive doctrines” are; he also has not
explained further how they have an “overlapping consensus “on human rights 
(especially on liberal rights).130 Furthermore, it is not clear why using these notions 
(comprehensive doctrines, overlapping consensus, etc.) can make his approach not 
                                                
130 As I said before, Donnelly also claims that equal concern and respect is also a political conception 
of justice. For example, he argues that “equal concern and respect, understood as a political conception 
of justice, can be endorsed by a variety of comprehensive doctrines.” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 46). It is hard 
to tell whether he actually thinks that Dworkin’s equal concern and respect is a comprehensive 
doctrine or a political conception of justice. It is also quite unclear how these notions are related to 





West-centric. It is also quite controversial for Donnelly to argue that different cultures 
have an overlapping consensus on the whole list of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. As far as we know, the list is even controversial in the Western 
cultures.131 With all of these weaknesses, it is hard to say that Donnelly has 
successfully replied to Bell’s cultural challenge.  
All replies from Donnelly to Bell appear to have some problems. In other 
words, Donnelly’s original argument and his replies cannot refute Bell’s cultural 
challenge. But it does not mean that Donnelly has to agree with Bell and give up his 
whole position. I suggest that Donnelly may use my arguments (Argument 4 to 
Argument 7) to reply to Bell’s challenge. Donnelly can generally accept my 
arguments, and I see no reason why he needs to reject any premise of my arguments. 
Moreover, Donnelly also agrees with my conclusions, i.e., physical securities and 
liberties are human rights. He agrees with these conclusions because physical security 
rights and liberal rights are also in the list of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Since Donnelly wants to argue for the whole list in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, his conclusion has a longer list of rights than I have argued in this 
dissertation. For example, he also supports social and economic rights, but I have not 
discussed any of these rights in this dissertation. He also argues for universal, equal 
and inalienable human rights, but my dissertation only focuses on universal rights. 
What Donnelly argues is more than what my arguments have shown, but at least my 
                                                




arguments can support a part of his position, i.e., physical securities and liberties are 
universal rights.132 
More importantly, my arguments can reply to the cultural challenge. I have 
explained why physical securities and liberties are minimal moral demands, nd I 
have also explained how these minimal moral demands can be found or developed in 
some maximal theories in East Asian cultures. As I have argued in the last sction, it 
is not necessary to require a consensus among cultures. All I ask is a possibility to 
find or develop those minimal moral demands in only some maximal theories of a 
culture. Since physical securities and liberties are minimal values, other Asian values 
that conflict with them should be given up. In a word, my arguments explain why 
physical securities and liberties are human rights, and they also explain that some 
Asian values (i.e., the practical Confucian tradition) can be changed or denied.  
Therefore, it seems to me that we may use my arguments to help Donnelly 
reply to Bell’s challenge. Although Donnelly’s replies cannot refute Bell’s challenge, 
my arguments can refute Bell’s challenge. In addition, my arguments ca support a 
part of Donnelly’s position, which is that physical securities and liberties are 
universal rights. In other words, my arguments show that it is not really West-centric 
to claim that physical securities and liberties are human rights. This conclusion saves 
at least a part of Donnelly’s position.  
 
 
                                                
132 It may be possible to expand my arguments to support social and economic rights and equal and 
inalienable rights, but this is out of the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, I leave them here and not 




Section 5.4 Beyond These Debates? 
 In the previous sections, I have discussed in detail how my arguments can 
contribute to the debate between Bell and Taylor and the debate between Bell and 
Donnelly. There are still many other debates of human rights, and I cannot describe 
all of them in this dissertation. But I want to summarize some important points of my 
arguments. In this section, I explain generally how my arguments can contribute o 
other approaches to human rights which also support that physical securities and 
liberties are human rights.  
Let me review some important features of my arguments. Arguments 4 to 7 
provide some jointly sufficient conditions for physical securities and liberties being 
East Asian rights and universal rights (human rights). In other words, if physical 
securities or liberties meet all of the premises of the arguments, then they are East 
Asian rights or universal rights. Let me uses Argument 7 to illustrate such a view. 
Argument 7 tells us that if liberties meet all of the premises, then liberties are 
universal rights. The premises of Argument 7 are a jointly sufficient condition for 
liberties being universal rights. But Argument 7 does not say that its premises are also 
necessary conditions.133 In other words, Argument 7 does not say that if liberties are 
universal rights, then liberties meet all of these premises. The argument does ot t ll 
us whether liberties are or are not universal rights if liberties do not meet on  or more 
of these premises. In this sense, the premises of these arguments are only “positive
conditions” (i.e., if liberties meet all of them, then liberties are universal rights) but 
                                                
133 I do not exclude the possibility that some of these premises are also necessary conditions. But the 
argument itself does not tell us whether any of these premises is a necessary condition; the argument 




not “negative conditions” (i.e., if liberties do not meet any of them, then liberties ae 
not universal rights). This means that Argument 7 is neither a complete theory nor a 
complete justification to universal rights. Indeed, constructing a theory or a complete 
justification is not a purpose of my project. The argument is only one way to show 
that liberties are universal rights, but it does not exclude the possibility that there are 
also other ways to prove that liberties are universal rights. In other words, Argument 
7 does not exclude the possibility that there are other necessary or sufficient 
conditions for liberties to be universal rights, unless the other conditions exclude my 
way to show that liberties are universal rights.134   
Of course, it does not mean that my arguments are compatible with every 
approach to human rights. Indeed, the main purpose of these arguments is to refute 
Bell’s approach to human rights. Bell and others believe that cultural factors sh uld 
be “limiting the set of human rights” (e.g., Bell, 2006a, p. 73). More precisely, Bl 
and others believe that liberties are not universal rights because liberties conflict with 
some East Asian cultural factors. The general reasoning behind their view is that 
conflicting with some cultural factors is a sufficient condition for X not being a 
universal right. In other words, if X conflicts with some cultural factors, then X is not 
a universal right. By the logic rule of contraposition, non-conflict with cultural factors 
is a necessary condition for X being a universal right. However, such a view is 
refuted by my arguments. My arguments have shown that when X (physical securities 
or liberties) fulfill all premises of my arguments, then it is already sufficient for X 
                                                
134Based on the same reasoning, Argument 4 is only one way to show that physical securities are East 
Asian rights; Argument 5 is only one way to show that physical securities are universal rights; and 
Argument 6 is only one way to show that liberties are East Asian rights. These arguments do not 




being a universal right. If X is a universal right, but X conflicts with some cultural 
factors, then non-conflicting with cultural factors is not a necessary condition for X 
being a universal right. This explains why physical securities and liberties are 
universal rights, even though physical securities and liberties conflict with some
cultural factors (such as the practical Confucian tradition).  
We now find that my arguments do not deny other ways which also show that 
physical securities and liberties are universal rights (unless the other ways deny my 
arguments), but my arguments show that it does not matter whether physical 
securities and liberties conflict with some cultural factors. In general, this means that 
my arguments have the following important function. There are many different 
approaches to human rights. Some of them are not directly related to or do not 
concern the East and West debate on human rights. But, it is not hard to imagine that 
Bell or others would argue that those approaches are too West-centric as well. The 
main function of my arguments is that if my arguments and these approaches to 
human rights are compatible, then at least these approaches do not need to concern 
whether their approaches are too West-centric. Let me use two recent approaches t  
human rights to illustrate my view here.  
Recently, James Griffin (2008) and Charles Beitz (2009) have developed two 
different approaches to human rights. Let me discuss Griffin’s approach first. As I 
mentioned earlier (chapter 3, section 3.4), one of the human rights traditions is that 
human rights are somehow derived from dignity. Griffin also follows this tradition, 
and he tries to interpret dignity further. He thinks that there are two grounds for hi




interpreted as “personhood”, which is further interpreted as “normative agency” 
(Griffin, 2008, pp. 29-367). He also divides “normative agency” into three 
components: “autonomy” (Griffin, 2008, pp.149-158), “liberty” (Griffin, 2008, pp. 
159-175), and “minimum provision” (Griffin, 2008, pp. 176-187). Based on some 
practical considerations (i.e., “practicalities”, see Griffin, 2008, pp. 37-39), human 
rights are justified by this account. In his own words, “Human rights can then be seen 
as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our personhood” (Griffin, 
2008, p. 33). According to such an account, human rights are universal because “they 
are possessed by human agents simply in virtue of their normative agency” (Griffin, 
2008, p. 48).  
Beitz thinks that Griffin’s account is a naturalistic account, which holds that 
“human rights belong to human beings ‘as such’ or ‘simply in virtue of their 
humanity’” (Beitz, 2009, p. 49). Beitz disagrees with such an approach.135  Instead, he 
argues for a “practical” approach that is grounded on the international order. He 
writes, “A practical conception takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we 
find them in international political life as the source materials for constructing a 
conception of human rights. It understands questions about the nature and content of 
human rights to refer to objects of the sort called ‘human rights’ in international 
practice” (Beitz, 2009, p. 102). According to this account, human rights are universal 
because human rights are based on the international politics and international order.136  
Since the purpose here is not to discuss or compare these approaches, I am not 
going to discuss or compare them in detail. Let me focus on how they meet the 
                                                
135 For Beitz’s comment on Griffin’s account, see Beitz (2009), pp. 59-68.  




cultural challenge, such as the one from Bell. None of these approaches is directly 
relevant to the East and West debate on human rights, but both of them can be treated 
as too West-centric. Griffin thinks that human rights are justified by his personhood 
account, and Beitz thinks that human rights are justified by international political life. 
Both of them do not concern East Asian cultures. Griffin’s explanation on 
personhood is based on Western moral and political philosophy (e.g., Kant’s 
philosophy). Beitz’s international political account is also West-centric because the 
international political status he describes is mainly shaped by the Western world. For 
example, he argues that the norms of human rights he wants to argue for “are 
expressed in the main international human rights instruments—the Universal 
Declaration of 1948 and the major treaties intended to give legal effect to its 
provisions” (Beitz, 2009, p. 8). But this is exactly what Bell and others argue 
against—they think that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also West-
centric. For example, Bell argues that “Since the UDHR [i.e., the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights] was formulated without significant input from East 
Asia, it is not always clear to East Asians why the UDHR should constitute ‘our’ 
human rights norms … Although the UDHR is normatively binding, most East Asian 
states endorsed it for pragmatic, political reasons and not because of a deeply held 
commitment to the human rights norms it contains” (Bell, 2006a, p. 68).137 In a word, 
the approaches from Griffin and Beitz would both be considered as West-centric 
approaches. This is a cultural challenge to Griffin and Beitz.  
                                                
137 Bell realizes that a Chinese representative might have contribute to the idea of the article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but Bell thinks that this is not enough to show that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a Western product. See Bell (2006a), p. 68n4 . See also 
Twiss (1998, p. 41) for the detail of how East Asian  contribute to the Universal Declaration of 




Griffin and Beitz may be able to reply to such a challenge by their own 
arguments, and there may be more than one way to reply to this cultural challenge, 
but the focus here is what my arguments can do for them. For the purpose here, let us 
assume that their approaches can accept my arguments. If my arguments are 
compatible with their approaches, then these approaches can definitely reply to the 
cultural challenge successfully and easily. The key point is that my arguments accept 
other approaches which also show that physical securities and liberties are human
rights. If their approaches also accept other arguments such as mine, then they do not 
need to worry the cultural challenge. This is because my arguments have alredy 
successfully refuted such a challenge. In general, this means that any approach to 
human rights that can accept my arguments can refute the cultural challenge easily. 
I admit that what I am saying here is simply an abstract and general solution, 
and I have not discussed whether my arguments are compatible with Griffin’s and 
Beitz’s approaches (this is another topic and beyond of the scope of the East and 
West debate on human rights). But my purpose here is not to discuss the detail of 
these approaches. I simply want to illustrate how my arguments in general can hep 
other approaches to human rights. In conclusion, since my arguments can allow other 
ways to show that physical securities and liberties are human rights, and my 
arguments refute the cultural challenge, any approach to human rights that can accept 
my arguments can also refute the cultural challenge easily. This is another 







Section 5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have explained some applications of my arguments (i.e., 
Argument 4 to Argument 7). The general idea is that my arguments can contribute to 
some approaches to human rights in the East and West debate on human rights. I have 
discussed in detail what my arguments can do to the debate between Bell and Taylor 
and the debate between Bell and Donnelly. I have discussed why their original 
approaches cannot successfully reply to Bell’s cultural challenge, and how my 
arguments can help them to refute Bell’s challenge. I have also summarized some 
special features of my arguments, and then I have explained how my arguments in 
general may help other approaches to human rights. All of these points have 
concluded the applications and contributions of my arguments in the East and West 







Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
 In this dissertation, I have developed arguments which explain why physical 
securities and liberties are East Asian rights and (universal) human rights. Since “the 
East Asian challenge to human rights” claims that liberties are not human rights 
because they are not East Asian rights, my arguments also successfully refute th  East 
Asian challenge to human rights.  
Although the East Asian challenge to human rights has some problems, this 
does not mean that it is not worthwhile to discuss it. On one side, most philosophers 
of human rights in the English-speaking world do not pay attention to East Asian 
culture or Asian philosophy. Even Walzer or other “communitarians” do not discuss 
Asian philosophy very deeply. On the other side, philosophers in East Asia usually 
focus solely on the contents of East Asian cultures, but they seldom explain clearly 
how East Asian cultures are related to human rights. Daniel Bell’s East Asian
challenge to human rights is significant because he explains comparatively clear
how East Asian cultural contexts seem to show that liberal rights are not human rights. 
In this sense, it is worth discussing the East Asian challenge to human rights in detail. 
This is why I have discussed Bell’s arguments in chapter 2 in depth. I have discussed 
that his arguments show us not only how cultures abstractly affect the justification of 
rights, but also how liberties seem to conflict with values in Asia. He concludes that 
physical securities are human rights (and hence also East Asian rights) because they 
are minimal values, and liberties are not East Asian rights (and hence not human 




Bell’s arguments of physical securities and liberties are quite special, but Bell 
has not successfully defended his arguments and conclusions. I agree that physicl
securities are human rights (and hence also East Asian rights) because they ar  
minimal values, but I do not agree that liberties are not human rights (and hence not 
East Asian rights) because liberties conflict with some East Asian cultural contexts. 
In chapters 3 and 4, I have developed my own arguments to support my view. In 
chapter 3, I have discussed the notions of minimal values in depth and have 
developed two arguments which show that physical security rights are East Asian 
rights and universal rights. In other words, the premises of these arguments are jointly 
sufficient conditions for physical securities being East Asian rights and universal 
rights. In chapter 4, I have applied a similar reasoning to liberties. I have argu d that 
liberties are essential necessities of dignity, and I have also argued that liberties do 
not conflict with all East Asian cultural contexts. Then I have developed two other 
arguments which show that liberties are East Asian rights and universal rights. Based 
on these arguments, I have proved that Bell is mistaken to claim that liberties are not 
universal rights because they are not East Asian rights.  
 In chapter 5, I have discussed the contributions of my arguments to the debate 
between Bell and Taylor and the debate between Bell and Donnelly. In general, I 
have also explained how my arguments may help other approaches to human rights. 
This explains how my arguments contribute to the East and West debate on human 
rights.  
 As I have mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, there are many East 




whether physical securities and liberties are human rights. But in addition to this
debate, the East and the West also have many other debates on human rights. Let me 
mention three of them here. First, I have only provided some jointly sufficient 
conditions for physical securities and liberties being human rights, but one may 
wonder what the necessary conditions are for physical securities and liberties ing 
human rights. Second, while my dissertation only focuses on civil and political rights, 
some may also wonder whether both the East and the West agree that social and 
economic rights (such as property rights, subsistence rights, etc.) are human rights or 
not. Indeed, Bell has also discussed property rights (e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp. 231-280) 
and subsistence rights (e.g., Bell, 2006a, p. 64, pp. 76-78), but I have not discussed 
his view on these rights in this dissertation. Third, some people think that the East and 
the West have different priorities on different rights. For example, Bell argues that in 
the East, social and economic rights have a higher priority than civil and political 
rights (e.g., Bell, 2006a, pp. 55-62). Such a debate does not focus on which rights are 
human rights and which rights are not human rights; it focuses on which rights are 
more important and why they are more important.  
Although my dissertation does not discuss any of these three debates directly, 
it is possible that my arguments in this dissertation can be used in these debates. For 
example, one may argue that some of the premises in my arguments are also 
necessary conditions for physical securities and liberties being human rights. Based 
on the same reasoning of my arguments for physical security rights and liberal rights, 
one may also argue that property rights or subsistence rights are also human rights. 




all minimal values. All of these debates are possible research topics that I look 
forward to continuing in the future.  
This dissertation can be considered as a first attempt at constructing a theory 
or a complete justification of human rights. This dissertation can also be considered 
as a first step to solve different East and West debates on human rights. There 
remains much to be done before a theory of human rights is fully developed.  I leave 









Chan, Joseph 陳祖為 
Chan Wing-Tsit 陳榮捷 
Chang, Carson 張君勱  




Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 
Fung Yu-Lan 馮友蘭 
Han dynasty 漢朝 
He Xinquan 何信全 
Hou Hanshu 後漢書 
Hsieh Yu-wei 謝幼偉 
Hsu Foo-kwan 徐復觀 
Hsü, Leonard Shihlien 許仕廉 
Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 
Jie 桀 




King Wu 武王 
King Zhou 紂王 
Lee Kuan Yew 李光耀 
Li 禮 
Li Xiaorong 李曉蓉 
Lingchi 凌遲 
Liu Shiu Pei 劉師培 
Liu Shu-Hsien 劉述先 
Mao Zedong 毛澤東 
Mencius 孟子 
Mou Chung-san 牟宗三 
Qin dynasty 秦朝 
Quanli 權利 
Ren 仁 
Shun Kwong-Loi 信廣來 
Song-Ming Confucianism 宋明儒學 
Tang 湯 
T'ang Chun-I 唐君毅 
Tu Weiming 杜維明 
Wong, David 黃百銳 



















Ackerly, Brooke (2005). Is Liberalism the Only Way toward Democracy? 
Confucianism and Democracy. Political Theory, 33 (no.4, August): 547-576. 
 
Ames, Roger (1988). Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative. In Human Rights 
and the World's Religions, Leroy S. Rouner (Ed.). Notre Dame, University of 
Notre Dame Press: 199-216. 
 
Angle, Stephen (2002). Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural 
Inquiry. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Angle, Stephen and Svensson, Marina (2001). Chinese Human Rights Web. Retrieved 
September 27, 2010, from http://www.chinesehumanrightsreader.org. 
 
Angle, Stephen and Svensson, Marina (Eds.). (2002). The Chinese Human Rights 
Reader: Documents and Commentary, 1900-2000. East Gate Book. 
 
An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed (Ed.). (1995). Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed (1999). The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: The 
Al-Arqam Case in Malaysia. In The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 
J. R. Bauer and D. Bell (Ed.). New York, Cambridge University Press: 147-
168. 
 
Avonius, Leena and Kingsbury, Damien (Eds.). (2008). Human Rights in Asia: A 
Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Barry, Brian (1995). Justice as Impartiality. Oxford University Press. 
 
Bauer, Joanne and Bell, Daniel (Eds.). (1999). The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Beitz, Charles (2001). Human Rights as a Common Concern. American Political 
Science Review, 95: 269-282. 
 
Beitz, Charles (2009). The Idea of Human Rights. New York, U.S.A.: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1993). Communitarianism and Its Critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1995). Democracy in Confucian Societies: The Challenge of 




David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Jones (Eds.). St. Martin's 
Press: 17-40. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1996). The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an 
East West Dialogue. Human Rights Quarterly, 18: 660-667. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1998a). Asian Communitarianism. In Confucian Democracy, Why & 
How, Hahm Chaibong, Hahm Chaihark and David Hall (Eds.). Korea, 
Kyŏnggi-do Koyang-si : Chŏnt'ong kwa Hyŏndae. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1998b). The Limits of Liberal Justice. Political Theory, 26 (4): 557-582. 
 
Bell, Daniel (1999). Which Rights Are Universal? Political Theory, 27 (6): 849-856. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2000). East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2004). Communitarian Philosophy and East Asian Politics. In 
Communitarian Politics in Asia, Chua Beng Huat (Ed.). New York, 
Routledge: 25-45. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2006a). Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East 
Asian Context. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2006b). East Asia and the West: The Impact of Confucianism on Anglo-
American Political Theory. In Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, John 
Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (Eds.). Oxford University Press: 
262-280. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2008). China's New Confucianism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2009). Communitarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved April 3, 2011, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/communitarianism/. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2010a). Reconciling Socialism and Confucianism? Reviving Tradition 
in China. Dissent, Winter 2010: 91-99. 
 
Bell, Daniel (2010b). Daniel A. Bell Replies. Dissent, Winter 2010: 101-102. 
 
Bell, Daniel (Ed.). (2007). Confucian Political Ethics. Princeton University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel, Brown, David, Jayasuriya, Kanishka and Jones, David (Eds.). (1995). 





Bell, Daniel and Chaibong, Hahm (Eds.). (2003). Confucianism for the Modern 
World. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bell, Daniel and Coicaud, Jean-Marc (Eds.). (2007). Ethics in Action: The Ethical 
Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Benedict, Ruth (1934). Patterns of Culture. Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah (1969/1997). Two Concepts of Liberty. In The Proper Study of 
Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux: 197-
242. 
 
Bloom, Irene (1999). Mencius and Human Rights. In Confucianism and Human 
Rights, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (Eds.). New York, Columbia 
University Press: 94-116. 
 
Brandt, Richard (1967). Ethical Relativism. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul 
Edwards (Ed.). NY, Macmillan. Volume 3. 
 
Brook, Timothy, Bourgon, Jerome and Blue, Gregory (2008). Death by a Thousand 
Cuts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Buchanan, Allen (1989). Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism. 
Ethics, 99: 852-882. 
 
Buchanan, Allen (2004). Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Buchanan, Allen (2006). Taking the Human out of Human Rights. In Rawls's Law of 
Peoples, Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Eds.). Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Caney, Simon (2005). Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Chan, Joseph (1995a). The Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights: A 
Philosophical Appraisal. In Human Rights and International Relations in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, James T. H. Tang (Ed.). London, Pinter: 25-38. 
 
Chan, Joseph (1995b). Raz on Liberal Rights and Common Goods. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 15 (1): 15-31. 
 
Chan, Joseph (1998). Asian Values & Human Rights: An Alternative View. In 
Democracy in East Asia, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Eds.). 





Chan, Joseph (1999). A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary 
China. In The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Joanne Bauer and 
Daniel Bell (Eds.). Cambridge University Press: 212-240. 
 
Chan, Joseph (2000). Thick and Thin Accounts of Human Rights. In Human Rights 
and Asian Values, Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (Eds.). Curzon Press: 59-
74. 
 
Chan, Joseph (2002). Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism. 
Philosophy East and West, 52 (3): 281-310. 
 
Chan, Joseph (2007). Democracy and Meritocracy: Toward a Confucian Perspective. 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 34 (2): 179-193. 
 
Chan, Joseph (2009). Is There a Confucian Perspective on Social Justice? In Western 
Political Thought in Dialogue with Asia, Takashi Shogimen and Cary 
Nederman (Eds.). United Kingdom, Lexington Books: 261-277. 
 
Chan, Wing-Tsit (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Chang, Carson, Hsieh, Yu-wei, Hsu, Foo-kwan, Mou, Chung-san and T'ang, Chun-i 
(1958). A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture. Reprinted in 
Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Chun-i T'ang,1988). Taiwan, 
Student Book Co., Ltd: 492-562. 
 
Charney, Evan (1999). Cultural Interpretation and Universal Human Rights. Political 
Theory, 27 (6): 840-848. 
 
China, People's Republic of (1991). Human Rights in China. Retrieved September 27, 
2010, from http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm. 
 
China, People's Republic of (2000). Fifty Years of Progress in China's Human Rights. 
Retrieved September 27, 2010, from http://www.china.org.cn/e-
white/3/index.htm. 
 
China, People's Republic of (2004). China's Progress in Human Rights in 2004. 
Retrieved September 27, 2010, from http://china.org.cn/e-
white/20050418/index.htm. 
 
China, People's Republic of (2005). Building of Political Democracy in China. 
Retrieved September 27, 2010, from 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Oct/145718.htm. 
 
China, People's Republic of (2009). China's Progress in Human Rights in 2009. 






Ci, Jewei (2005). Taking the Reasons for Human Rights Seriously. Political Theory, 
33 (2): 243-265. 
 
Cohen, Andrew and Wellman, Christopher (Eds.). (2005). Contemporary Debates in 
Applied Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Cohen, Joshua (2004). Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope 
For? Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (2): 190-213. 
 
Confucius (1992). The Analects. (D.C. Lau, Translator). Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press. 
 
Conner, Alison (1999). Confucianism and Due Process. In Confucianism and Human 
Rights, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (Eds.). New York, Columbia 
University Press: 179-192. 
 




Dallmayr, Fred (2002). 'Asian Values' and Global Human Rights. Philosophy East 
and West, 52 (2): 173-189. 
 
Davis, Michael (Ed.). (1995). Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, 
Philosophical, and Political Perspectives. Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
de Bary, Wm. Theodore (1983). The Liberal Tradition in China. Chinese University 
Press. 
 
de Bary, Wm. Theodore (1985). Confucian Liberalism and Western Parochialism: A 
Response to Paul A. Cohen. Philosophy East and West, 35 (4): 399-412. 
 
de Bary, Wm. Theodore (1998a). Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian 
Communitarian Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
de Bary, Wm. Theodore (1998b). Confucianism and Human Rights in China. In 
Democracy in East Asia, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Eds.). Baltimore, 
Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press: 42-54. 
 
de Bary, Wm. Theodore and Tu, Weiming (Eds.). (1998). Confucianism and Human 
Rights. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 




Community Values. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Donnelly, Jack (1989). Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Donnelly, Jack (1999). Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense Of "Western" 
Universalism. In The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Joanne Bauer 
and Daniel Bell (Eds.). Cambridge University Press: 60-87. 
 
Donnelly, Jack (2003). Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Donnelly, Jack (2007). The Relative Universality of Human Rights. Human Rights 
Quarterly, 29: 281-306. 
 
Donnelly, Jack (2008). Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (a Reply to 
Michael Goodhart). Human Rights Quarterly, 30: 194-204. 
 
Doyle, Michael (1983a). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (Part 1). 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (3 summer): 205-235. 
 
Doyle, Michael (1983b). Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (Part 2). 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (4 Autumn): 323-353. 
 
Doyle, Michael (1997). Ways of War and Peace. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald (1977). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald (2002). Taking Rights Seriously in Beijing. The New York Review 
of Books, 49 (14). 
 
Finkelman, Paul and Miller, Joseph (Eds.). (1998). Macmillan Encyclopedia of World 
Slavery. MacMillan  
 
Fitzgerald, John (1999). China and the Quest for Dignity. The National Interest, 55 
(Spring 1999): 47-59. 
 
Fung, Yu-Lan (1948). A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: The Free 
Press. 
 
Gardels, Nathan (1992). Interview with Lee Kuan Yew. New Perspective Quarterly, 9 
(1). 
 




Journal on Human Rights and the Law, 1: 9-52. 
 
Goodhart, Michael (2008). Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly. 
Human Rights Quarterly, 30: 183-193. 
 
Gowans, Chris (2004). Moral Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved April 3, 2011, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/moral-relativism/. 
 
Griffin, James (2008). On Human Rights. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hansen, Chad (1985a). Individualism in Chinese Thought. In Individualism and 
Holism, Donald Munro (Ed.). Ann Arbor, Michigan, Center of Chinese 
Studies, University of Michigan: 35-55. 
 
Hansen, Chad (2004). The Normative Impact of Comparative Ethics: Human Rights. 
In Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and 
Community, Kwong-Loi Shun and David Wong (Eds.). Cambridge University 
Press: 72-99. 
 
Hansen, Chad (1985b). Punishment and Dignity in China. In Individualism and 
Holism, Donald Munro (Ed.). Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan. 
 
He, Xinquan (1996). Ru Xue Yu Xian Dai Min Zhu: Dang Dai Xin Rujia Zheng Zhi 
Zhe Xue Yan Jiu [Confucianism and the Contemporary Democracy: A 
Research on the Political Philosophy of Neo-Confucianism]. Taiwan: Zhong 
yang yan jiu yuan Zhongguo wen zhe yan jiu suo chou bei chu [In Chinese: 儒
學與現代民主: 當代新儒家政治哲學研究 / 何信全著. 中央研究院中國文
哲研究所籌備處]. 
 
Henkin, Louis (1986). The Human Rights Idea in Contemporary China: A 
Comparative Perspective. In Human Rights in Contemporary China, Randle 
Edwards, Louis Henkin and Andrew Nathan (Eds.). New York, Columbia 
University Press: 7-39. 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley (1919). Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Hsü, Leonard Shihlien (1932). The Political Philosophy of Confucianism. New York: 
E.P. Button & Co. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael (2001). Human Rights as Politics and as Idolatry. New York: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Ihara, Craig (2004). Are Individual Rights Necessary? A Confucian Perspective. In 




Kwong-Loi Shun and David Wong (Eds.). Cambridge University Press: 11-
30. 
 
Jacobsen, Michael and Bruun, Ole (Eds.). (2000). Human Rights and Asian Values: 
Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia. Curzon 
Press. 
 
Kant, Immanuel (1795/2006). Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on 
Politics, Peace, and History. Yale University Press. 
 
Kim, Dae Jung (1994). Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic 
Values. Foreign Affairs, 73 (6 Nov/Dec): 189-194. 
 
Kymlicka, Will (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Langlois, Anthony (2001). The Politics of Justice and Human Rights. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lee, Seung-Hwan (1992). Was There a Concept of Rights in Confucian Virtue-Based 
Morality? Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 19: 241-261. 
 
Lee, Seung-Hwan (1996). Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues? Philosophy East 
and West, 46 (3): 367-379. 
 
Li, Xiaorong (2000). The East Is East, Silly (Book Review of East Meets West by 




Li, Xiaorong (2006). Ethics, Human Rights and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press. 
 
Liu, Shu-Hsien (1998). Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-
Ming. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Liu, Shu-Hsien (2003). Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy. 
Praeger Publishers. 
 
Liu, Shu-Hsien (2007). Democratic Ideal and Practice: A Critical Reflection. Journal 
of Chinese Philosophy, 34 (2): 257-275. 
 





MacIntyre, Alasdair (1989). Whose Justice? Which Rationality? University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1991). Letter. The Responsive Community, Summer (1991). 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair (2007). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (3rd Edition). 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Macleod, Alistair (2006). Rawls's Narrow Doctrine of Human Rights. In Rawls's Law 
of Peoples, Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (Eds.). Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Martin, Rex and Reidy, David A. (Eds.). (2006). Rawls's Law of Peoples. Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Mencius (2003). Mencius. (D.C. Lau, Translator). Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press. 
 
Mill, John Stuart (1859/2002). On Liberty New York, U.S.A.: Dover Publications, 
Inc. 
 
New York Times (2007, April 5). Man Who Insulted King Pardoned.  Retrieved 










Nickel, James (2007). Making Sense of Human Rights. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, Inc. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha (2000). Women and Human Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Orend, Brian (2000). Michael Walzer on War and Justice. McGill-Gueen's University 
Press. 
 
Orend, Brian (2002). Human Rights: Concept and Context. Peterborought, Ontario, 
Canada: Broadview Press Ltd. 
 




Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig (Ed.). New York, Routledge. 5: 
442-454. 
 
Peerenboom, Randall (1999). Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought. In 
Confucianism and Human Rights, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu 
(Eds.). New York, Columbia University Press: 234-260. 
 
Pogge, Thomas (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights. Polity Press. 
 
Rainblot, George (2006). The Concept of Rights. Netherlands: Springer. 
 
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. 
 
Rawls, John (1993). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press. 
 
Rawls, John (1999). The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press. 
 
Raz, Joseph (1986). The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Raz, Joseph (1992). Rights and Individual Well-Being. Ratio Furis, 5 (2): 127-142. 
 
Raz, Joseph (2010). Human Rights without Foundations. In The Philosophy of 
International Law, Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Eds.). Oxford 
University Press: 321-337. 
 
Rodriguez, Junius P. (Ed.). (1997). The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery. 
Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. 
 
Rorty, Richard (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers 
Volume 1. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rosemont, Henry Jr. (1988). Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique. In 
Human Rights and the World's Religions, Leroy S. Rouner (Ed.). Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press: 167-182. 
 
Rosemont, Henry Jr. (1991). A Chinese Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political 
Economy and Society. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. 
 
Rosemont, Henry Jr. (1998). Human Rights: A Bill of Worries. In Confucianism and 
Human Rights, Wm. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (Eds.). New York, 
Columbia University Press: 54-66. 
 
Rosemont, Henry Jr. (2004). Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian 
Critique of Modern Western Liberalism. In Confucian Ethics: A Comparative 
Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, Shun and Wong (Eds.). Cambridge 





Rosemont, Henry Jr. (2007). Civil Society, Government, and Confucianism: A 
Commentary. In Confucian Political Ethics, Daniel Bell (Ed.). Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
 
Sandel, Michael (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2nd Edition). 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schram, Stuart R. (Ed.). (1974). Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters, 
1956-1971. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
 
Sen, Amartya (1997). Human Rights and Asian Values. Sixteenth Morgenthau 
Memorial Lecture. New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International 
Affairs, Published in a shortened form in The New Republic, 14-21 July 1997. 
 
Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. 
 
Sen, Amartya (2004). Elements of a Theory of Human Rights. P ilosophy and Public 
Affairs, 32 (4): 315-356. 
 
Shue, Henry (1996). Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Shun, Kwong-Loi and Wong, David (Eds.). (2004). Confucian Ethics: A Comparative 
Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sumner, Leonard Wayne (1987). The Moral Foundation of Rights U.S.A.: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Svensson, Marina (2002). Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and 
Political History. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
Talbott, William (2005). Which Rights Should Be Universal? Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Tan, Sor-hoon (2004). Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction. State 
University of New York Press. 
 
Tan, Sor-hoon (2010). Confucianism and Democracy. In Co fucianism in Context: 
Classic Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, East Asia and Beyond, W suk 
Chang and Leah Kalmanson (Eds.). State University of New York Press: 103-
120. 
 
T'ang, Chun-I (1974). Ren Wen Jing Shen Zhi Zhong Jian [the Reconstruction of 






T'ang, Chun-I (1988). Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Taiwan: Student 
Book Co., Ltd. 
 
Taylor, Charles (1979). What's Wrong with Negative Liberty. In The Idea of 
Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, Alan Ryan (Ed.). Oxford 
University Press: 175-193. 
 
Taylor, Charles (1999). Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights. In 
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell 
(Eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press: 124-144. 
 
Twiss, Sumner (1998). A Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and 
Human Rights. In Confucianism and Human Rights, Wm. Theodore de Bary 
and Weiming Tu (Eds.). New York, Columbia University Press: 27-53. 
 
United Nations (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved September 
27, 2010, from http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
 
United Nations (1966a). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Retrieved September 27, 2010, from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. 
 
United Nations (1966b). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Retrieved September 27, 2010, from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
 
United Nations (1993a). Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Retrieved 




United Nations (1993b). Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights. See Davis (1995), 
pp. 205-209. 
 
Van Norden, Bryan (2007). Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese 
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press  
 
Walzer, Michael (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Walzer, Michael (1983). Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. 
Blackwell. 
 
Walzer, Michael (1987). Interpretation and Social Criticism: The Tanner Lectures on 





Walzer, Michael (1994). Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Walzer, Michael (1995). Response. In Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, Michael 
Walzer and David Miller (Eds.). Oxford, Oxford University Press: 281-298. 
 
Walzer, Michael (2007). Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights in Global 
Society. In Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, David Miller 
(Ed.). N.Y., Yale University Press: 251-263. 
 
Walzer, Michael (2010). Michael Walzer Responds. Di sent, Winter 2010: 100-101. 
 
Wan, Ming (2008). The Political Economy of East Asia. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Wenar, Leif (2010). Rights. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 
April 2, 2011, from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights. 
 
Wong, David (1984). Moral Relativity. Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press. 
 
Wong, David (2004). Rights and Community in Confucianism. In Co fucian Ethics: 
A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, Kwong-Loi Shun 
and David Wong (Eds.). Cambridge University Press: 31-48. 
 
Wong, David (2006). Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Wong, Xi (1998). China. In Macmillan Encyclopedia of World Slavery, Paul 
Finkelman and Jospeh Miller (Eds.). 1: 179-180. 
 
Woo, Peter K.Y. (1980). A Metaphysical Approach to Human Rights from a Chinese 
Point of View. In The Philosophy of Human Rights: International 
Perspectives, Alan Rosenbaum (Ed.). Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood 
Press: 113-124. 
 
Yasuaki, Onuma (1999). Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights. In 
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell 
(Eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press: 103-123. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed (1994). Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. 
Foreign Affairs, 73 (2, March/April): 109-126. 
